Essays on Experimental Investigation of Lottery Contests by Sheremeta, Roman
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Essays on Experimental Investigation of
Lottery Contests
Roman Sheremeta
August 2009
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/49888/
MPRA Paper No. 49888, posted 18. September 2013 06:55 UTC
 
 
 
ESSAYS ON EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION OF LOTTERY CONTESTS 
 
 
A Dissertation 
Submitted to the Faculty 
of 
Purdue University 
by 
Roman M. Sheremeta 
 
 
In Partial Fulfillment of the 
Requirements for the Degree 
of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
August 2009 
Purdue University 
West Lafayette, Indiana
ii 
 
 
 
 
Для слави Христа. 
Присвячується моїм батькам за їхню самовіддану підтримку і любов.  
 
For the glory of Christ. 
To my parents for their devotion, unconditional support and enduring love.  
 
iii 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
 
 
This dissertation is a result of perseverance, hard work and most importantly – 
support from many generous and inspiring people. 
I am greatly indebted to my advisor Professor Tim Cason who helped me to focus 
on the important parts of my work and guided me with his insights. Without his 
discernment, support and countless hours of advising, it would have been much more 
difficult, if not impossible, to complete this dissertation. 
I also want to thank my committee members who were very generous with their 
time. In particular, I am grateful to Professor Dan Kovenock for helping me to write 
rigorous economic theory and design accurate economic experiments. Professors Jason 
Abrevaya, Jack Barron, and Marco Casari provided valuable research feedback and 
helped to do systematic econometric analysis. 
During the time of writing my dissertation I received insightful comments and 
support from my colleagues. Jingjing Zhang has been a wonderful friend and coauthor. 
Her kind and heartwarming support is especially appreciated. Subhasish Modak 
Chowdhury, Levi Mielke, Curtis Price, and Anya Savikhin provided comments and 
valuable feedback to improve my research. 
Finally, I would like to thank my parents and my brother who have been a 
constant source of spiritual support and enduring love. 
v 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
 
 Page 
 
ABSTRACT ....................................................................................................................... vi 
 
INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1 
 
ESSAY 1: CONTEST DESIGN: AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION ................   8 
1.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................... 8 
1.2 Theoretical Model ................................................................................................... 11 
1.3 Experimental Design and Procedures ...................................................................... 13 
          A. Treatments and Hypothesis ............................................................................ 13 
          B. Experimental Procedures ................................................................................ 16 
1.4 Results ..................................................................................................................... 18 
1.5 Exploring Over-Dissipation..................................................................................... 23 
          A. Quantal Response Equilibrium ....................................................................... 23 
          B. Risk Aversion ................................................................................................. 26 
          C. Lag Dependence and Assessment of the Random Draw ................................ 28 
1.6 Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 31 
1.7 References ............................................................................................................... 33 
1.8 Appendix ................................................................................................................. 37 
 
ESSAY 2: EXPERIMENTAL COMPARISON OF MULTI-STAGE AND ONE-STAGE 
CONTESTS ...................................................................................................................... 48 
2.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 48 
2.2 Theoretical Model ................................................................................................... 51 
2.3 Experimental Design and Procedures ...................................................................... 53 
          A. Experimental Design ...................................................................................... 53 
          B. Experimental Procedures ................................................................................ 54 
2.4 Results ..................................................................................................................... 56 
          A. General Results ............................................................................................... 56 
          B. One-Stage versus Multi-Stage ........................................................................ 61 
          C. Non-monetary Utility of Winning .................................................................. 66 
2.5 Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 71 
2.6 References ............................................................................................................... 73 
2.8 Appendix ................................................................................................................. 78 
v 
 
 
Page 
 
ESSAY 3: EFFORT CARRYOVER AND INFORMATION DISCLOSURE IN TWO 
STAGE POLITICAL CONTESTS ................................................................................... 91 
3.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 91 
3.2 Theoretical Model ................................................................................................... 94 
3.3 Experimental Design and Procedures ...................................................................... 96 
          A. Experimental Design and Hypotheses ............................................................ 96 
          B. Experimental Procedures ................................................................................ 98 
3.4 Results ................................................................................................................... 100 
          A. General Results ............................................................................................. 100 
          B. The Effect of Carryover ................................................................................ 104 
          C. The Effect of Information Disclosure ........................................................... 105 
          D. The Determinants of Effort........................................................................... 107 
3.5 Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 110 
3.6 References ............................................................................................................. 111 
3.7 Appendix ............................................................................................................... 115 
 
ESSAY 4: PERFECT-SUBSTITUTES, BEST-SHOT, AND WEAKEST-LINK 
CONTESTS BETWEEN GROUPS ............................................................................... 130 
4.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 130 
4.2 Literautre Review .................................................................................................. 134 
4.3 The Experimental Environment ............................................................................ 136 
          A. The Model..................................................................................................... 136 
          B. Experimental Design and Predictions ........................................................... 140 
          C. Experimental Procedures .............................................................................. 143 
4.4 Experimental Results ............................................................................................. 145 
          A. Symmetric Contests ...................................................................................... 145 
          B. Asymmetric Contests .................................................................................... 153 
          C. A Comparison of Contest Rules ................................................................... 156 
          D. The Determinants of Effort........................................................................... 160 
4.5 Discussion and Conclusions .................................................................................. 162 
4.6 References ............................................................................................................. 166 
4.7 Appendix ............................................................................................................... 174 
 
VITA ............................................................................................................................... 184 
 
 
  
vi 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
Sheremeta, Roman M. Ph.D., Purdue University, August, 2009. Essays on Experimental 
Investigation of Lottery Contests. Major Professor: Timothy N. Cason. 
 
 
 
A contest is a situation in which individuals or groups expend costly resources 
while competing to win a specific prize. The variety of economic situations that can be 
described as contests has attracted enormous attention from economic theorists. Despite 
the extensive theoretical research of contests, very little empirical research has been done 
to evaluate the theory. This dissertation uses experimental methods to provide empirical 
investigation of different aspects of contest theory. The dissertation consists of four 
independent essays. 
The first essay experimentally compares the performance of four simultaneous 
lottery contests: a grand contest, two multiple prize settings (equal and unequal prizes), 
and a contest which consists of two sub-contests. Consistent with the theory, the grand 
contest generates the highest effort levels among all simultaneous contests. In multi-prize 
settings, equal prizes produce lower efforts than unequal prizes. The results also support 
the argument that joint contests generate higher efforts than an equivalent number of sub-
contests. The second essay experimentally studies a two-stage elimination contest and 
compares its performance with a one-stage contest. Contrary to the theory, the two-stage 
contest generates higher total effort expenditures than the equivalent one-stage contest.
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The third essay investigates the performance of a two-stage elimination contest with 
effort carryover. Experimental results support all major theoretical predictions: the first 
stage effort and the total effort expenditures increase in the carryover rate, and the second 
stage effort decreases in the carryover rate. 
Consistent with other experimental studies, there is significant over-dissipation of 
efforts relative to the equilibrium prediction in all contests. The first essay argues that this 
over-dissipation can be partially explained by strong endowment size effects. Subjects 
who receive bigger endowments tend to over-dissipate, while subjects who receive 
smaller endowments tend to under-dissipate. This behavior is consistent with the 
predictions of a quantal response equilibrium. The second and third essays provide 
evidence that winning is a component in a subject‟s utility and that non-monetary utility 
of winning is an important factor to explain over-dissipation in contests. 
The final essay investigates contests between groups. Each group has one strong 
player, with a higher valuation for the prize, and two weak players, with lower valuations. 
In contests where individual efforts are perfect substitutes, both strong and weak players 
expend significantly higher efforts than predicted by theory. In best-shot contests, where 
group performance depends on the best performer within the group, most of the effort is 
expended by strong players while weak players free-ride. In weakest-link contests, where 
group performance depends on the worst performer within the group, there is almost no 
free-riding and all players expend similar positive efforts. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Costly competitions between economic agents are often portrayed as contests. A 
contest is a situation in which individuals or groups expend resources while competing to 
win a specific prize. Examples range from college admissions and competition for 
promotions to global relationships in which different countries and political parties 
expend resources to lobby their own interests (Krueger, 1974). The variety of economic 
situations that can be described as contests has attracted enormous attention from 
economic theorists. The most popular theories investigating different aspects of contests 
are based on the seminal model of rent-seeking introduced by Tullock (1980). The main 
focus of rent-seeking literature is the relationship between the extent of rent dissipation 
and underlying contest characteristics such as group size, number of prizes, number of 
inter-related stages, and rules that regulate interactions (Nitzan, 1994). 
Despite the extensive theoretical research of contests, very little empirical 
research has been done to evaluate the theory (Szymanski, 2003). This is because in the 
field one can observe only the performance which is a function of effort, ability, and 
random noise (Ericsson and Charness, 1994). Therefore, it is difficult to measure 
individual efforts separately from other factors. This dissertation uses experimental 
methods to provide empirical investigation of different aspects of contest theory. The 
dissertation consists of four independent essays.  
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The first essay contributes to the discussion on contest design. A number of 
theoretical papers have been devoted to the design of an optimal contest that generates 
the highest revenue – the total amount of effort expended by the contestants. A common 
motivation for such research is the objective of various agencies (political parties, lottery 
administrators, and economic groups) to maximize earnings by extracting the highest 
effort from the contestants. Overall, it is generally observed in the contest literature that 
pooling competition generates higher dissipation rates (Clark and Riis, 1998; Amegashie, 
2000; Fu and Lu, 2008; Moldovanu and Sela, 2006). Clark and Riis (1998) show that the 
income maximizing contest administrator obtains the highest rent-seeking effort when, 
instead of many small prizes, a large prize is provided. Fu and Lu (2008) demonstrate 
that the rent dissipation rate increases when the number of contestants and prizes are 
scaled up. Therefore, the authors conclude that a grand contest generates higher revenue 
than any set of subcontests. Moldovanu and Sela (2006) investigate a similar problem 
under the structure of all-pay auctions where all players know their own abilities and the 
distribution of abilities in the population. The major finding of Moldovanu and Sela 
(2006) is that independently of the number of contestants and the distribution of abilities, 
a grand contest generates the highest revenue when the cost function is either linear or 
concave. 
Despite the abundance of theoretical work on contest design, no experimental 
research has specifically compared alternative contest mechanisms. To begin to bridge 
this gap, the first essay investigates and compares the performance of four simultaneous 
contests: a grand contest, two multi-prize settings (equal and unequal prizes), and a 
contest which consists of two sub-contests. Consistent with the theory, the grand contest 
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generates the highest revenue among all simultaneous contests. In multi-prize settings, 
equal prizes produce lower efforts than unequal prizes. The results also provide strong 
empirical support for the argument that joint contests generate higher efforts than an 
equivalent number of sub-contests. However, contrary to the theory, there is significant 
over-dissipation in all contests. This over-dissipation can be partially explained by strong 
endowment size effects. Subjects who receive bigger endowments tend to over-dissipate 
while subjects who receive smaller endowments tend to under-dissipate. This behavior is 
consistent with the predictions of a quantal response equilibrium. Finally, there is a 
strong heterogeneity between subjects and expenditures span the entire strategy space, 
which is clearly inconsistent with the pure strategy equilibrium. Most of these findings 
can be explained to some extent by differences in risk preference and probabilistic nature 
of lottery contests. 
The majority of rent-seeking studies are based on the assumption that contests last 
for only one stage. Many contests in practice, however, last for multiple stages. In each 
stage contestants expend costly efforts in order to advance to the final stage and win the 
prize. The US presidential race and many other political competitions fall into the 
category of multi-stage elimination contests. At each stage, candidates use self-promotion 
and campaign advertisement in order to advance to the final stage and win the election. 
Another prominent example of multi-stage elimination contests is the international 
competition for hosting the Olympic Games. In this contest, countries are eliminated at 
each stage and the resources spent by each country in earlier stages affect the probability 
of winning the competition in later stages. 
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Multi-stage elimination contests have been studied theoretically by Rosen (1986), 
Clark and Riis (1996), Gradstein (1998), Amegashie (1999), Gradstein and Konrad 
(1999), Baik and Lee (2000), and Stein and Rapoport (2005). Gradstein and Konrad 
(1999), for example, consider a multi-stage elimination contest in which a number of 
parallel contests take place at each stage and only winners are promoted to the next stage. 
They show that, depending on the contest success function, a multi-stage contest may 
induce higher effort by the participants than a one-stage contest. Under a lottery contest 
success function, however, the two structures are equivalent. In the same line of research, 
Baik and Lee (2000) study a two-stage elimination contest with effort carryovers. In such 
a contest, players in two groups compete non-cooperatively to win a prize. In the first 
stage, each group selects a finalist who competes for the prize in the second stage. First-
stage efforts are partially (or fully) carried over to the second stage. Baik and Lee (2000) 
demonstrate that, in the case of player-specific carryovers, rent dissipation increases in 
the carryover rate and the rent is fully dissipated with full carryover. 
The second essay compares the performance of a two-stage elimination contest 
with an equivalent one-stage contest. The experiment is based on the original model 
developed by Gradstein and Konrad (1999). The results of the experiment indicate that, 
contrary to the theory, the two-stage contest generates higher revenue and higher 
dissipation rates than the equivalent one-stage contest. Over-dissipation is observed in 
both stages of the two-stage contest and experience diminishes over-dissipation in the 
first stage but not in the second stage. Multivariate analysis reveals that the variation in 
individual behavior can be partially explained by the differences in risk preferences. The 
experiment also provides evidence that winning is a component in a subject‟s utility and 
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that non-monetary utility of winning is an important factor to explain over-dissipation in 
contests. 
The third essay explores the following questions: What is the effect of effort 
carryover on the behavior of contestants in a two-stage elimination contest? How does 
the information about the effort carried over by the opponent affect the behavior in 
different stages of the contest? To answer these questions we experimentally study a two-
stage elimination contest developed by Baik and Lee (2000). The findings of the 
experiment indicate that efforts expended in both stages of the competition exceed 
theoretical predictions, with experience diminishing effort expenditures in the first stage 
but not in the second stage. Experimental results support all major comparative statics 
predictions of the theory: the first stage effort and the total effort expenditures increase in 
the carryover rate, and the second stage effort decreases in the carryover rate. We also 
find that disclosing information about the opponent‟s carryover effort increases the 
second stage effort and decreases the first stage effort. 
The final essay investigates contests between groups. Examples of contests 
between groups include competitions between firms for patents, R&D competitions 
between consortia, or election campaigns by political parties. As these contests unfold, 
conflicts arise within each group and between groups. Members of the same group have 
incentives to cooperate with each other by contributing individual efforts in order to win 
a contest. Since effort is costly, each member also has an incentive to abstain from 
contributing any effort and instead free-ride on the efforts of other members. The amount 
of free-riding that occurs within a group depends on the composition of the group and the 
rules that regulate the competition. Members of the same group who have a lower interest 
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in winning the competition are more likely to free-ride on the efforts of members who 
have a higher interest in winning. However, free-riding behavior is unlikely when the 
performance of the entire group depends crucially on the performance of each member of 
a group. 
The purpose of the final essay is to examine, experimentally, how heterogeneity 
within and between groups affects group competition, and what impact different contest 
rules have on effort expended and the amount of free-riding. The experiment employs 
lottery contests between two groups. Each group has two types of players – one strong 
player and two weak players. The strong player values the prize more highly than the 
weak player and the valuations are common knowledge. The assumptions of the model 
allow us to interpret the heterogeneity in valuations as heterogeneity in abilities or 
heterogeneity in costs. All players within each group simultaneously and independently 
expend their efforts. In the “perfect-substitutes” contest, the performance of a group 
depends on the sum of individual efforts. In the “best-shot” contest, the performance of a 
group depends on the best performer. In the “weakest-link” contest, the performance of a 
group depends on the worst performer. The better performing group is more likely to win 
the prize. However, the worse performing group still has a chance to win, since the 
probability of winning is determined by a lottery contest success function. 
The results of the experiment indicate that, contrary to theoretical predictions, 
there is significant over-contribution of efforts by both strong and weak players in 
contests where individual efforts are perfect substitutes. This over-contribution is not 
explained by quantal response equilibrium but it can be partially explained by social 
identity theory. Consistent with theoretical predictions, in best-shot contests most of the 
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effort is expended by strong players while weak players free-ride. In weakest-link 
contests all players expend similar positive efforts conforming to the Pareto dominant 
equilibrium. When groups are asymmetric, the result of the competition depends on the 
rule that regulates the competition. The group with a stronger player is more likely to win 
the contest if the performance of both groups depends solely on the best performer within 
each group. On the contrary, the same group is less likely to win the weakest-link and the 
perfect-substitutes contests. 
The rule that regulates the competition also determines the amount of total effort 
expended, amount of free-riding, and the relative performance of strong players. Perfect-
substitutes contests generate the highest total effort expended among all contests, 
followed by best-shot and then weakest-link contests. The most free-riding behavior 
occurs in best-shot contests while there is almost no free-riding in weakest-link contests. 
Strong players expend the highest relative effort in best-shot contests, followed by 
perfect-substitutes and then weakest-link contests. 
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ESSAY 1 
CONTEST DESIGN: AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Costly competitions between economic agents are often portrayed as contests. 
Examples range from college admissions and competition for promotions to global 
relationships in which different countries and political parties expend resources to lobby 
their own interests (Krueger, 1974; Tullock, 1980). The variety of economic situations 
that can be described as contests has attracted enormous attention from economic 
theorists. The main focus of this literature is the relationship between the setup of rent-
seeking contests and the strategic behavior of contestants. It is well recognized that 
strategic behavior is sensitive to different contest rules. Therefore, depending on the 
objective, a careful design of each contest is required. 
Despite the abundance of theoretical work on contest design, no experimental 
research has specifically compared alternative contest mechanisms.
1
 To begin to bridge 
this gap, this study investigates and compares the performance of four simultaneous 
contests: a grand contest, two multi-prize settings (equal and unequal prizes), and a 
contest which consists of two subcontests.  
                                                 
1
 Several experimental studies looked at the design of rank order tournaments (Orrison et al., 2004; 
Harbring and Irlenbusch, 2003, 2005) and fund-raising lotteries (Morgan and Sefton, 2000; Lange, 2007). 
The most closely related work to ours is done by Müller and Schotter (2007) who analyze the influence of 
prizes in all-pay auction with heterogeneous agents following the theoretic work by Moldovanu and Sela 
(2001). 
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Consistent with the theory, we find that the grand contest generates the highest 
revenue among all simultaneous contests. In multi-prize settings, equal prizes produce 
lower efforts than unequal prizes. Our results also provide strong empirical support for 
the argument that joint contests generate higher efforts than an equivalent number of 
subcontests. However, contrary to the theory, we find significant over-dissipation in all 
contests. This over-dissipation can be partially explained by strong endowment effects. 
Subjects who receive bigger endowments tend to over-dissipate while subjects who 
receive smaller endowments tend to under-dissipate in contests. This behavior is 
consistent with the predictions of a quantal response equilibrium. Finally, we find that 
there is a strong heterogeneity between the subjects and that, instead of playing the pure 
strategy equilibrium, subjects expend efforts that span the entire strategy space. Most of 
these findings can be explained to some extent by differences in risk preference and 
misperception of the random draw. 
A number of theoretical papers have been devoted to the design of an optimal 
contest that generates the highest revenue – the total amount of effort expended by the 
contestants. A common motivation for such research is the objective of various agencies 
(political parties, lottery administrators, and economic groups) to maximize earnings by 
extracting the highest effort from the contestants. Gradstein and Konrad (1999), for 
example, provide a rationale for a multi-stage contest design by endogenizing the choice 
of contest structure.  They show that, depending on a return to scale parameter of the 
contest success function, a multi-stage contest may induce higher effort by the 
participants than a one-stage contest. In the same line of research, Baik and Lee (2000) 
study a two-stage contest with effort carryovers. They demonstrate that, in the case of 
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player-specific effort carryovers, the rent-dissipation rate (defined as the ratio of the 
expended total effort to the value of the prize) increases in the carryover rate and the rent 
is fully dissipated with carryover rate equal to one. Finally, Fu and Lu (2007) investigate 
the optimal structure of a multistage sequential-elimination contest with pooling 
competition in each stage. They demonstrate that the optimal contest eliminates one 
contestant at each stage until the finale in which a single winner takes the entire prize. 
Overall, it is generally observed in the contest literature that pooling competition 
generates higher dissipation rates (Clark and Riis, 1998; Amegashie, 2000; Fu and Lu, 
2009; Moldovanu and Sela, 2006).
2
 Clark and Riis (1998) show that the income 
maximizing contest administrator obtains the highest rent-seeking effort when, instead of 
many small prizes, a large prize is provided. Fu and Lu (2009) demonstrate that the rent 
dissipation rate increases when the number of contestants and prizes are scaled up. 
Therefore, the authors conclude that a grand contest generates higher revenue than any 
set of subcontests. Moldovanu and Sela (2006) investigate a similar problem under the 
structure of all-pay auctions where all players know their own abilities and the 
distribution of abilities in the population. The major finding of Moldovanu and Sela 
(2006) is that independently of the number of contestants and the distribution of abilities, 
a grand contest generates the highest revenue when the cost function is either linear or 
concave. However, it is not always the case that pooling competition generates the 
highest efforts. For example, if the contestants have convex costs several prizes may be 
optimal (Moldovanu and Sela, 2001; Kräkel, 2006). The non-optimality of a single large 
                                                 
2
 For more multiple prize contests see Glazer and Hassin (1988), Barut and Kovenock (1998), and Che and 
Gale (2003). 
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prize can also occur in a contest where players have commonly known but different 
abilities (Szymanski and Valletti, 2005). 
The empirical evidence for contest design theory is mixed (Szymanski, 2003). 
Maloney and McCormick (2000), for example, analyze responses of individual runners to 
prizes in foot races. They find a significant relation between the performance and the 
prize value. Consistent with Lazear and Rosen (1981), higher prize values cause higher 
effort levels. Similar to Maloney and McCormick (2000), Lynch and Zax (2000) examine 
data on road races in the United States. They find that the performance increases in 
response to larger prize spreads. However, when controlled for ability factor, the impact 
of the prize spread disappears. The authors thus conclude that the larger prize spreads 
produce better performance not because they encourage all runners to run faster but 
because they attract faster runners. 
 
1.2 Theoretical Model 
Denote by  a contest with  identical risk-neutral players 
who are competing for  prizes of a common value , . No player may 
win more than one prize. Each player  chooses irreversible effort level of  to influence 
the probability of winning. Let  be the set of remaining  players who have 
not won one of the  prizes. Then the conditional probability that a contestant  
wins the -th prize is given by a lottery contest success function: 
,           (1) 
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The efforts are often raised to an exponent term to indicate the sensitivity of a 
contest. Our reasons for choosing this specific contest success function is that it is simple 
enough for subjects to understand and it is also commonly used in most of the rent-
seeking contest literature, including virtually all of the experimental contest literature. It 
is important to emphasize, however, that the simplicity of (1) does not affect the 
comparative statics predictions of the theory (Clark and Riis, 1998; Fu and Lu, 2009). 
We concentrate our analysis on the symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibrium of 
the game. The expected payoff of player , , is derived by multiplying player ‟s 
probability of winning each prize, , by its value, . Since we are 
considering symmetric equilibrium the efforts made by other players  can be 
denoted as . Therefore, the probability that  wins the first prize is . 
If  does not win the first prize, his conditional probability of winning the second prize is 
the product of the probability that  does not win the first prize and the probability that he 
does win the second prize. Applying this reasoning we can write player ‟s expected 
payoff as: 
 (2) 
The expected payoff (2) is based on the assumptions that players are risk-neutral 
and have linear costs. However, by relaxing the linearity of costs assumption the 
comparative statics predictions of the theory are not affected. In fact, in the derivation of 
the equilibrium, Clark and Riis (1998) use a nonlinear cost function  instead of , 
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where . Differentiating (2) with respect to  leads to the equilibrium effort level 
in the contest : 
3
 
.      (3) 
Formula (3) is the building block of the experimental design used in this study. It 
shows that the effort level of each contestant depends on the number of contestants, the 
number of prizes, the value of prizes, and the ordering of prizes. Especially interesting is 
the “placement effect”: the contest administrator can increase the effort level (3) by 
reducing the value of an early prize  and increasing the value of a later prize  by the 
same amount. Taking into account that the revenue collected by the administrator is 
simply the summation of all individual efforts, the placement effect justifies the use of a 
large single prize to maximize the revenue collected in the contest. 
 
1.3 Experimental Design and Procedures 
A. Treatments and Hypothesis 
Suppose there are  players who are willing to participate in a contest. The 
administrator has a budget  and he wants to maximize total revenue extracted from 
contestants. The administrator must choose how to organize this contest. The simplest 
way to do this is a simultaneous move grand contest, in which all players are pooled into 
one large group with only one large prize. This type of contest is the baseline treatment of 
this study. 
                                                 
3
 General conditions for existence of the equilibrium and detail derivations are shown in Clark and Riis 
(1998). 
  
14 
Treatment GC: The first contest is a grand contest  in which all  
contestants are in the same group and they compete for a single prize of value . 
Applying (3) and summing over all contestants‟ efforts, the total revenue collected in  
is 
.        (4) 
If the prize  is divisible the administrator must choose how to divide it. He can 
divide the prize into several unequal prizes or he can make all prizes equal. The next two 
treatments investigate these alternatives. 
Treatment UC: In contest  all contestants are competing for two 
unequal prizes  and . A 3 to 1 ratio of splitting the prize has been 
proposed by Galton (1902). Note, that the sum of  and  yields the combined prize of 
value . The total revenue generated by this contest is 
.       (5) 
Treatment EC: In the third contest, , all contestants compete for 
two prizes of the same value . The total revenue collected is derived from 
formula (3): 
.       (6) 
Frequently, instead of putting the contestants into one large group, they are split 
into several subgroups. In these cases the competition goes on within each group. As a 
result, the contest organizer collects the revenue from each subcontest separately. 
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Treatment SC: This last simultaneous contest treatment consists of two separate 
and identical contests . The SC treatment resembles the EC 
treatment, but instead of competition within the same group, contestants are split into two 
equal size groups  and the winner of each group receives a prize value . The total 
revenue collected in both  and  is 
.        (7) 
Based on the four treatments, we can formalize the following three hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Grand contest (GC) generates the highest revenue among all 
simultaneous contests. 
This hypothesis follows directly from the four treatments listed above. It can also 
be derived from Clark and Riis (1998), who showed that an administrator who wishes to 
maximize the revenue should combine all of the prizes into one grand prize. 
Hypothesis 2: In multi-prize settings, equal prizes (EC) produce lower efforts than 
unequal prizes (UC). 
This hypothesis comes from the observation that increasing the value of the first 
prize, while decreasing the value of the second prize by the same amount, increases effort 
expenditures. Therefore, the UC treatment should generate higher revenue than the EC 
treatment, since in the UC treatment the first prize is  while in the EC treatment 
the first prize is . Our final hypothesis is based on a recent study by Fu and Lu 
(2009), who showed that the joint contest generates higher revenue than any set of 
subcontests.  
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Hypothesis 3: Joint contest (EC) generates higher efforts than equivalent number 
of subcontests (SC). 
In summary, the four contests can be ranked by the total revenue collected: 
. If revenue maximization is the objective of the 
administrator then the grand contest should be preferred over all other contests, unequal 
prize splitting should be preferred over equal prize splitting, and a joint contest should be 
preferred over two equivalent subcontests. 
B. Experimental Procedures 
The experiment consists of four different contests. Table 1.3.1 shows the 
equilibrium effort levels, revenue generated by each contest, and dissipation rates, 
defined as the total expenditures divided by the total value of the prize, for  and 
.  
Table 1.3.1 – Experimental Design and Nash Equilibrium Predictions 
 
The experiment used 132 subjects drawn from the population of undergraduate 
students at Purdue University. Computerized experimental sessions were run using z-
Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) at the Vernon Smith Experimental Economics Laboratory. We 
ran eleven experimental sessions with two treatments in each session as in Table 1.3.2. 
There were 12 subjects in the lab during each session. Each experimental session 
proceeded in three parts. Subjects were given instructions, available in the Appendix, at 
Effort, e Revenue, TR
GC 1 4 1 120 22.5 90 0.75
UC 1 4 2 90,30 20.0 80 0.67
EC 1 4 2 60,60 17.5 70 0.58
SC 2 2 1 60 15.0 60 0.50
Treatment
Number of         
Groups
Players per 
Group, N
Prizes per         
Group, s
Dissipation 
Rate
Equilibrium              Value of the 
Prize, V
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the beginning of each part and the experimenter read the instructions aloud. In the first 
part subjects made a series of choices in simple lotteries, similar to Holt and Laury 
(2002). The second and the third parts of the experiment corresponded to two out of four 
treatments. For example, in GC-UC, each subject played in a grand contest for 30 
periods, then played for 30 periods in an unequal prize contest. In each period, subjects 
were randomly and anonymously placed into a group of 4 players in GC, UC, and EC 
treatments or into a group of 2 players in SC treatment. 
Table 1.3.2 – Summary of Treatments and Sessions 
 
At the beginning of each period, each subject received an endowment of 60 
experimental francs. Subjects could use their endowments to expend efforts (place bids) 
in order to win a prize. Subjects were informed that by increasing their efforts, they 
would increase their chance of winning the prize and that, regardless of who wins the 
prize, all subjects would have to pay for their efforts. After all subjects submitted their 
efforts the computer assigned the winner via a random draw. A simple lottery was used to 
explain how the computer chose the winner. At the end of each period, the sum of all 
efforts in the group, the result of the random draw, and personal period earnings were 
reported to all subjects. After completing all 60 decision periods, 10 periods were 
randomly selected for payment (5 periods for each treatment). The earnings were 
  GC-UC 2 24 1440 30 60
  UC-GC 2 24 1440 30 60
  EC-SC 2 24 1440 30 60
  SC-EC 2 24 1440 30 60
  GC-UC (40) 1 12 720 30 40
  Pilot Sessions 2 24 960 20 60
Number of 
Periods
  Design
Number of 
Sessions
Total 
Participants
Number of 
Decisions
Endowment
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converted into US dollars at the rate of 50 francs to $1. On average, subjects earned $18 
each and this was paid in cash. The experimental sessions lasted for about 70 minutes. 
 
1.4 Results 
Table 1.4.1 summarizes average efforts and payoffs over all treatments, and 
shows that subjects over-expend effort relative to the risk-neutral Nash prediction. As a 
result, payoffs are lower than expected. Note that on average players competing in the 
grand contest do not earn any positive payoffs. 
Table 1.4.1 – Average Statistics 4 
 
The dissipation rate is defined as the ratio of the expended total effort (revenue) to 
the value of the prize. In the grand contest 100% of the rent is dissipated by 4 players, 
while only 66% of the rent is dissipated by 4 players in the two subcontests. Actual 
dissipation rates are significantly higher than what is predicted by the theory.
5
  
Result 1: Significant over-dissipation is observed in all treatments. 
                                                 
4
 We also checked for a possible order effect since subjects consecutively played in two of the four possible 
contests. No significant difference was found. In fact, the averages presented in Table 1.4.1 are almost 
identical to the averages when we consider only the first treatment in each session. In GC, UC, EC and SC 
the average efforts without the order effect are 30.2, 29.9, 21.5, and 18.5.  
5
 To support this conclusion we estimated a simple panel regression for each treatment, where the 
dependent variable is effort and independent variables are a constant and session dummy-variables. The 
model included a random effects error structure, with the individual subject as the random effect, to 
account for the multiple decisions made by individual subjects. Based on a standard Wald test, conducted 
on estimates of a model, we found that for all treatments the constant coefficients are significantly higher 
than the predicted theoretical values in Table 1.4.1 (p-value < 0.05). The same conclusion also stands after 
clustering standard errors at the session level (p-value < 0.05).   
Equilibrium Equilibrium Equilibrium Actual
GC 22.5 30.0 (0.5) 120.1 7.5 0.0 (1.3) 0.75 1.00 
UC 20.0 29.3 (0.5) 117.4 10.0 0.7 (0.9) 0.67 0.98 
EC 17.5 21.6 (0.3) 86.4 12.5 8.4 (0.7) 0.58 0.72 
SC 15.0 19.7 (0.3) 78.6 15.0 10.3 (0.8) 0.50 0.66 
Standard error of the mean in parentheses
Dissipation RatePayoff, π
Actual
Revenue, 
TR
Treatment
Effort, e
Actual   
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Table 1.4.1 also reports the total revenue collected in each contest. This revenue 
can be calculated by summing up all efforts within a given contest or by multiplying 
dissipation rate by the prize value. The data indicates that all four revenues are ranked 
consistently with the theory. The revenue collected in the EC treatment is higher than the 
revenue collected in the SC treatment. A random effect regression of effort on the 
treatment dummy-variable indicates that the difference is significant (p-value < 0.01). 
6
 
This finding is consistent with Hypothesis 3. The actual difference between the revenue 
collected in the EC and SC treatments is about 8, which is very close to the theoretical 
prediction of 10.  
Result 2: The equal-prize joint contest generates significantly greater effort and 
revenue than the two equivalent subcontests. 
The next result, which supports Hypothesis 2, is that the revenue collected in the 
UC treatment exceeds the revenue collected in the EC treatment. Based on the estimation 
of a random-effect model with standard errors clustered at the session level, the 
difference in revenues is significant (p-value < 0.05). Although this finding supports 
Hypothesis 2, the difference in revenues of 31 (=117-86) is much higher than the 
theoretical difference of 10 (=80-70). 
Result 3: The unequal-prize contest generates significantly greater effort and 
revenue than the equal-prize contest. 
The grand contest is designed to produce the highest competition from the 
contestants and therefore generates the highest revenue for the administrator. Table 1.4.1 
                                                 
6
 When clustering standard errors at the session level, the difference is significant only for the last 15 
periods of the experiment (p-value < 0.05). 
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shows that the grand contest indeed generates the highest effort level, the highest 
revenue, and the highest dissipation rate. This provides support for Hypothesis 1. Based 
on the estimation of a random-effect model with standard errors clustered at the session 
level, the effort expended in the GC treatment is significantly higher than the effort 
expended in the EC treatment (p-value < 0.05) and the SC treatment (p-value < 0.05). 
The difference in effort between the GC and UC treatments is significant only for the last 
15 periods of the experiment (p-value < 0.05).
7
 
Result 4: The grand contest generates somewhat higher efforts and revenue than 
unequal-prize contest and considerably higher efforts and revenue than either equal-prize 
contest or two equivalent subcontests. 
Overall, Results 2, 3, and 4 provide strong empirical support for the theoretical 
findings of contest design: the most rent-seeking efforts are obtained when a large prize is 
provided instead of several small prizes and the joint contest generates higher revenue 
than a set of subcontests. The support for the theory comes from aggregate rather than 
individual analysis of the data. Figure 1.4.1a displays the full distribution of efforts made 
in first 15 periods of the experiment. Instead of following a unique pure strategy Nash 
equilibrium, subjects‟ efforts are distributed on the entire strategy space. In the SC 
treatment, for example, all efforts should be concentrated at 15, but instead they range 
from 0 to 60. Similar behavior is observed in GC, UC, and EC treatments. 
Result 5: The actual efforts are distributed on the entire strategy space. 
                                                 
7
 It is important to emphasize that although the average efforts are similar in both GC and UC treatments, 
the strategic behavior of individual subjects is very different. By analyzing individual efforts, we find that 
in the GC treatment subjects choose 0 and 60 more often than in the UC treatment (right panel of Figure 
4.1b). As a result, there are more subjects who compete too much and at the same time more subjects who 
drop out of the competition in the GC treatment than in the UC treatment.  
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Figure 1.4.1a – Distribution of Efforts in Periods 1-15 
 
Figure 1.4.1b – Distribution of Efforts in Periods 16-30 
It is often argued that subjects need to get some experience in order to learn how 
to play the equilibrium (Camerer, 2003). For that reason, Figure 1.4.1b displays the 
distribution of efforts in final 15 periods of the experiment. The fraction of the 
equilibrium efforts in SC and EC treatments is around 13-16% and the fraction of 
equilibrium efforts in GC and UC treatments is around 4-11%. There is a minor 
difference between the distribution of efforts in periods 1-15 and periods 16-30. 
Nevertheless, some learning takes place. The fraction of efforts which are higher than the 
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equilibrium decreases and the fraction of efforts which are lower than the equilibrium 
increases with the periods played. This can be seen by the leftward shift of the 
distribution (Figure 1.4.1a versus Figure 1.4.1b). In Section 1.5 we provide more formal 
analysis of the learning trends that occur in our experiment. 
   
Figure 1.4.2 – Average Effort by Subjects in EC-SC and GC-UC Treatments 
Another argument that is commonly made in the experimental and theoretical 
literature is that players may play an asymmetric equilibrium instead of a symmetric 
equilibrium (Dechenaux et al., 2006). Although Clark and Riis (1998) do not prove the 
uniqueness of the pure strategy equilibrium (3), in our specific case the equilibrium is 
indeed unique (Szidarovszky and Okuguchi, 1997; Cornes and Hartley, 2005).
8
 
                                                 
8
 Because of experimental design all players are restricted to choose integer effort levels from 0 to 60. 
Therefore, one can look at the 4-player contest as 4-dimensional normal form game with nearly 1.4E+07 
possible outcomes. We ran computer simulation to check for all possible pure strategy equlibria and the 
only one that was found is unique and symmetric. Because of the restriction on the strategy space, in the 
equilibrium of the GC (EC) treatment two players expend 23 (18) francs and two players expend 22 (17) 
francs. It is also important to emphasize that because of the concavity of payoff functions the pure strategy 
equilibrium is also the unique mixed strategy equilibrium. We performed computer simulation for the SC 
treatment to confirm this. 
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Figure 1.4.2 displays the average efforts by all subjects who participated in the 
experiment. On the left side each subject is ranked by the average effort he expended in 
the EC treatment and on the right side each subject is ranked by the average effort he 
expended in the GC treatment. Some subjects never enter the competition and expend 
zero effort in all periods, while others expend substantial effort, averaging about 50.
9
 
Result 6: There is a strong heterogeneity in efforts between the subjects. 
Uniqueness of the pure strategy equilibrium and findings in Results 1, 5, and 6 
produce a challenge for contest theory. Nevertheless, Results 2, 3, and 4 support the 
major comparative static predictions. Why individual behavior is different across subjects 
is a separate question. There are many behavioral and demographic factors that may 
cause these differences. The next section explores in more detail the possible behavioral 
and demographic factors that cause subjects to deviate from the theoretical predictions. 
 
1.5 Exploring Over-Dissipation 
A. Quantal Response Equilibrium 
Although the comparative statics predictions hold in the experiment, there is a 
significant over-dissipation in all treatments (Result 1) which is not captured by the 
theory. Potters et al. (1998) conjectured that most subjects are likely to make mistakes. 
These mistakes add noise to the Nash equilibrium solution and thus may cause over-
dissipation in contest games. We check this hypothesis by applying a quantal response 
                                                 
9
 Evidently, the participants who bid more in EC treatment are also more likely to bid more in SC 
treatment. We can track this correlation since each subject participated in two different treatments in each 
session. The Spearman's rank correlation coefficient, ρ, is 0.58 and it is significantly greater than zero (p-
value < 0.01). The correlation between GC and UC treatment is even higher, ρ = 0.81 (p-value < 0.01). This 
important observation shows the consistency of each subject‟s behavior across different experimental 
contests. Therefore, it strongly confirms the presence of heterogeneity between the subjects. 
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equilibrium (QRE) developed by McKelvey and Palfrey (1995). The crucial parameter of 
this model is the error parameter, μ, which determines the sensitivity of the choice 
probabilities with respect to payoffs. The maximum likelihood estimates of μ for each 
treatment are shown in the Table 1.5.1.
10
 The table also reports the corresponding value 
of the likelihood function. The level of mistakes made in GC and UC treatments is very 
high. We cannot reject the random play hypothesis for either of the treatments. This 
conclusion stands even when we estimate the model based on the data from the last 15 
periods of the experiment. On the other hand, the behavior in EC and SC treatments can 
be captured by the QRE with a reasonable level of mistakes. 
Table 1.5.1 – QRE Computation Based on All Periods 
  
Figure 1.5.1 illustrates the average effort at the QRE as a function of μ for each 
treatment. On the vertical axis we find the average effort for each player. When μ is zero, 
the behavior is consistent with the Nash equilibrium. With increasing level of mistakes, 
all players over-expend average effort relative to the Nash equilibrium. As players move 
closer to random play, i.e., putting equal weights on each strategy, the average effort 
approaches 30 (one half of the endowment). Even without additional computation one 
can see how the QRE can account for the over-dissipation in all treatments of the 
                                                 
10
 The estimation procedure followed Goeree et al. (2002). A more detail description of the estimation 
procedure is available from the author upon a request. 
GC 1.21E+07 -5919.7 p = 0.99 p <  0.01
UC 729.4 -5919.7 p = 0.77 p <  0.01
EC 9.3 -5654.6 p <  0.01 p <  0.01
SC 9.3 -5557.9 p <  0.01 p <  0.01
GC (40) 113.4 -1336.7 p = 0.56 p <  0.01
UC (40) 3.2 -1274.5 p <  0.01 p <  0.01
LR test 
(Equilibrium)
Treatment μ,  error LL
LR test 
(Random)
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experiment. For example, the average effort of 19.6 in SC treatment falls perfectly on the 
bottom curve around μ ≈ 9 (left panel of Figure 1.5.1). 
 
Figure 1.5.1 – Average Effort at the QRE 
It is important to emphasize that computation of QRE is heavily dependent on the 
initial endowment which subjects receive to play the contest game. In our experiment, 
each period all subjects receive an endowment of 60. Given this endowment, according to 
the QRE, at each level of mistakes subjects can only expend effort which is higher than 
the Nash equilibrium (left panel of Figure 1.5.1). Therefore, one may argue that the over-
dissipation in contests can always be explained by the QRE.
11
 However, this argument is 
not necessarily true because lower endowments may lead to under-dissipation relative to 
the Nash equilibrium prediction. For example, when the endowment is 40, the QRE 
predicts that higher level of mistakes in the GC treatment should result in under-
                                                 
11
 Bullock and Rutstrom (2007) find that observed behavior in the Tullock-type model of political 
competition is fully captured by QRE predictions. Anderson et al. (1998) develop a theoretical model of the 
all-pay auction based on the QRE. The model predicts that overbidding in the all-pay auction occurs due to 
the mistakes and that overbidding should increase with the size of the bidders‟ group. Nevertheless, Gneezy 
and Smorodinsky (2006) found that the over-dissipation in the all-pay auction is independent of the group 
size in later periods. 
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dissipation (right panel of Figure 1.5.1). The intuition behind this prediction is 
straightforward: when subjects have large endowments then their mistakes are more 
likely to result in over-dissipation, while small endowments are more likely to result in 
under-dissipation. 
To make a definite conclusion, we conducted one more session with GC (40) and 
UC (40) treatments. This time each subject was given an endowment of 40 instead of 60. 
We were very surprised to discover that the average effort in GC (40) treatment indeed 
fell from 30.0 to 21.6 which is below the Nash equilibrium prediction of 22.5. In the UC 
(40) treatment, average effort fell from 29.3 to 21. This finding is a strong support for 
QRE.
12
 It is also consistent with Sheremeta (2009), who conducted one treatment 
equivalent to the GC treatment. In that study subjects were given the endowment of 120 
francs instead of 60 and as a result the average effort was 34.1 instead of 30. A strong 
effect of the endowment on subjects‟ behavior can explain why some experimental 
studies (Schmidt et al., 2005; Shupp, 2004) find less rent-seeking expenditures than what 
is predicted by the equilibrium.
13
 
 
B. Risk Aversion 
The QRE model can account for the general trend of over-dissipation in the 
experiment. However, it cannot explain the heterogeneity in efforts between the subjects 
                                                 
12
 With the restriction on the endowment, the estimated level of mistakes, μ, also decreased in both 
treatments (Table 1.5.1). However, in the GC (40) treatment we still cannot reject the random play 
hypothesis. 
13
 In Schmidt et al. (2005) and Shupp (2004) subjects were given a budget which allowed them to bid up to 
$20 while $13.5 was the Nash equilibrium prediction. Assuming a substantial level of mistakes made by 
subjects, the QRE approaches $10 and is below the Nash equilibrium. Therefore, taking into account our 
findings about the effect of the endowment on the behavior of the rent-seekers, we can explain why these 
authors find significant under dissipation in their experiments. 
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(Result 6). In the experimental literature it is believed that this heterogeneity is mainly 
caused by heterogeneity of risk preferences. Previous experimental studies found a 
significant effect of risk aversion on the dissipation rate (Miller and Pratt, 1991). In our 
experiment, rather than estimating risk aversion from the observed choices in contest 
games (Goeree et al., 2002; Schmidt et al., 2005), in the first stage we used a simple 
lottery to elicit risk aversion from the subjects. 
Table 1.5.2 – Classification of Subjects by Risk Aversion (All Treatments) 
  
Following Holt and Laury (2002), subjects were asked to state whether they 
preferred safe option A or risky option B. In the experiment, the majority of subjects 
chose the safe option A when the probability of the high payoff in option B was small, 
and then crossed over to option B.
14
 Table 1.5.2 presents a summary of A choices made 
by all subjects in the experiment. Risk neutrality corresponds to the switching point of 
either 7 or 8 safe choices A. The majority of subjects show a tendency toward risk-averse 
                                                 
14
 Option A yielded $1 payoff with certainty, while option B yielded a payoff of either $3 or $0. The 
probability of receiving $3 or $0 varied across all 15 lotteries. The first lottery offered a 5% chance of 
winning $3 and a 95% chance of winning $0, while the last lottery offered a 70% chance of winning $3 and 
a 30% chance of winning $0. 
4 1 1.73 30.07
5 2 1.46 33.03
6 4 1.26 34.94
7 18 1.10 25.68
8 12 0.96 24.74
9 10 0.83 27.06
10 19 0.73 21.86
11 14 0.63 26.59
12 8 0.54 22.93
13 5 0.46 25.11
14 1 0.39 9.55
15 2 0.32 10.07
Number of 
A choices
Number of 
Subjects
Relative Risk 
Aversion, r
Average 
Effort, e
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or risk-neutral behavior. Based on the observed switching point for each subject, we can 
estimate their degree of risk aversion.
15
 To be consistent with other studies we calculate 
risk aversion parameters, r, based on the assumption that all subjects have constant 
relative risk aversion. The estimates are shown in Table 1.5.2. Higher r corresponds to 
lower number of safe choices A. Conventionally, subjects are considered to be risk-
seeking when r > 1. Risk neutrality corresponds to the case when r = 1. As r decreases, 
subjects become more risk-averse and prefer more safe options A. 
Theoretical work by Hillman and Katz (1984) showed that risk-averse players 
should exert lower efforts than the prediction for risk-neutral players and risk-seeking 
players should exert higher efforts. Thus, if risk aversion is a crucial factor for explaining 
heterogeneity between the subjects then the efforts expended in the contest should be 
negatively correlated with the number of safe choices made. The last column of Table 
1.5.2 displays an average effort corresponding to the number of safe choices A made by 
all subjects. Consistent with the theory, there is significant negative correlation between 
these two variables. The Spearman's rank correlation coefficient, ρ, is -0.81 and it is 
significantly different from zero (p-value < 0.01). 
 
C. Lag Dependence and Assessment of the Random Draw 
So far, we have discussed several explanations for over-dissipation (Result 1) and 
heterogeneity between the subjects (Result 6). Another question that needs to be 
addressed is why actual efforts are distributed on the entire strategy space (Result 5). One 
                                                 
15
 Note that switching from A to B only gives us an interval of risk aversion coefficient. However, for 
statistical computations we will use a mid-point approximation. 
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explanation may come from the probabilistic nature of a contest. The random draw made 
by the computer in period t-1 may affect the individual behavior in period t. To capture 
this dynamic we estimated several random-effects (RE) models (Table 1.5.3). 
Table 1.5.3 – Random-Effect Models
 
Specification (1) is a simple RE regression of individual efforts made in all 
periods of the experiment on experimentally relevant explanatory variables. The 
coefficient capturing risk aversion is significant and has the expected sign. The variable 
inconsistency is intended to capture the subjects who demonstrated inconsistency in their 
risk preferences. Time spent on making a decision has a positive effect on over-
Dependent variable, Effort
(1)             
RE
(2)             
RE
(3)             
RE
# of safe options A -1.01*** -0.97*** -0.67***
  [degree of risk aversion] (0.26) (0.20) (0.08)
inconsistency 1.92 1.7 0.81
  [1 if subject is inconsistent in the lottery choices] (1.93) (1.43) (0.61)
bidding time 0.09** 0.10** 0.15***
  [time spent to make a decision] (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
1/t 4.26*** 4.16*** 3.92**
  [inverse of a time trend] (1.46) (1.46) (1.55)
# quiz -0.22 -0.17 -0.31**
  [correct quiz answers] (0.49) (0.36) (0.15)
win-lag 2.05***
  [1 if subject won in t -1] (0.32)
fairwin-lag 5.16*** 1.79***
  [1 if subject wins in period t -1and the draw is fair] (0.37) (0.44)
unfairwin-lag -3.00*** -2.44***
  [1 if subject wins in period t -1and the draw is unfair] (0.49) (0.51)
daverage-lag 0.51***
  [deviation from average effort in t -1] (0.01)
treatment-GC 9.48*** 9.58*** 9.07***
  [1 if treatment is GC] (0.84) (0.84) (0.89)
treatment-UC 8.22*** 8.36*** 8.27***
  [1 if treatment is UC] (0.94) (0.94) (1.00)
treatment-EC 2.06*** 2.05*** 2.07***
  [1 if treatment is EC] (0.48) (0.48) (0.51)
constant 22.35*** 25.72*** 24.69***
(5.16) (3.79) (1.62)
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
In each regression we also control for session effects
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dissipation. One explanation for this may be that subjects who take more time to make 
their decisions are actually confused about what they should do and therefore they make 
more mistakes (from Section 1.5, more mistakes corresponds to higher over-dissipation).  
We also find that the inverse of a time trend is positive and significant in all 
specifications, which suggests that individual learning is taking place and, that with the 
repetition of the game, subjects expend lower efforts. The quiz variable is measured by 
the number of correct quiz answers (a measure of how well subjects understand the 
instructions) and is designed to capture the ability factor.
16
 However, we found this 
variable is not significantly different from zero. 
To capture the dynamics of the game we include a win-lag variable. This is a 
dummy-variable which takes on the value of 1 if the player won the prize in period t-1 
and is 0 otherwise. In Specification (1), this variable has a significant positive effect on 
effort. One explanation for this finding is due to the income effect: subjects who won in 
period t-1 have higher income in period t and therefore expend higher efforts.
17
 In 
Specification (2), instead of using win-lag variable, we use fairwin-lag and unfairwin-lag 
variables. The fairwin-lag (unfairwin-lag) variable takes on the value of 1 if subject wins 
the prize in period t-1 and the random draw in period t-1 is fair (unfair). The fair draw is 
defined as a random draw that favors the player whose effort is higher than the average 
effort in the group. On the other hand, the unfair draw favors a player with a low effort. 
From the estimation, we find that the subjects who expend high efforts and win raise their 
                                                 
16
 Before the actual experiment, subjects completed the quiz on the computer to verify their understanding 
of the instructions. If a subject‟s answer was incorrect, the computer provided the correct answer. The 
experiment started only after all participants had answered all quiz questions. 
17
 It is rather surprising since we tried to avoid this effect by using random payment. It is also possible that 
subjects derive utility from winning (Goeree et al., 2002; Sheremeta, 2009). Thus, subjects who win the 
prize in period t-1 expend higher efforts to ensure that they win the prize in period t. 
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efforts in the consecutive period, while the subjects who expend low efforts and win 
reduce their efforts in the consecutive period. One may argue that this is simply due to 
the fact that subjects who expend higher (lower) efforts in one period are also more likely 
to expend higher (lower) efforts in the next period. To address this argument we run 
Specification (3) in which we include daverage-lag variable. This variable is equal to the 
difference between player i‟s effort and the average effort in the group in period t-1. 
From the estimation we find that this variable is indeed significant, i.e., subjects whose 
efforts are above the average in the past exert higher efforts in the current period. Even 
though the magnitudes of fairwin-lag and unfairwin-lag variables dropped, both variables 
are still significant. The response to fair and unfair draw by the subjects is intuitive but it 
is not rational. Since the nature of winning the contest is probabilistic, the perception of 
fair and unfair draw is important in explaining why subjects vary their efforts across 
periods and why actual efforts are distributed on the entire strategy space. 
 
1.6 Conclusion 
In this study we use experimental methods to test several theoretical predictions 
of contest design literature. We investigate and compare the performance of four 
simultaneous contests: a grand contest, two multi-prize settings (equal and unequal 
prizes), and a contest which consists of two subcontests. Consistent with the theory, we 
find that the grand contest generates the highest revenue among all simultaneous contests. 
We also find that in multi-prize settings, equal prizes produce lower efforts than unequal 
prizes. Finally, our experiment supports the argument that joint contests generate higher 
efforts than the equivalent number of subcontests. 
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Although the comparative statics predictions hold in our experiment, consistent 
with the other experimental studies, there is a strong heterogeneity between the subjects 
and significant over-dissipation of rent (Millner and Pratt, 1989, 1991; Davis and Reilly, 
1998; Potters et al., 1998). Subjects‟ heterogeneity can be partially captured by 
differences in risk preferences. Significant over-dissipation can be possibly explained by 
strong endowment effects. Subjects who receive big endowments tend to over-dissipate, 
while subjects who receive smaller endowments tend to under-dissipate in contests. This 
behavior is consistent with the predictions of a quantal response equilibrium. 
We argue that because of the probabilistic nature of contests it is important to 
control for lag of winning and misperception of the random draw. Subjects who expend 
high efforts and win the prize in period t-1 raise their efforts in the consecutive period, 
while subjects who expend low efforts and win in period t-1 substantially decreased their 
efforts in period t. These findings are attributed to the misperception of the random draw 
and they can partly explain why actual efforts in contests are distributed on the entire 
strategy space. 
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1.8 Appendix 
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS 
This is an experiment in the economics of strategic decision making. Various 
research agencies have provided funds for this research. The instructions are simple.  If 
you follow them closely and make appropriate decisions, you can earn an appreciable 
amount of money. 
The experiment will proceed in three parts. Each part contains decision problems 
that require you to make a series of economic choices which determine your total 
earnings. The currency used in Part 1 of the experiment is U.S. Dollars. The currency 
used in Part 2 and 3 of the experiment is francs. Francs will be converted to U.S. Dollars 
at a rate of _50_ francs to _1_ dollar. At the end of today‟s experiment, you will be paid 
in private and in cash. 12 participants are in today‟s experiment. 
It is very important that you remain silent and do not look at other people‟s work. 
If you have any questions, or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an 
experimenter will come to you. If you talk, laugh, exclaim out loud, etc., you will be 
asked to leave and you will not be paid. We expect and appreciate your cooperation.  
At this time we proceed to Part 1 of the experiment. 
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR PART 1 
YOUR DECISION 
In this part of the experiment you will be asked to make a series of choices in 
decision problems. How much you receive will depend partly on chance and partly on the 
choices you make. The decision problems are not designed to test you. What we want to 
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know is what choices you would make in them. The only right answer is what you really 
would choose. 
For each line in the table in the next page, please state whether you prefer option 
A or option B. Notice that there are a total of 15 lines in the table but just one line will be 
randomly selected for payment. You ignore which line will be paid when you make your 
choices. Hence you should pay attention to the choice you make in every line. After you 
have completed all your choices a token will be randomly drawn out of a bingo cage 
containing tokens numbered from 1 to 15. The token number determines which line is 
going to be paid. 
Your earnings for the selected line depend on which option you chose: If you 
chose option A in that line, you will receive $1. If you chose option B in that line, you 
will receive either $3 or $0. To determine your earnings in the case you chose option B 
there will be second random draw. A token will be randomly drawn out of the bingo cage 
now containing twenty tokens numbered from 1 to 20. The token number is then 
compared with the numbers in the line selected (see the table). If the token number shows 
up in the left column you earn $3. If the token number shows up in the right column you 
earn $0. 
 Are there any questions? 
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Participant ID _________ 
 
Decis
ion 
no. 
Optio
n A 
Option 
B 
Please  
choose  
A or B 
1 $1 $3   never 
$0   if 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13, 
       14,15, 16,17,18,19,20 
 
2 $1 $3   if 1 comes out 
$0   if 2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13, 
       14,15, 16,17,18,19,20 
 
3 $1 $3   if 1 or 2 comes out 
$0   if 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15, 
       16,17,18,19,20 
 
4 $1 $3   if 1,2 or 3 
$0   if  4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15, 
       16,17,18,19,20 
 
5 $1 $3   if 1,2,3,4 
$0   if  5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,  
       16,17,18,19,20 
 
6 $1 $3   if 1,2,3,4,5 
$0   if 6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,  
       16,17,18,19,20 
 
7 $1 $3   if 1,2,3,4,5,6 
$0   if 7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,  
       16,17,18,19,20 
 
8 $1 $3   if 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 
$0   if 8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,  
       16,17,18,19,20 
 
9 $1 $3   if 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8 
$0   if 9,10,11,12,13,14,15,  
       16,17,18,19,20 
 
10 $1 $3   if 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9 
$0   if 10,11,12,13,14,15,  
       16,17,18,19,20 
 
11 $1 $3   if 1,2, 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 $0   if 11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20  
12 $1 $3   if 1,2, 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11 $0   if 12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20  
13 $1 $3   if 1,2, 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12 $0   if 13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20  
14 $1 
$3   if 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10  
       11,12,13 
$0   if 14,15,16,17,18,19,20  
15 $1 
$3   if 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10  
       11,12,13,14 
$0   if 15,16,17,18,19,20  
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR PART 2 
YOUR DECISION 
The second part of the experiment consists of 30 decision-making periods. At the 
beginning of each period, you will be randomly and anonymously placed into a group of 
4 participants. The composition of your group will be changed randomly every period. 
Each period, you and all other participants will be given an initial endowment of 60 
francs. You will use this endowment to bid for a reward. The reward is worth 120 francs 
to you and the other three participants in your group. You may bid any integer number of 
francs between 0 and 60. An example of your decision screen is shown below. 
 
Decision Screen 
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YOUR EARNINGS 
After all participants have made their decisions, your earnings for the period are 
calculated. These earnings will be converted to cash and paid at the end of the experiment 
if the current period is one of the five periods that is randomly chosen for payment. If you 
receive the reward your period earnings are equal to your endowment plus the reward 
minus your bid. If you do not receive the reward your period earnings are equal to your 
endowment minus your bid. 
If you receive the reward:   
Earnings = Endowment + Reward – Your Bid = 60 + 120 – Your Bid 
If you do not receive the reward:   
Earnings = Endowment – Your Bid = 60 – Your Bid 
The more you bid, the more likely you are to receive the reward. The more the 
other participants in your group bid, the less likely you are to receive the reward. 
Specifically, for each franc you bid you will receive one lottery ticket. At the end of each 
period the computer draws randomly one ticket among all the tickets purchased by 4 
participants in the group, including you. The owner of the drawn ticket receives the 
reward of 120 francs. Thus, your chance of receiving the reward is given by the number 
of francs you bid divided by the total number of francs all 4 participants in your group 
bid. 
Chance of receiving 
the reward 
= 
Your Bid 
Sum of all 4 Bids in your group 
In case all participants bid zero, the reward is randomly assigned to one of the 
four participants in the group.  
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Example of the Random Draw 
This is a hypothetical example used to illustrate how the computer is making a 
random draw. Let‟s say participant 1 bids 10 francs, participant 2 bids 15 francs, 
participant 3 bids 0 francs, and participant 4 bids 40 francs. Therefore, the computer 
assigns 10 lottery tickets to participant 1, 15 lottery tickets to participant 2, 0 lottery 
tickets to participant 3, and 40 lottery tickets for participant 4. Then the computer 
randomly draws one lottery ticket out of 65 (10 + 15 + 0 + 40). As you can see, 
participant 4 has the highest chance of receiving the reward: 0.62 = 40/65. Participant 2 
has 0.23 = 15/65 chance, participant 1 has 0.15 = 10/65 chance, and participant 3 has 0 = 
0/65 chance of receiving the reward. 
After all participants make their bids, the computer will make a random draw 
which will decide who receives the reward. Then the computer will calculate your period 
earnings based on your bid and whether you received the reward or not. 
At the end of each period, your bid, the sum of all bids in your group, whether 
you received the reward or not, and the earnings for the period are reported on the 
outcome screen as shown below. Once the outcome screen is displayed you should record 
your results for the period on your Personal Record Sheet under the appropriate heading. 
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Outcome Screen 
 
IMPORTANT NOTES 
 You will not be told which of the participants in this room are assigned to which 
group. At the beginning of each period you will be randomly re-grouped with three other 
participants to form a four person group. You can never guarantee yourself the reward. 
However, by increasing your contribution, you can increase your chance of receiving the 
reward. Regardless of who receives the reward, all participants will have to pay their 
bids. 
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At the end of the experiment we will randomly choose 5 of the 30 periods for 
actual payment in Part 2 using a bingo cage. You will sum the total earnings for these 5 
periods and convert them to a U.S. dollar payment, as shown on the last page of your 
record sheet. 
Are there any questions? 
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR PART 3 
The third part of the experiment consists of 30 decision-making periods. The rules 
for part 3 are almost the same as the rules for part 2. At the beginning of each period, you 
will be randomly and anonymously placed into a group of 4 participants. The 
composition of your group will be changed randomly every period. Each period you will 
be given an initial endowment of 60 francs. The only difference is that in part 3, you will 
use this endowment to bid for two rewards (instead of one reward). The first reward is 
worth 90 francs and the second reward is worth 30 francs to you and the other three 
participants in your group. You may bid any integer number of francs between 0 and 60. 
After all participants have made their decisions, your earnings for the period are 
calculated in the similar way as in part 2. 
If you receive the first reward: 
Earnings = Endowment + First Reward – Your Bid = 60+90–Your Bid 
If you receive the second reward:  
Earnings = Endowment + Second Reward – Your Bid = 60+30–Your Bid 
If you do not receive either reward:  
Earnings = Endowment – Your Bid = 60–Your Bid 
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The more you bid, the more likely you are to receive either first or second reward. 
The more the other participants in your group bid, the less likely you are to receive any 
reward. Specifically, for each franc you bid you will receive one lottery ticket. At the end 
of each period the computer draws randomly one ticket among all the tickets purchased 
by 4 participants in the group, including you. The owner of the drawn ticket receives the 
first reward of 90 francs. Thus, your chance of receiving the first reward is given by the 
number of francs you bid divided by the total number of francs all 4 participants in your 
group bid.  
Chance of receiving 
the reward 
= 
Your Bid 
Sum of all 4 Bids in your group 
In case you do not receive the first reward there is a second draw for the second 
reward. For the second draw computer draws randomly one ticket among all the tickets 
purchased by 3 participants in the group who did not receive the first reward (the 
participant who received the first reward is excluded from the second draw). The owner 
of the drawn ticket receives the second reward of 30 francs. Your chance of receiving the 
second reward is given by the number of francs you bid divided by sum of 3 bids made 
by the participants who did not receive the first reward. 
Chance of receiving 
the second reward 
= 
Your Bid 
Sum of all 3 Bids made by participants 
who did not receive the first reward 
Each participant can win at most one reward. In case all participants bid zero, the 
first and the second reward is randomly assigned to two of the four participants in the 
group. 
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Example of the Random Draw 
This is a hypothetical example used to illustrate how the computer is making a 
random draw. Let‟s say participant 1 bids 10 francs, participant 2 bids 15 francs, 
participant 3 bids 0 francs, and participant 4 bids 40 francs. Therefore, the computer 
assigns 10 lottery tickets to participant 1, 15 lottery tickets to participant 2, 0 lottery 
tickets to participant 3, and 40 lottery tickets for participant 4. Then, for the first random 
draw, the computer randomly draws one lottery ticket out of 65 (10 + 15 + 0 + 40). As 
you can see, participant 4 has the highest chance of receiving the first reward: 0.62 = 
40/65. Participant 2 has 0.23 = 15/65 chance, participant 1 has 0.15 = 10/65 chance, and 
participant 3 has 0 = 0/65 chance of receiving the first reward. 
After all participants make their bids, the computer makes a first random draw 
which decides who receives the first reward. Let‟s say that participant 4 has received the 
first reward.  Then, for the second random draw, the computer randomly draws one 
lottery ticket out of 25 (10 + 15 + 0). Since participant 4 has already received first reward 
he is excluded from the second draw. Now, as you can see, participant 2 has the highest 
chance of receiving the second reward: 0.6 = 15/25. Participant 1 has 0.4 = 15/25 chance 
and participant 3 has 0 = 0/25 chance of receiving the second reward. 
To summarize, all participants will make only one bid. After all participants have 
made their decisions, the computer will make two consecutive draws which will decide 
who receives the first and the second reward. Regardless of who receives the first and the 
second reward, all participants will have to pay their bids. Then the computer will 
calculate your period earnings based on your bid and whether you received either reward. 
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At the end of each period, your bid, the sum of all bids in your group, whether 
you received the first reward or not, whether you received the second reward or not, and 
the earnings for the period are reported on the outcome screen. Once the outcome screen 
is displayed you should record your results for the period on your Personal Record Sheet 
under the appropriate heading. 
At the end of the experiment we will randomly choose 5 of the 30 periods for 
actual payment in Part 3 using a bingo cage. You will sum the total earnings for these 5 
periods and convert them to a U.S. dollar payment, as shown on the last page of your 
record sheet. 
Are there any questions?  
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ESSAY 2 
EXPERIMENTAL COMPARISON OF  
MULTI-STAGE AND ONE-STAGE CONTESTS 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Contests are economic, political, or social interactive situations in which agents 
expend resources to receive a certain prize. Examples include marketing and advertising 
by firms, patent races, and rent-seeking activities. All these contests differ from one 
another on multiple dimensions including group size, number of prizes, number of inter-
related stages, and rules that regulate interactions. The most popular theories 
investigating different aspects of contests are based on the seminal model of rent-seeking 
introduced by Tullock (1980). The main focus of rent-seeking literature is the 
relationship between the extent of rent dissipation and underlying contest characteristics 
(Nitzan, 1994). 
The majority of rent-seeking studies are based on the assumption that contests last 
for only one stage. Many contests in practice, however, last for multiple stages. In each 
stage contestants expend costly efforts in order to advance to the final stage and win the 
prize. Two major purposes of our study are to compare the performance of a one-stage 
contest versus a two-stage elimination contest and to examine whether over-dissipation is 
observed in both stages of the two-stage contest.  
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We find that, contrary to the theory, the two-stage contest generates higher 
revenue and higher dissipation rates than the equivalent one-stage contest. Over-
dissipation is observed in both stages of the two-stage contest and experience diminishes 
over-dissipation in the first stage but not in the second stage. Our experiment also 
provides evidence that winning is a component in a subject‟s utility. A simple behavioral 
model that accounts for a non-monetary utility of winning can explain significant over-
dissipation in both contests. It can also explain why the two-stage contest generates 
higher revenue than the equivalent one-stage contest. 
Recent theoretical models of multi-stage elimination contests reveal interesting 
dynamic aspects. Gradstein and Konrad (1999) consider a multi-stage elimination contest 
in which a number of parallel contests take place at each stage and only winners are 
promoted to the next stage. The authors show that, depending on the contest success 
function, a multi-stage contest may induce higher effort by the participants than a one-
stage contest. Under a lottery contest success function, however, the two structures are 
equivalent. In the same line of research, Baik and Lee (2000) study a two-stage 
elimination contest with effort carryovers. In this contest, players in two groups compete 
non-cooperatively to win a prize. In the first stage, each group selects a finalist who 
competes for the prize in the second stage. First-stage efforts are partially (or fully) 
carried over to the second stage. Baik and Lee (2000) demonstrate that, in the case of 
player-specific carryovers, the rent-dissipation rate (defined as the ratio of the expended 
total effort to the value of the prize) increases in the carryover rate and the rent is fully 
dissipated with full carryover. Other theoretical studies of multi-stage elimination 
contests have been conducted by Rosen (1986), Clark and Riis (1996), Gradstein (1998), 
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Amegashie (1999), Stein and Rapoport (2005), Fu and Lu (2009), and Groh et al. 
(2009).
18
 All these studies investigate different aspects of multi-stage contests such as 
elimination procedures, interdependency between the stages, asymmetry between 
contestants, and resource constraints. 
Since rent-seeking behavior in the field is difficult to measure, researchers have 
turned to experimental testing of the theory, with almost all studies focused on one-stage 
contests (Millner and Pratt, 1989, 1991; Shogren and Baik, 1991; Davis and Reilly, 1998; 
Potters et al., 1998; Anderson and Stafford, 2003).
19
 Despite considerable differences in 
experimental design among these studies, most share the major finding that aggregate 
rent-seeking behavior exceeds the equilibrium predictions.
20
 Several researchers have 
offered explanations for such behavior based on non-monetary utility of winning (Parco 
et al., 2005), misperception of probabilities (Baharad and Nitzan, 2008), quantal response 
equilibrium, and heterogeneous risk preferences (Goeree et al., 2002; Sheremeta, 2009). 
There are currently only a few experimental studies that investigate the 
performance of multi-stage contests.
21
 Schmitt et al. (2004) develop and experimentally 
test a model in which rent-seeking expenditures in the current stage affect the probability 
of winning a contest in both current and future stages. Two other experimental studies are 
based on a two-stage rent-seeking model developed by Stein and Rapoport (2005). In this 
model all players have budget constraints. In the first stage, players compete within their 
                                                 
18
 Another type of multi-stage contests is the multi-battle contests. In a multi-battle contest, players 
compete in a sequence of simultaneous move contests to win a prize and the player whose number of 
victories reaches some given minimum number wins the prize. Such contests have been studied by Harris 
and Vickers (1985, 1987), Klumpp and Polborn (2006), and Konrad and Kovenock (2009). 
19
 For empirical results on multi-stage elimination tournaments in sports see Ehrenberg and Bognanno 
(1990) and Bognanno (2001). 
20
 Shogren and Baik (1991) do not find excessive expenditure. 
21
 Exception is a study by Amegashie et al. (2007) on multi-stage all-pay auction. 
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own groups by expending efforts, and the winner of each group proceeds to the second 
stage. In the second stage, players compete with one another to win a prize by expending 
additional efforts subject to budget constraints. The experimental studies of Parco et al. 
(2005) and Amaldoss and Rapoport (2009) reject the equilibrium model of Stein and 
Rapoport (2005) because of significant over-dissipation in the first stage. Both 
experimental studies conjecture that the non-monetary utility of winning plays a crucial 
role in explaining excessive over-dissipation in the first stage. Our experimental design is 
based on Gradstein‟s and Konrad‟s (1999) theoretical model, which compares the 
performance of a one-stage contest versus a multi-stage elimination contest.  
 
2.2 Theoretical Model 
In a simple one-stage contest  identical players are competing for a prize of 
value . Each risk-neutral player  chooses his effort level, , to win the prize. The 
probability that a contestant  wins the prize is given by a lottery contest success function: 
.        (1) 
The contestant‟s probability of winning increases monotonically in own effort and 
decreases in the opponents‟ efforts. The expected payoff for risk-neutral player  is given 
by 
.       (2) 
That is, the probability of winning the prize, , times the value of the 
prize, , minus the effort expended, . Differentiating (2) with respect to  and 
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accounting for the symmetric Nash equilibrium leads to a classical solution (Tullock, 
1980), 
.         (3) 
The simple model considered above is the building block of the contest theory. 
Gradstein and Konrad (1999) extended this model to study a multi-stage elimination 
contest. In their contest,  players expend irreversible efforts in attempt to advance to the 
final stage. In the first stage, all players are divided into several groups. The winner of 
each group proceeds to the second stage, where contestants again are divided into 
competing groups, etc. The winner of the final stage receives a prize of value . For our 
analysis, assume that there are only two stages. In the first stage, all players are divided 
into  equal groups (  players per each group), with the winner of each group 
proceeding to the final. To analyze the two-stage contest, we apply backward induction. 
According to (3), in the second stage each finalist will expend effort of  
.         (4) 
The resulting expected payoff in the second stage is . Knowing 
this, in the first stage  players within each group compete as if the value of the prize 
was . Therefore, according to (3), the first stage equilibrium effort is given by 
.         (5) 
It is straightforward to show that, under the equilibrium strategy, the second order 
conditions hold and the resulting expected payoff is non-negative.
22
 Formulas (4) and (5) 
                                                 
22
 For a more detail derivations see Amegashie (1999), Gradstein and Konrad (1999), and Baik and Lee 
(2000). 
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demonstrate how the first and second stage equilibrium efforts of each player depend on 
the prize value and the number of contestants in each stage. 
 
2.3 Experimental Design and Procedures 
A. Experimental Design 
Our experiment consists of two different contests. The outline of the experimental 
design and theoretical predictions for each contest are shown in Table 2.3.1. In each 
contest there are 4 players and the prize value is 120 experimental francs. In a baseline 
treatment, all 4 contestants compete with each other for the prize in a one-stage (OS) 
contest. In equilibrium the revenue collected in such contest is 90. The resulting 
dissipation rate, defined as the total efforts divided by the value of the prize, is 0.75. 
The second treatment is a two-stage (TS) contest which consists of 4 players split 
between 2 equal groups. The first stage winner of each group proceeds to the second 
stage and the winner of the second stage receives the prize. This contest resembles many 
real life situations. For instance, swimming or track tournaments often place competitors 
in different groups called “heats” with the winner of each “heat” proceeding to the finale. 
From Table 2.3.1, one can see that the major competition in TS arises between two 
players in the second stage. Therefore, the revenue collected from the second stage is 
substantially higher than the revenue collected from the first stage. The total revenue 
collected from both stages in TS treatment is 90, which is equivalent to the revenue 
collected in OS treatment. This equivalence was proved by Gradstein and Konrad (1999) 
for a more general multi-stage contest under lottery contest success function. 
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Table 2.3.1 – Experimental Design and Equilibrium Effort Levels
 
 
B. Experimental Procedures 
The experiment was conducted at the Vernon Smith Experimental Economics 
Laboratory. A total of 84 subjects participated in seven sessions (12 subjects per session). 
All subjects were Purdue University undergraduate students who participated in only one 
session of this study. Some students had participated in other economics experiments that 
were unrelated to this research. 
The computerized experimental sessions were run using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 
2007). Each experimental session proceeded in four parts. Subjects were given the 
instructions, available in the Appendix, at the beginning of each part and the 
experimenter read the instructions aloud. Before the actual experiment, subjects 
completed the quiz on the computer to verify their understanding of the instructions. The 
experiment started only after all subjects had answered all quiz questions. In the first part 
subjects made 15 choices in simple lotteries, similar to Holt and Laury (2002). Subjects 
Treatment OS TS
Value of the Prize, V 120 120
Number of Players, N 4 4
Number of Groups, K 1 2
Effort in stage 1, e 1 22.5 7.5
Effort in stage 2, e 2 ― 30
Total Revenue 90 90
Dissipation Rate 0.75 0.75
  
55 
were asked to state whether they preferred safe option A or risky option B.
23
 This method 
was used to elicit subjects‟ risk preferences. The second and the third parts corresponded 
to OS and TS treatments ran in different orders. In three sessions we ran OS treatment 
first and in three other sessions we ran TS treatment first. Each subject played 30 periods 
in OS treatment and 30 periods in TS treatment.  
In each period, subjects were randomly and anonymously placed into a group of 4 
players designated as participant 1, 2, 3, or 4. Subjects were randomly re-grouped after 
each period. In the first stage of TS treatment, participant 1 was paired against participant 
2 and participant 3 was paired against participant 4. In OS treatment, all 4 participants 
were paired against each other. At the beginning of each period, each subject received an 
endowment of 120 experimental francs. Subjects could use their endowments to expend 
efforts (make bids). After all subjects submitted their efforts, the computer chose the 
winner by implementing a simple lottery rule. In TS treatment, the two finalists – one 
from each pair – again made their efforts in the second stage. At the end of the second 
stage the computer chose the winner of the prize and displayed the following information 
to all subjects: the opponent‟s effort in the first stage, the other opponent‟s effort in the 
second stage, the result of the random draw in the first and second stage, and personal 
period earnings. Subjects who did not proceed to the second stage in TS treatment did not 
receive any information about the decisions made in the second stage. All subjects were 
informed that by increasing their efforts, they would increase their chance of winning and 
                                                 
23
 Option A yielded $1 payoff with certainty, while option B yielded a payoff of either $3 or $0. The 
probability of receiving $3 or $0 varied across all 15 lotteries. The first lottery offered a 5% chance of 
winning $3 and a 95% chance of winning $0, while the last lottery offered a 70% chance of winning $3 and 
a 30% chance of winning $0. 
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that, regardless of who wins the prize, all subjects would have to pay for their efforts. The 
instructions explained the structure of the game in detail. 
In the final fourth part of the experiment, subjects were given an endowment of 
120 francs and were asked to expend efforts in a one-stage contest in order to be a 
winner. The procedure followed closely to the OS treatment. The only difference was that 
the prize value was 0 francs. Subjects were told that they would be informed whether 
they won the contest or not. We used this procedure to receive an indication of how 
important it is for subjects to win when winning is costly and there is no monetary reward 
for winning.  
At the end of the experiment, 1 out of 15 decisions subjects made in part one was 
randomly selected for payment. Subjects were also paid for 5 out of 30 periods in part 
two, for 5 out of 30 periods in part three, and for 1 decision they made in part four. The 
earnings were converted into US dollars at the rate of 60 francs to $1. On average, 
subjects earned $25 each which was paid in cash. The experimental sessions lasted for 
about 90 minutes. 
 
2.4 Results 
A. General Results 
Table 2.4.1 summarizes average efforts, average net payoffs, and average 
dissipation rates over the treatments. The first striking feature of the data is that, on 
average, net payoffs in both treatments are negative and the actual dissipation rates are 
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significantly greater than predicted.
24
 Similar findings are also reported in Davis and 
Reilly (1998) and Gneezy and Smorodinsky (2006). In both studies, revenues collected 
repeatedly exceeded the prize and subjects earned, on average, negative payoffs. 
Result 1: There is significant over-dissipation in one-stage and two-stage contests. 
Table 2.4.1 – Average Statistics 
 
There are several possible explanations for significant over-dissipation. First, it is 
possible that subjects expend significantly higher efforts because each period they receive 
a “free” endowment of 120 francs.25 Note that this endowment is substantially higher 
than the Nash equilibrium predictions. While the endowment itself has no theoretical 
impact, it certainly may have a behavioral impact, causing subjects to over-dissipate. The 
second explanation, related to the endowment size effect, is that subjects are likely to 
make “errors.” Sheremeta (2009) shows how the quantal response equilibrium developed 
by McKelvey and Palfrey (1995), which accounts for errors made by individual subjects, 
                                                 
24
 We ran a random effect regression on a constant separately for each treatment. Then we tested whether 
the constant coefficients are equal to the predicted theoretical values as in Table 2.4.1. We found significant 
differences for all treatments (p-value < 0.01). 
25
 The endowment was chosen for several reasons. First, the endowment was chosen to be equal to the prize 
value to be consistent with other studies (Anderson and Stafford, 2003; Herrmann and Orzen, 2008). 
Second, the endowment of 120 francs was also chosen to be substantially higher than the Nash equilibrium 
predictions in order to make sure that in the two-stage contest subjects are not budget constrained 
(otherwise, we would have to provide additional endowment in the second stage of a two-stage contest 
which would cause substantial differences in earnings between two treatments).  
Equilibrium Equilibrium
Effort in stage 1 22.5 34.1 (0.7) 7.5 18.9 (0.6)
Effort in stage 2 ― 30 47.2 (0.9)
Net Payoff 7.5 -4.1 (1.1) 7.5 -12.5 (1.2)
Total Revenue 90 90
Dissipation Rate 0.75 0.75
Standard error of the mean in parentheses
Treatment
―
136
1.14
OS TS
170
1.42
Actual   Actual   
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can explain some over-dissipation in lottery contests. Finally, and probably most 
importantly, subjects may have a non-monetary utility of winning. If that is the case, then 
in addition to the monetary value of 120 francs, subjects also compete to be winners. In 
Section C we provide evidence consistent with subjects having a non-monetary utility of 
winning which may explain why there is persistent over-dissipation in both treatments. 
 
Figure 2.4.1 – Average Efforts by Treatments 
It is important to emphasize that the over-dissipation in the TS treatment takes 
place in both stages of the competition. In the first stage of TS treatment, subjects expend 
an average effort of 18.9 which is more than double the equilibrium effort of 7.5 (Table 
2.4.1). In the second stage, instead of the equilibrium effort of 30, subjects expend an 
average effort of 47.2. The first and the second stage efforts in TS treatment are higher 
than theoretical values in all periods of the experiment (Figure 2.4.1). 
Result 2: In two-stage contest, significant over-dissipation is observed in both 
stages. 
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This result is very different from previous experimental findings. In a related 
study, Parco et al. (2005) find significant over-dissipation only in the first stage of a two-
stage contest. Given the first stage over-dissipation, and the fact that subjects are budget 
constrained, there is significant under-dissipation in the second stage. Our study shows 
that, after eliminating the budget constraints, over-dissipation in a two-stage contest 
occurs in both stages. 
It is often argued that subjects need to get some experience in order to learn how 
to play the equilibrium. For that reason, Figure 2.4.1 displays the average effort over all 
30 periods of the experiment. As players become more experienced, the average efforts 
made in the first stage of OS and TS treatments decrease. A simple regression of the first 
stage effort on a period trend shows a significant and negative relationship (p-value < 
0.01). Although this is true for the first stage, it is not the case for the subjects‟ behavior 
in the second stage. 
Result 3: Experience diminishes over-dissipation in the first stage but not in the 
second stage. 
One possible reason for this finding is that at the beginning of the TS treatment, 
subjects apply similar strategies to both stages of the competition. This may occur 
because the decisions are cognitively difficult, which causes subjects to apply similar 
heuristics or “rules of thumb” to both stages (Gigerenzer and Goldstein, 1996). But with 
the repetition, subjects learn the strategic aspect of the two-stage contest and correctly 
redistribute their efforts between the first stage and the second stage.
26
 Note that in the 
                                                 
26
 We estimated a convergence model as in Noussair et al. (1995) and found that the first stage effort in OS 
and TS treatments does not converge to the predicted level of 22.5 and 7.5 (p-value < 0.01 for both 
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second half of the experiment the magnitude of relative to the equilibrium over-
dissipation in the first stage is very similar to the magnitude of relative over-dissipation in 
the second stage (efforts are approximately one and a half times higher than the 
equilibrium predictions). 
Another point that is worth noting is that subjects‟ efforts are distributed on the 
entire strategy space, which is clearly inconsistent with play at a unique pure strategy 
Nash equilibrium. Figure 2.4.2 displays the full distribution of efforts made in the first 
stage of the OS treatment and both stages of the TS treatment. Instead of a single point 
equilibrium, efforts range from 0 to 120. 
Result 4: There is substantial variance in individual efforts. 
  
Figure 2.4.2 – Distribution of Efforts 
High variance in individual efforts is consistent with previous experimental 
findings of the contest literature (Davis and Reilly, 1998; Potters et al., 1998). Several 
explanations have been offered. The first is that players may play an asymmetric 
                                                                                                                                                 
treatments) and the second stage effort in TS treatment does not converge to the predicted level of 30 (p-
value < 0.01). 
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equilibrium instead of a symmetric equilibrium. However, this argument does not apply 
to rent-seeking contests since the equilibrium in such contests is unique (Szidarovszky 
and Okuguchi, 1997). A second explanation is that subjects play a quantal response 
equilibrium by drawing their effort levels from the equilibrium distribution and thus 
causing some variance. A third explanation for effort fluctuations is based on the 
probabilistic nature of a contest which may from period to period affect individual 
decisions. Finally, it might be the case that subjects have different preferences towards 
risk which affect their behavior. In our experiment we elicited a measure of risk attitudes 
from a series of lotteries. We find substantial evidence that the measurement of risk 
attitude is a good predictor of subject‟s behavior in a contest: less risk-averse subjects 
expend higher efforts than more risk-averse subjects.
27
 This observation is consistent with 
theoretical work by Hillman and Katz (1984) and it can explain why individual efforts are 
not identical and instead are distributed on the entire strategy space. 
 
B. One-Stage versus Multi-Stage 
The major purpose of this study is to compare the performance of a one-stage 
contest with a multi-stage contest. Theoretically, OS and TS treatments should produce 
the same revenues and the same dissipation rates. However, Table 2.4.1 reveals a big 
difference in the revenue collected between the two treatments. The total revenue in the 
OS treatment is 136, while the total revenue in the TS treatment is 170. Subjects behave 
more aggressively in the multi-stage contest, exerting efforts that are 25% higher than 
                                                 
27
 We estimate several random effects models where the dependent variable is the total effort expended and 
the independent variables are the measurements of risk-aversion, session, and treatment dummy-variables. 
All specifications indicate that risk attitudes elicited from lotteries have significant influence on the effort 
expended in contests. The results of the estimation are available from the author upon request. 
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efforts in the one-stage contest. The estimation of a random effects model, where the 
dependent variable is the effort and the independent variables are a treatment dummy-
variable and a period trend, indicates that the treatment difference is significant (p-value 
< 0.01). The difference is significant even when we exclude the first 15 periods of the 
experiment (p-value < 0.01). 
Result 5: Two-stage contest generates higher revenue and higher dissipation rates 
than an equivalent one-stage contest. 
 
Figure 2.4.3 – Fraction of Drop-Outs (0 Effort) over 30 Periods 
What is causing this substantial treatment difference? A closer look at the 
distribution of first stage efforts in Figure 2.4.2 reveals that there are almost twice as 
many drop-outs (effort of 0) in the OS treatment than in the TS treatment. From Figure 
2.4.3 we see that this difference persists throughout all periods of the experiment. This 
difference is significant based on the estimation of a random effects probit model, where 
the dependent variable is whether or not the subject expended any effort and the 
independent variables are a treatment dummy-variable and a period trend (p-value < 
0
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0.01). One immediate explanation comes from the fact that in the OS treatment each 
subject always competes with three other subjects at the same time while in the TS 
treatment each subject competes with only one other subject at the same time. Therefore, 
less competitive subjects drop out of the contest more often in the OS treatment than in 
the TS treatment. To look for more evidence on the “drop-out” effect, we conducted an 
additional session (12 subjects) where two subjects were given the endowment of 120 
francs and were competing in a contest for a prize value of 120 francs. The results fully 
support the “drop-out” phenomenon: when the contest is between two players, there are 
only 2% of drop-outs, and when the contest is between four players, there are 16% of 
drop-outs. These differences suggest that “drop-out” phenomenon may partially explain 
the higher over-dissipation in TS treatment relative to OS treatment.
28
 
 
Figure 2.4.4 – The Average Effort by Outcome of Stage in TS treatment 
Another explanation for significant over-dissipation in the TS treatment comes 
from the dynamic nature of the multi-stage contest. Figure 2.4.4 displays the average 
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 Muller and Schotter (2009) also documented the drop-out phenomenon in a contest developed by 
Moldovanu and Sela (2001). 
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efforts by both winners and losers in each stage of the TS treatment. In equilibrium, 
symmetric players should expend the same effort and therefore should have equal 
probability of winning the first and second stage. However, in contrast to the equilibrium 
predictions, in both stages there is strong heterogeneity in individual behavior with 
winners expending significantly higher efforts than losers (the difference is especially 
large in the second stage). This important observation can also help to explain why a 
multi-stage contest generates significantly higher revenue than a one-stage contest. 
Subjects who expend higher efforts in the first stage are more likely to proceed to the 
second stage. Therefore, the first stage serves as a catalyst that helps to select more 
competitive subjects into the second stage. As a result of the selection effect, more 
competitive subjects compete twice in the same TS treatment. 
To look for more evidence on the selection effect, we conducted two additional 
sessions (24 subjects) with a treatment very similar to the TS treatment. The only 
difference was that, instead of subjects making their own decisions in the first stage, 
subjects had to choose the efforts suggested by the computer. The computer randomly 
chose the first stage efforts, drawn independently for each subject from efforts observed 
in the first stage of original TS treatment. In the second stage, the two finalists made their 
own second stage efforts. This treatment was designed to eliminate the selection effect by 
exogenously assigning different subjects to the second stage. Consistent with our 
hypothesis, the average effort in the second stage significantly dropped from 47.2 
originally to 35.3 (p-value < 0.01).
29
 This finding suggests that the selection effect in fact 
                                                 
29
 We estimated a random effects model, where the dependent variable is the second stage effort and 
independent variable is a session dummy. The session dummy was significant with confidence level of 1%. 
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contributes to the over-dissipation in the TS treatment and it can also explain why the TS 
treatment generates higher dissipation than the OS treatment.
30
 
Behavioral economists may recognize yet another possible explanation for 
significant over-dissipation in TS treatment. Instead of a selection effect in the first stage, 
one may argue that significant over-dissipation in the second stage is a result of a sunk 
cost fallacy. In economics, sunk costs are costs that have been incurred and which cannot 
be recovered. Rational economic agents should not let sunk costs influence their 
decisions. However, there is some evidence that economic agents fall prey to a sunk cost 
fallacy (Arkes and Blumer, 1985; Meyer, 1993; Friedman et al., 2007). In our 
experiment, subjects who get to the second stage of the TS treatment are the subjects who 
expended some positive efforts in the first stage. If subjects do not discard sunk costs 
associated with the first stage efforts, they will expend more efforts in the second stage. 
This implies that the second stage efforts should decrease when the first stage efforts 
decrease. The data clearly rejects this prediction. Although, with experience, subjects 
decrease the first stage efforts in TS treatment, they do not decrease the second stage 
efforts, as the sunk cost fallacy would predict (Result 3, right panel of Figure 2.4.1). 
Moreover, the data from the session investigating “drop-out” effects indicates that in a 
two-player contest subjects expend the average effort of 33.5. This effort is very close to 
effort expenditures of 35.3 in the session where subjects are exogenously assigned into 
the second stage of TS treatment. Note that the difference between these two sessions is 
that in the first session the selection and sunk cost effects are eliminated while in the 
                                                 
30
 Eriksson et al. (2009) report results from an experiment where subjects could self-select into a 
tournament. Their results show that when the subjects choose to enter a tournament, the average effort is 
higher than when the tournament payment scheme is imposed. 
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second session only the selection effect is eliminated. Only minor differences in effort 
expenditures (33.5 versus 35.3) indicate that additional elimination of the sunk costs 
effect does change individual behavior. Therefore, we conclude that the sunk cost fallacy 
is unlikely to explain the differences in dissipation rates between TS and OS treatments.
31
 
 
C. Non-Monetary Utility of Winning 
Our theoretical predictions are based on the assumption of risk neutrality and 
symmetry among all the players. However, previous experimental research has found a 
significant effect of risk attitudes and demographic characteristics on the dissipation rate 
(Miller and Pratt, 1991; Schmidt et al., 2005; Sheremeta, 2009). Understanding individual 
differences and how these differences affect the behavior is very important since it can 
help to uncover important selection effects in contests. 
Table 2.4.2 – Total Effort versus Different Characteristics 
Effort in a Contest 
with No Prize 
Percent of 
Subjects 
Average Effort in 
Contests with Prize 
   0 57.7% 31.3 
   0-10 17.3% 33.4 
   10-20 2.6% 39.9 
   20-30 10.3% 45.1 
   30-40 1.3% 50.6 
   40-50 2.6% 73.2 
   50-60 2.6% 74.3 
   >60 5.8% 54.2 
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 Note that the sunk cost fallacy works in a different way than the selection effect. The sunk cost fallacy 
means that subjects who get to the second stage expend higher efforts because they are not willing to forgo 
their efforts in the first stage. The selection effect means that more competitive subjects get to the second 
stage and therefore they compete more during the second stage. We believe that selection effect and 
possibly sunk cost fallacy can explain why TS treatment generates higher dissipation than OS treatment. 
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In our experiment we elicited a non-monetary value of winning. At the end of 
each session subjects were given a trivial task. In a treatment similar to OS treatment, all 
subjects were given an initial endowment of 120 francs and were asked to submit their 
efforts for a prize value 0. Subjects were explicitly told that they would have to pay for 
their efforts. This task was used to elicit subject‟s non-monetary utility of winning. It is 
reasonable to assume that subjects who exert higher efforts in such a task have a higher 
non-monetary utility of winning. We were very surprised to discover that about 30% of 
subjects submitted efforts between 1 and 30, and about 12% of subjects chose efforts 
higher than 30 (30 francs is equivalent to $0.5). Table 2.4.2 shows that the higher efforts 
subjects expend in a contest with no prize, indicating higher non-monetary utility of 
winning, the higher their total effort in contests with prize is.  
Table 2.4.3 – Determinants of Effort in Contests with Prize 
 
An obvious question that one may ask is whether the non-monetary utility of 
winning is a good predictor of subject‟s effort expenditures in a contest. To answer this 
question we estimate several random effects models where the dependent variable is the 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable, total effort OS+TS OS+TS OS TS
period-trend -0.27*** -0.27*** -0.11** -0.56***
    [inverse of a period trend, 1/t ] (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.10)
non-monetary 0.28*** 0.26*** 0.22*** 0.41***
    [effort in a contest with no prize] (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.13)
quiz -2.93* -1.97 -5.48*
    [number of correct quiz answers] (1.75) (1.66) (2.27)
OS dummy -6.24*** -6.24***
  [1 if OS treatment] (1.12) (1.12)
Observations 3960 3960 2520 1440
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%
Random effect models account for individual characteristics of subjects
In each regression we control for session, period, and treatment effects
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total effort expended and the independent variables are a period trend, a treatment 
dummy-variable, and non-monetary expenditures. We also include dummy-variables to 
control for session effects (not shown in the table). The results of the estimation are 
presented in Table 2.4.3. Specifications (1) and (2) use the data from both treatments, 
while specifications (3) and (4) use the data from OS and TS treatments separately. 
The estimation of specification (1) in Table 2.4.3 indicates a very significant and 
positive correlation between the total effort and the non-monetary variable. One may 
argue that non-monetary coefficient is capturing confusion instead of a non-monetary 
utility of winning. The problem with such an argument is that subjects participated in the 
contest with no prize at the very end of the experiment, after they played other contests 
for 60 periods. In specification (2) we use the quiz variable measuring the number of 
correct quiz answers to further control for confusion.
32
 We find that subjects who 
understand the instructions better expend significantly lower efforts in contests. 
Nevertheless, controlling for confusion, the non-monetary coefficient is still positive and 
highly significant. This finding suggests that winning is a component in a subject‟s utility 
and that higher non-monetary utility of winning causes higher over-dissipation in 
contests. It is also evident that the non-monetary coefficient is almost twice as high in the 
TS treatment as in the OS treatment (specifications 3 versus 4). This suggests that the 
non-monetary utility of winning may be more important in a two-stage contest than in a 
one-stage contest. 
                                                 
32
 This is a measure of how well subjects understand the instructions. Before the actual experiment, subjects 
completed the quiz on the computer to verify their understanding of the instructions. If a subject‟s answer 
was incorrect, the computer provided the correct answer. The experiment started only after all participants 
had answered all quiz questions. 
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What are the implications of these findings? First, the non-monetary utility of 
winning can explain why there is persistent over-dissipation in numerous experimental 
studies, including our own. Second, the non-monetary utility of winning can explain why 
the two-stage contest generates higher revenue than an equivalent one-stage contest. To 
formalize this argument, consider the following revised version of the theoretical model 
presented in Section 2.2. To account for a non-monetary utility of winning, we assume 
that each player, in addition to the prize of value , has a non-monetary value of winning 
. In such a case, the expected payoff of a risk-neutral player  competing in a simple -
player one-stage contest is given by 
.      (6) 
The crucial difference from the original model is that the total value of winning 
the contest is . Differentiating (6) with respect to  leads to a Nash equilibrium 
solution 
.        (7) 
Next, consider a two-stage contest, where in the first stage  players are divided 
into  equal groups. By backward induction, according to (7), in the second stage each 
finalist will expend effort of 
.        (8) 
The resulting expected payoff in the second stage is . Knowing this, 
in the first stage  players within each group compete as if the value of the prize was 
, and the first stage non-monetary value of winning was . Therefore, 
according to (7), the first stage equilibrium effort is given by 
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.       (9) 
Note that this simple behavioral model can explain several phenomena observed 
in our experiment. First, it can explain significant over-dissipation in both contests and in 
both stages of the competition. It is also straightforward to show that this model predicts 
higher effort expenditures in the two-stage contest, , than in the 
one-stage contest, . The reason behind this result is that in the two-stage 
contest some players receive non-monetary utility of winning twice (in the first stage and 
then in the second stage), while in the one-stage contest such utility is received only once. 
One possible extension to this model is to assume that the non-monetary value of winning 
depends on the number of contestants, i.e. . For example, one can replicate all 
qualitative predictions of our behavioral model under the assumption of linear non-
monetary utility of winning, i.e. . Obviously, the correct specification of the 
non-monetary utility of winning is an important question for future research. 
The non-monetary utility of winning  in (7), (8), and (9) is not directly observable. 
It can be elicited through a simple experiment in which , however, as we did in the 
final stage of our experiment. The data suggests that the average non-monetary value of 
winning is about 62.9 experimental francs, which is equivalent to $1.05.
33
 Accounting for 
such addition utility of winning, the revised equilibrium effort in the one-stage contest is 
34.3. This prediction is almost identical to the average effort of 34.1 that subjects 
expended in OS treatment. In the two-stage contest, the revised first stage equilibrium 
effort is 27.1 and the second stage effort is 45.7. These predictions are also relatively 
                                                 
33
 Equation (7) implies that . In a contest with no prize,  and , subjects 
expend an average effort of  11.8. Therefore, the implied value of  is 62.9. 
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close to the observed actual efforts of 18.9 and 47.4 in TS treatment. One reason why our 
behavioral model overestimates the effort expenditures in the first stage is due to the 
assumption that subjects correctly account for the future utility of winning in the second 
stage. However, if subjects are myopic and they do not recognize the possibility of 
receiving an additional utility of winning in the second stage then their expenditures in 
the first stage will be lower. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
Many contests in the real world last for multiple stages. In each stage contestants 
exert costly efforts in order to advance to the final stage and win the prize. The majority 
of experimental studies, however, focus on one-stage static contests. In this article, we 
depart from conventional practice by studying a multi-stage elimination contest and 
comparing its performance with a one-stage contest. We find significant over-dissipation 
in both contests and in both stages of the competition. This over-dissipation can be 
explained by a non-monetary utility of winning. 
More importantly, contrary to the theory, the two-stage contest generates higher 
revenue than the equivalent one-stage contest. We propose several explanations for this 
finding. First explanation is based on the observation that there are twice as many drop-
outs in the one-stage contest than there are in the two-stage contest. Another explanation 
is a selection effect which implies that more competitive subjects win the first stage and 
thus proceed to the second stage. As a result, more competitive subjects compete twice in 
the same two-stage contest. We find evidence for the selection effect: when subjects are 
exogenously assigned into the second stage, subjects on average expend significantly 
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lower second stage efforts than when the assignment is endogenous. Finally, and 
probably most importantly, we find that the non-monetary utility of winning can account 
for the majority of differences between the one-stage and two-stage contests. 
The results of this study have important implications for contest design (Rosen, 
1986; Gradstein and Konrad, 1999). By using a multi-stage contest instead of a one-stage 
contest, the designer can extract higher total efforts from contestants. Moreover, by using 
a multi-stage contest, the designer can increase participation rate. Knowing that the major 
competition takes place in the latter stages, the designer can guarantee high performance 
from contestants in the final stage of a multi-stage contest. 
This study also points out the importance of modeling theoretically a number of 
behavioral considerations such as heterogeneity between players and a non-monetary 
utility of winning. By incorporating these behavioral considerations, we can understand 
why individual behavior does not comply with the equilibrium predictions of classical 
models. Obviously, this study also opens several interesting questions about how one 
should model the non-monetary utility of winning, what are the alternative elicitation 
mechanisms that can reveal individual preferences towards winning, and what are the 
implications of such preferences in different economic environments. 
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2.8 Appendix 
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS 
This is an experiment in the economics of strategic decision making. Various 
research agencies have provided funds for this research. The instructions are simple.  If 
you follow them closely and make appropriate decisions, you can earn an appreciable 
amount of money. 
The experiment will proceed in four parts. Each part contains decision problems 
that require you to make a series of economic choices which determine your total 
earnings. The currency used in Part 1 of the experiment is U.S. Dollars. The currency 
used in Part 2, 3 and 4 of the experiment is francs. Francs will be converted to U.S. 
Dollars at a rate of _60_ francs to _1_ dollar. At the end of today‟s experiment, you will 
be paid in private and in cash. 12 participants are in today‟s experiment. 
It is very important that you remain silent and do not look at other people‟s work. 
If you have any questions, or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an 
experimenter will come to you. If you talk, laugh, exclaim out loud, etc., you will be 
asked to leave and you will not be paid. We expect and appreciate your cooperation.  
At this time we proceed to Part 1 of the experiment. 
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR PART 1 
YOUR DECISION 
In this part of the experiment you will be asked to make a series of choices in 
decision problems. How much you receive will depend partly on chance and partly on the 
choices you make. The decision problems are not designed to test you. What we want to 
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know is what choices you would make in them. The only right answer is what you really 
would choose. 
For each line in the table in the next page, please state whether you prefer option 
A or option B. Notice that there are a total of 15 lines in the table but just one line will be 
randomly selected for payment. You ignore which line will be paid when you make your 
choices. Hence you should pay attention to the choice you make in every line. After you 
have completed all your choices a token will be randomly drawn out of a bingo cage 
containing tokens numbered from 1 to 15. The token number determines which line is 
going to be paid. 
Your earnings for the selected line depend on which option you chose: If you 
chose option A in that line, you will receive $1. If you chose option B in that line, you 
will receive either $3 or $0. To determine your earnings in the case you chose option B 
there will be second random draw. A token will be randomly drawn out of the bingo cage 
now containing twenty tokens numbered from 1 to 20. The token number is then 
compared with the numbers in the line selected (see the table). If the token number shows 
up in the left column you earn $3. If the token number shows up in the right column you 
earn $0. 
 Are there any questions? 
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Participant ID _________ 
 
Decis
ion 
no. 
Optio
n A 
Option 
B 
Please  
choose  
A or B 
1 $1 $3   never 
$0   if 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13, 
       14,15, 16,17,18,19,20 
 
2 $1 $3   if 1 comes out 
$0   if 2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13, 
       14,15, 16,17,18,19,20 
 
3 $1 $3   if 1 or 2 comes out 
$0   if 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15, 
       16,17,18,19,20 
 
4 $1 $3   if 1,2 or 3 
$0   if  4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15, 
       16,17,18,19,20 
 
5 $1 $3   if 1,2,3,4 
$0   if  5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,  
       16,17,18,19,20 
 
6 $1 $3   if 1,2,3,4,5 
$0   if 6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,  
       16,17,18,19,20 
 
7 $1 $3   if 1,2,3,4,5,6 
$0   if 7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,  
       16,17,18,19,20 
 
8 $1 $3   if 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 
$0   if 8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,  
       16,17,18,19,20 
 
9 $1 $3   if 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8 
$0   if 9,10,11,12,13,14,15,  
       16,17,18,19,20 
 
10 $1 $3   if 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9 
$0   if 10,11,12,13,14,15,  
       16,17,18,19,20 
 
11 $1 $3   if 1,2, 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 $0   if 11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20  
12 $1 $3   if 1,2, 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11 $0   if 12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20  
13 $1 $3   if 1,2, 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12 $0   if 13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20  
14 $1 
$3   if 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10  
       11,12,13 
$0   if 14,15,16,17,18,19,20  
15 $1 
$3   if 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10  
       11,12,13,14 
$0   if 15,16,17,18,19,20  
  
  
81 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR PART 2 
YOUR DECISION 
The second part of the experiment consists of 30 decision-making periods and 
each period consists of two stages. At the beginning of each period, you will be randomly 
and anonymously placed into a group of four participants. The composition of your group 
will be changed randomly every period. Each period you will be randomly and 
anonymously assigned as participant 1, 2, 3, or 4. In Stage 1 participant 1 will be paired 
with participant 2 and participant 3 will be paired with participant 4. All four participants 
will be given an initial endowment of 120 francs. You will use this endowment to bid for 
a chance of participating in the final Stage 2. An example of your decision screen is 
shown below. 
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The two finalists – one from each pair – will proceed to Stage 2. The other two 
participants who did not win in Stage 1 will no longer participate in this period. In Stage 
2 the two remaining participants will bid for a reward. The reward is worth 120 francs. 
The two participants may bid any number of francs between 0 and the amount of francs 
remaining from the initial endowment (including 0.5 decimal points). An example of the 
decision screen is shown below. 
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The diagram below depicts the basic structure of each period. 
 
 
YOUR EARNINGS 
If you receive the reward your period earnings are equal to your endowment plus 
the reward minus your bids in Stage 1 and Stage 2. If you do not receive the reward your 
period earnings are equal to your endowment minus your bids in Stage 1 and Stage 2. 
Note that if you do not win in Stage 1, your bid in Stage 2 is automatically assigned to 
zero. 
If you receive the reward:  
Earnings = Endowment + Reward – Your Bid in Stage 1 – Your Bid in Stage 2 = 
    = 120 + 120 – Your Bid in Stage 1 – Your Bid in Stage 2 
If you do not receive the reward:   
Earnings = Endowment – Your Bid in Stage 1 – Your Bid in Stage 2 = 
    = 120 – Your Bid in Stage 1 – Your Bid in Stage 2 
The more you bid in each stage, the more likely you are to win that stage. The 
more the other participants bid, the less likely you are to win. Specifically, in Stage 1, for 
reward of 120 francs 
participant 1 
endowment of 
120 francs 
Stage 1 Stage 1 
finalist 1  
amount of francs 
remaining from the 
initial endowment 
Stage 2 
participant 2 
endowment of 
120 francs 
participant 3 
endowment of 
120 francs 
participant 4 
endowment of 
120 francs 
finalist 2  
amount of francs 
remaining from the 
initial endowment 
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each franc you bid you will receive one lottery ticket. At the end of Stage 1 the computer 
draws randomly one ticket among all the tickets purchased by you and the other 
participant. The owner of the drawn ticket wins Stage 1 and proceeds to Stage 2. Thus, 
your chance of winning in Stage 1 is given by the number of francs you bid divided by 
the total number of francs you and the other participant bids. 
Chance of winning 
in Stage 1 
= 
Your Bid 
Your Bid + The Other Participant‟s Bid 
In case both participants bid zero in Stage 1, the computer randomly chooses one 
participant who wins Stage 1 and proceeds to Stage 2. In Stage 2, for each franc you bid 
you will also receive one lottery ticket. At the end of Stage 2 the computer draws 
randomly one ticket among all the tickets purchased by you and the other finalist of Stage 
1. The owner of the drawn ticket wins Stage 2 and receives the reward of 120 francs. 
Thus, your chance of winning Stage 2 is given by the number of francs you bid divided 
by the total number of francs you and the other participant bids. 
Chance of winning 
in Stage 2 
= 
Your Bid 
Your Bid + The Other Participant‟s Bid 
In case both participants bid zero in Stage 2, the winner is determined randomly. 
 
Example of the Random Draw 
This is a hypothetical example of how the computer makes a random draw. Let‟s 
say, in Stage 1, participant 1 bids 10 francs, participant 2 bids 5 francs, participant 3 bids 
0 francs, and participant 4 bids 40 francs. Therefore, the computer assigns 10 lottery 
tickets to participant 1, 5 lottery tickets to participant 2, 0 lottery tickets to participant 3, 
and 40 lottery tickets to participant 4. In Stage 1, participant 1 is paired with participant 
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2. Therefore, for this fist pair the computer randomly draws one lottery ticket out of 15 
(10 lottery tickets for participant 1 and 5 lottery tickets for participant 2). As you can see, 
participant 1 has higher chance of winning in Stage 1: 0.67 = 10/15. Participant 2 has 
0.33 = 5/15 chance of winning in Stage 1. Similarly, participant 3 is paired with 
participant 4 in Stage 1. For this second pair, the computer randomly draws one lottery 
ticket out of 40 (0 lottery tickets for participant 3 and 40 lottery tickets for participant 4). 
As you can see, in this pair participant 3 has no chance of winning in Stage 1: 0 = 0/40.  
Let‟s say that computer made a random draw in Stage 1 and the winner of the first 
pair is participant 2 while the winner of the second pair is participant 4. Therefore, 
participant 2 and participant 4 proceed to Stage 2. Let‟s say, in Stage 2, participant 2 bids 
60 francs and participant 4 bids 20 francs. Therefore, the computer assigns 60 lottery 
tickets to participant 2 and 20 lottery tickets to participant 4. Then the computer 
randomly draws one lottery ticket out of 80 (60 + 20). As you can see, participant 2 has 
higher chance of winning in Stage 2: 0.75 = 60/80. Participant 4 has 0.25 = 20/80 chance 
of winning in Stage 2.  
After four participants make their bids in Stage 1, the computer will make a 
random draw which will decide who wins in Stage 1 and thus proceeds to Stage 2. Then 
after two remaining participants make their bids in Stage 2, the computer will make a 
random draw which will decide who wins in Stage 2. Then the computer will calculate 
your period earnings based on your bid in Stage 1 and Stage 2 and whether you received 
the reward or not. These earnings will be converted to cash and paid at the end of the 
experiment if the current period is one of the five periods that is randomly chosen for 
payment. 
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At the end of each period, your bid in Stage 1, the other participant‟s bid in Stage 
1, whether you won in Stage 1 or not, your bid in Stage 2, the other participant‟s bid in 
Stage 2, whether you received the reward or not, and the earnings for the period are 
reported on the outcome screen as shown below. Once the outcome screen is displayed 
you should record your results for the period on your Personal Record Sheet under the 
appropriate heading. 
 
Outcome Screen 
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IMPORTANT NOTES 
 You will not be told which of the participants in this room are assigned to which 
group. At the beginning of each period you will be randomly re-grouped with three other 
participants to from a four-person group. You can never guarantee yourself the reward. 
However, by increasing your contribution, you can increase your chance of winning in 
Stage 1 and Stage 2 and thus increase your chance of receiving the reward. Regardless of 
who receives the reward, all participants will have to pay their bids in Stage 1 and Stage 
2. 
At the end of the experiment we will randomly choose 5 of the 30 periods for 
actual payment in Part 2 using a bingo cage. You will sum the total earnings for these 5 
periods and convert them to a U.S. dollar payment, as shown on the last page of your 
record sheet. 
Are there any questions? 
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR PART 3 
The third part of the experiment consists of 30 decision-making periods. The rules 
for part 3 are similar to the rules for part 2. At the beginning of each period, you will be 
randomly and anonymously placed into a group of 4 participants. The composition of 
your group will be changed randomly every period. Each period you will be given an 
initial endowment of 120 francs. You will use this endowment to bid for a reward. The 
reward is worth 120 francs to you and the other three participants in your group. The only 
difference is that in part 3, there will be only one stage (instead of two stages). In that 
stage all four participants including you will bid for a reward. 
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After all participants have made their decisions, your earnings for the period are 
calculated in the similar way as in part 2. 
If you receive the reward:  
Earnings = Endowment + Reward – Your Bid = 120 + 120 – Your Bid 
If you do not receive the reward:   
Earnings = Endowment – Your Bid = 120 – Your Bid 
The more you bid, the more likely you are to receive the reward. The more the 
other participants in your group bid, the less likely you are to receive the reward. 
Specifically, for each franc you bid you will receive one lottery ticket. At the end of each 
period the computer draws randomly one ticket among all the tickets purchased by 4 
participants in the group, including you. The owner of the drawn ticket receives the 
reward of 120 francs. Thus, your chance of receiving the reward is given by the number 
of francs you bid divided by the total number of francs all 4 participants in your group 
bid. 
Chance of receiving 
the reward 
= 
Your Bid 
Sum of all 4 Bids in Your Group 
In case all participants bid zero, the reward is randomly assigned to one of the 
four participants in the group.  
 
Example of the Random Draw 
This is a hypothetical example used to illustrate how the computer is making a 
random draw. Let‟s say participant 1 bids 10 francs, participant 2 bids 15 francs, 
participant 3 bids 0 francs, and participant 4 bids 40 francs. Therefore, the computer 
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assigns 10 lottery tickets to participant 1, 15 lottery tickets to participant 2, 0 lottery 
tickets to participant 3, and 40 lottery tickets for participant 4. Then the computer 
randomly draws one lottery ticket out of 65 (10 + 15 + 0 + 40). As you can see, 
participant 4 has the highest chance of receiving the reward: 0.62 = 40/65. Participant 2 
has 0.23 = 15/65 chance, participant 1 has 0.15 = 10/65 chance, and participant 3 has 0 = 
0/65 chance of receiving the reward. 
After all participants make their bids, the computer will make a random draw 
which will decide who receives the reward. Then the computer will calculate your period 
earnings based on your bid and whether you received the reward or not. 
At the end of each period, your bid, the sum of all bids in your group, whether 
you received the reward or not, and the earnings for the period are reported on the 
outcome screen. Once the outcome screen is displayed you should record your results for 
the period on your Personal Record Sheet under the appropriate heading. 
At the end of the experiment we will randomly choose 5 of the 30 periods for 
actual payment in Part 3 using a bingo cage. You will sum the total earnings for these 5 
periods and convert them to a U.S. dollar payment, as shown on the last page of your 
record sheet. 
Are there any questions? 
  
INSTRUCTIONS FOR PART 4 
The fourth part of the experiment consists of only 1 decision-making period. The 
rules for part 4 are the same as the rules for part 3. At the beginning of the period, you 
will be randomly and anonymously placed into a group of 4 participants. You will be 
  
90 
given an initial endowment of 120 francs. You will use this endowment to bid in order to 
be a winner. For each franc you bid you will receive one lottery ticket. At the end of each 
period the computer draws randomly one ticket among all the tickets purchased by 4 
participants in the group, including you. The owner of the drawn ticket becomes a 
winner. Thus, your chance of becoming a winner is given by the number of francs you 
bid divided by the total number of francs all 4 participants in your group bid. The only 
difference is that in part 4 the winner does not receive the reward. Therefore, the reward 
is worth 0 francs to you and the other three participants in your group. After all 
participants have made their decisions, your earnings are calculated. 
Earnings = Endowment – Your Bid = 120 – Your Bid 
 After all participants have made their decisions, your earnings will be displayed 
on the outcome screen. Your earnings will be converted to cash and paid at the end of the 
experiment. 
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ESSAY 3 
EFFORT CARRYOVER AND INFORMATION DISCLOSURE IN  
TWO STAGE POLITICAL CONTESTS 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Multi-stage contests are commonly characterized by the number of stages and the 
extent to which the expenditures in one stage affects the probability of winning in another 
stage. The US presidential race and many other political competitions fall into the 
category of multi-stage elimination contests. At each stage, candidates use self-promotion 
and campaign advertisement in order to advance to the final stage and win the election. 
Campaign advertising in earlier stages enhances the candidate‟s image and thus increases 
the probability of winning the final stage of the election. Another prominent example of 
multi-stage elimination contests is the international competition for hosting the Olympic 
Games. In this contest, countries are eliminated at each stage and the resources expended 
by each country in earlier stages affect the probability of winning the competition in later 
stages. 
In this study we are interested in the following questions: What is the effect of 
effort carryover on the behavior of contestants? How does information about the effort 
carried over by the opponent affect behavior in different stages of the contest? To answer 
these questions we experimentally study a two-stage elimination contest between two
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political parties. In the first stage, parties run their primaries to select one candidate who 
proceeds to the final stage. The resources and efforts expended in the first stage by the 
winning candidates are partially or fully carried over to the second stage. In the second 
stage, the two finalists compete against each other in the general election. The winner of 
the second stage receives an “election prize”. 
The findings of the experiment indicate that efforts expended in both stages of the 
competition exceed theoretical predictions, with experience diminishing effort 
expenditures in the first stage but not in the second stage. Our experimental results 
support all major comparative statics predictions of the theory: the first stage effort and 
the total effort expenditures increase in the carryover rate, and the second stage effort 
decreases in the carryover rate. With regard to the effect of information, we find that 
disclosing information about the opponent‟s carryover effort increases the second stage 
effort and decreases the first stage effort. 
To place our study into the context of previous literature, the following is a brief 
review of theoretical and experimental studies on contests. Major theories in contest 
literature are based on the seminal model of rent-seeking introduced by Tullock (1980). 
The focus of this literature is the relationship between effort expenditures and underlying 
contest characteristics (Nitzan, 1994). Most theoretical studies assume that contests last 
for only one stage. However, more recent theoretical studies point out the importance of 
analyzing multi-stage contests (Gradstein and Konrad, 1999; Baik and Lee, 2000; Stein 
and Rapoport, 2005; Kaplan and Sela, 2008).
34
 Gradstein and Konrad (1999), for 
                                                 
34
 Other theoretical studies of multi-stage elimination contests have been conducted by Rosen (1986), Clark 
and Riis (1996), Gradstein (1998), and Amegashie (1999). All these studies investigate different aspects of 
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example, consider a multi-stage elimination contest in which contestants expend costly 
efforts in each stage in order to advance to the final stage and win the prize. The authors 
show that, depending on the contest success function, a multi-stage contest may induce 
higher effort by the participants than a one-stage contest. Two related studies by Baik and 
Lee (2000) and Stein and Rapoport (2005) consider two-stage elimination contests in 
which expenditures made in the first stage affect both the expenditures and the outcomes 
of the second stage. Stein and Rapoport (2005) create the inter-dependence between the 
efforts expended in two stages by introducing budget constraints. They derive the 
conditions under which the budget constraint is binding and show how it may affect the 
expenditures in both stages. Baik and Lee (2000) create inter-dependence between the 
efforts expended in two stages by allowing the first stage effort to be carried over to the 
second stage. In their contest, players in two groups compete non-cooperatively to win a 
prize. In the first stage, each group selects a finalist who competes for the prize in the 
second stage. First-stage efforts are partially (or fully) carried over to the second stage. 
Baik and Lee (2000) demonstrate that, in the case of player-specific carryovers, the total 
effort expenditures increase in the carryover rate and the rent is fully dissipated with full 
carryover. 
Empirical studies of multi-stage elimination contests are hard to conduct since it 
is difficult to measure the effort and the ability of individual contestants (Ehrenberg and 
Bognanno, 1990; Bognanno, 2001; Szymanski, 2003). With this in mind, several 
researchers have turned to experimental tests of multi-stage elimination contests in a 
                                                                                                                                                 
multi-stage contests such as elimination procedures, interdependency between the stages, and asymmetry 
between contestants. 
  
94 
laboratory setting. Parco et al. (2005) and Amaldoss and Rapoport (2009) report the 
results of experiments on two-stage contest with budget-constrained players. Their 
findings reject the equilibrium model of Stein and Rapoport (2005) because of significant 
over-dissipation in the first stage. Both experimental studies conjecture that the non-
pecuniary utility of winning plays a crucial role in explaining excessive over-dissipation 
in the first stage. Sheremeta (2009b) finds that, contrary to theoretical predictions of 
Gradstein and Konrad (1999), a two-stage elimination contest generates higher revenue 
than an equivalent one-stage contest. Our experimental design is based on the theoretical 
work of Baik and Lee (2000) and it shares some features with experimental studies of 
Parco et al. (2005) and Sheremeta (2009b).
35
 
 
3.2 Theoretical Model 
Consider a two-stage contest with a total of  players. In the first stage, all 
players are split evenly between  groups and each group consists of  players. Each 
player  chooses his effort level  to influence the probability  of winning the first 
stage. This probability is defined by a lottery contest success function: 
.       (1) 
The contestant‟s probability of winning depends on his own effort relative to the 
total effort expended by all players. The winner in each group proceeds to the second 
stage. In the second stage,  players compete for an exogenous prize of value . The 
probability that contestant  wins in the second stage is given by: 
                                                 
35
 Other experimental studies of multi-stage contests are done by Schmitt et al. (2004), Amegashie et al. 
(2007), and Altmann et al. (2008). 
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.      (2) 
In addition to the second stage effort , a fraction of the first stage effort  is 
carried over to the second stage. The carryover parameter  denotes the extent to 
which the first stage effort is carried over to the second stage. This parameter is the same 
for all players and is common knowledge. 
To analyze the two-stage contest, we apply backward induction. In the second 
stage, the efforts made in the first stage are already determined. Therefore, the second 
stage expected payoff of a risk-neutral player , , is derived by multiplying player 
„s probability of winning the second stage, , by prize value, , minus second stage 
effort, . 
      (3) 
Taking first order conditions with respect to  for all  and solving 
them simultaneously we obtain 
,      (4) 
From equations (4) and (2), the equilibrium probability of player  winning the 
second stage is given by . Furthermore, the expected payoff in the second stage is 
. We can now analyze the contest in the first stage between  
players. Assuming each player  has correct expectations about the second stage expected 
payoff, the first stage expected payoff, , can be derived by multiplying player ‟s 
probability of winning the first stage, , by the expected payoff from the second stage, 
, minus the first stage effort, .  
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     (5) 
Taking first order conditions with respect to , and assuming a symmetric pure 
strategy equilibrium, we obtain the first stage subgame perfect equilibrium effort: 
.        (6) 
Combining (4) and (6), the equilibrium solution for the second stage effort is 
.       (7) 
It is straightforward to show that, under the equilibrium strategy, the second order 
conditions hold and the resulting expected payoff is non-negative (Baik and Lee, 2000). 
Formulas (6) and (7) demonstrate how the first and second stage equilibrium efforts 
depend on the prize value, the carryover rate, and the number of contestants in each stage. 
Simple comparative statics reveal that the first stage equilibrium effort  increases while 
the second stage equilibrium effort  decreases in the carryover rate  (  and 
). It is also easy to show that the total expenditures – sum of all individual 
expenditures in the first and second stage – increase in the carryover rate (
). 
 
3.3 Experimental Design and Procedures 
A. Experimental Design and Hypotheses 
Our experiment is based on the theoretical model described in the previous 
section. The outline of the experimental design and theoretical predictions for each 
  
97 
treatment are shown in Table 3.3.1. Each treatment studies a two-stage contest with two 
groups,  = 2, and with two players per group,  = 2. The first stage winner of each 
group proceeds to the second stage and the winner of the second stage receives the prize 
of  = 120 experimental francs.  
Table 3.3.1 – Experimental Design and Equilibrium Effort Levels  
 
In partial carryover treatments (PCI and PCNI), half of the first stage winner‟s 
effort is carried over to the second stage (  = 0.5). In full carryover treatments (FCI and 
FCNI), the entire first stage winner‟s effort is carried over to the second stage (  = 1). 
The theoretical model described in Section 3.2 generates several intuitive predictions. As 
the extent of carryover increases, the effort made in the first stage increases and the effort 
made in the second stage decreases. From Table 3.3.1, the first stage effort increases from 
12 to 30 and the second stage effort decreases from 24 to 0 as we move from  = 0.5 to  
= 1. Based on these predictions we formulate the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1: The first stage effort increases and the second stage effort decreases 
in the carryover rate. 
Note that the total effort also depends on the carryover rate. According to the 
theoretical model, the total effort expenditures increase in the carryover rate and they are 
equal to the value of the prize when  = 1. Table 3.3.1 shows that the total effort 
increases from 96 to 120 as  increases from 0.5 to 1. The resulting dissipation rate, 
Effor
t
Total Effort
1 12 48
2 24 48
1 30 120
2 0 0
0.80
FCI (FCNI) 1.002
20.5
1
2
2
120
Treatment Stage
Groups, 
K
Players, 
N
Carryover 
rate, α
120
PCI (PCNI)
Prize,      
V
Equilibrium             Dissipation 
Rate
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defined as the sum of all efforts divided by the value of the prize, also increases from 0.8 
to 1. 
Hypothesis 2: The dissipation rate and the total effort increase in the carryover 
rate. 
We also study two information conditions: full information and no information. In 
PCI and FCI treatments, players receive full information about the opponent‟s efforts 
carried over from the first stage (“I” stands for full information). In PCNI and FCNI 
treatments, players receive no information about the opponent‟s efforts carried over from 
the first stage (“NI” stands for no information). If players behave according to the 
subgame perfect equilibrium, there should be no difference in the effort expenditures 
between the two conditions. 
Hypothesis 3: The information about the opponent‟s carryover effort does not 
affect individual behavior. 
 
B. Experimental Procedures 
The experiment was conducted at the Vernon Smith Experimental Economics 
Laboratory. A total of 96 Purdue University undergraduate students participated. All 
students participated in only one session of this study; however, some students had 
participated in other economics experiments that were unrelated to this research. 
The computerized experimental sessions were run using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 
2007). We study four treatments in eight sessions as shown in Table 3.3.2. Each 
experimental session proceeded in three parts. Subjects were given instructions, available 
in the Appendix, at the beginning of each part and the experimenter read the instructions 
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aloud. Before the actual experiment, subjects completed a quiz on the computer to verify 
their understanding of the instructions. The experiment started only after all subjects had 
answered all quiz questions. In the first part subjects made 15 choices in simple lotteries, 
similar to Holt and Laury (2002).
36
 This method was used to elicit individual subjects‟ 
risk preferences.  
Table 3.3.2 – Summary of Treatments and Sessions 
  
The second and the third parts corresponded to two out of four treatments. For 
example, in PCI → FCI, each subject played in the PCI treatment for 30 periods, then 
played in the FCI treatment for 30 periods. In each period, subjects were randomly and 
anonymously placed into a group of 4 participants. Subjects were randomly re-grouped 
after each period. In the first stage, participant 1 was paired against participant 2 and 
participant 3 was paired against participant 4. At the beginning of each period, each 
subject received an endowment of 120 experimental francs. Subjects could use their 
endowments to expend efforts (place bids). After all subjects submitted their efforts in the 
first stage, the computer then informed them if they were chosen to proceed to the second 
stage. The computer chose the winner of each pair randomly by implementing a simple 
lottery rule. The two finalists – one from each pair – again submitted efforts in the second 
                                                 
36
 Subjects were asked to state whether they preferred safe option A or risky option B. Option A yielded $1 
payoff with certainty, while option B yielded a payoff of either $3 or $0. The probability of receiving $3 or 
$0 varied across all 15 lotteries. The first lottery offered a 5% chance of winning $3 and a 95% chance of 
winning $0, while the last lottery offered a 70% chance of winning $3 and a 30% chance of winning $0. 
  PCI → FCI 2 12 2160 30 60 francs to $1
  FCI → PCI 2 12 2160 30 60 francs to $1
  PCNI → FCNI 2 12 2160 30 60 francs to $1
  FCNI → PCNI 2 12 2160 30 60 francs to $1
  Design
Number of         
Sessions
Conversion 
Rate
Periods per 
Treatment
Participants 
per Session
Total Number 
of Decisions
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stage. At the end of the second stage the computer chose the winner of the prize and 
displayed the following information to all subjects: the opponent‟s effort in the first stage, 
the other opponent‟s effort in the second stage, the result of the random draw in the first 
and second stage, and personal period earnings. Subjects who did not proceed to the 
second stage did not receive any information about the decisions made in the second 
stage. The instructions explained the structure of the game in detail. 
In the final fourth part of the experiment, subjects were given an endowment of 
120 francs and were asked to expend efforts in a one-stage contest for a prize value 0. 
Subjects were told that they would be informed whether they won the contest or not. We 
used this procedure to receive an indication of how important it is for subjects to win 
when winning is costly and there is no monetary reward for winning. 
At the end of the experiment, 1 out of 15 decisions subjects made in part one was 
randomly selected for payment. Subjects were also paid for 5 out of 30 periods in part 
two, for 5 out of 30 periods in part three, and for the 1 decision they made in part four. 
The earnings were converted into US dollars at the rate of 60 francs to $1. On average, 
subjects earned $25 each which was paid in cash. Each experimental session lasted about 
90 minutes. 
 
3.4 Results 
A. General Results 
Table 3.4.1 summarizes, by treatments, the average effort, average payoff, and 
average dissipation rate. The striking feature of the data is that, in all two-stage contests, 
subjects exert much higher efforts relative to the subgame perfect equilibrium prediction. 
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As a result, average payoffs are negative and average dissipation rates, defined as the 
ratio of the total effort expended to the prize value, are significantly greater than 
equilibrium dissipation rates.
37
 This finding is consistent with previous experimental 
studies of Davis and Reilly (1998), Gneezy and Smorodinsky (2006), and Sheremeta 
(2009a, b). In all four studies, the total effort expenditures exceeded the prize value and 
subjects earned, on average, negative payoffs. 
Result 1: Significant over-dissipation is observed in all contests. 
Table 3.4.1 – Average Statistics 
 
Two recent studies by Parco et al. (2005) and Amaldoss and Rapoport (2009) 
found significant over-dissipation in the first stage of a two-stage contest with budget 
constraints. Given the first stage over-dissipation, and the fact that subjects were budget 
constrained, there was a significant under-dissipation in the second stage. In contrast, 
Sheremeta (2009b) found significant over-dissipation in both stages of a two-stage 
contest without budget constraints. The current study is more closely related to 
Sheremeta (2009b) since subjects are not budget constrained. Thus, it is not surprising 
                                                 
37
 We ran a random effect regression on a constant separately for each treatment. Then we tested whether 
the constant coefficients are equal to the predicted theoretical values as in Table 3.4.1. We found that these 
differences are significant for all treatments (p-value < 0.01). 
Equilibrium Equilibrium Equilibrium Actual
1 12.0 18.2 (0.6)
2 24.0 37.7 (0.9)
1 30.0 21.0 (0.7)
2 0.0 34.3 (1.1)
1 12.0 22.0 (0.7)
2 24.0 32.6 (0.9)
1 30.0 33.4 (0.9)
2 0.0 18.9 (0.9)
Standard error of the mean in parentheses
152.5 0.0 -8.1 (1.1)
Total 
Effort
Average Payoff, π
Actual
148.2 6.0 -7.0 (1.2)
1.43
Dissipation Rate
1.280.80
0.80 1.23
1.00 1.27
153.1
1.00171.6 (1.2)0.0
-8.3
-12.9
(1.2)6.0
Treatment
Average Effort, e
Actual   
FCNI
PCNI
Stage
PCI
FCI
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that we find significant over-dissipation not only in the first stage but also in the second 
stage of a two-stage contest. 
The left panel of Figure 3.4.1 indicates that, in all two-stage contests, as players 
become more experienced, the first stage average effort decreases. The declining trend 
over the periods in each treatment is significant based on the estimation of a random 
effect model (p-value < 0.01), where the dependent variable is an effort and the 
independent variable is an inverse of a period trend. Although subjects decrease their first 
stage effort over the periods, this is not the case for the subjects‟ behavior in the second 
stage.  
Result 2: Experience diminishes over-dissipation in the first stage but not in the 
second stage. 
 
Figure 3.4.1 – Average Effort by Treatments 
Another point worth noting is the substantial variance in the distribution of effort. 
Figures 3.4.2a and 3.4.2b display, by treatment, the full distribution of the first and 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Effort
Period
Stage 1
PCI FCI
PCNI FCNI
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Effort
Period
Stage 2
PCI FCI
PCNI FCNI
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second stage efforts. Note that, instead of following a pure strategy equilibrium, 
individual efforts are instead distributed on the entire strategy space between 0 and 120. 
Result 3: There is substantial variance in individual efforts. 
 
Figure 3.4.2a – Distribution of Efforts in Stage  
 
Figure 3.4.2b – Distribution of Efforts in Stage 2 
Result 3 is consistent with previous experimental findings (Davis and Reilly, 
1998; Potters et al., 1998; Sheremeta, 2009a,b). Several explanations have been offered. 
The first explanation is that subjects make mistakes, causing some variance in efforts 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
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EffortPCI FCI
0
0.1
0.2
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0.4
0.5
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EffortPCNI FCNI
0
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(McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995; Goeree et al., 2002). The second explanation is that 
subjects behave differently because of demographic differences (Casari et al., 2007; 
Sheremeta, 2009a). And the third explanation for effort fluctuation is that success in 
contests is based on a random draw which may influence individual decisions over the 
periods (Sheremeta, 2009a). 
 
B. The Effect of Carryover 
The subgame perfect equilibrium derived in Section 3.2 predicts that, as the extent 
of carryover increases, the effort made in the first stage increases and the effort made in 
the second stage decreases. Table 3.4.1 shows that in treatments with partial carryover 
(PCI and PCNI) the first stage efforts are 18.2 and 22, while in treatments with full 
carryover (FCI and FCNI) the first stage efforts are 21 and 33.4. This finding is 
consistent with Hypothesis 1, indicating that the first stage expenditures increase in the 
carryover rate.
38
 Table 3.4.1 also shows that in PCI and PCNI treatments the second stage 
efforts are 37.7 and 32.6, while in FCI and FCNI treatments the second stage efforts are 
34.3 and 18.9. This finding is also consistent with Hypothesis 1, indicating that efforts in 
the second stage decrease in the carryover rate.
39
 
Result 4: The first stage effort increases while the second stage effort decreases in 
the carryover rate.  
                                                 
38
 We estimated random effect models separately for each information condition (I and NI), with effort 
expenditures as the dependent variable and treatment dummy as the independent variable. In both 
conditions the dummy-variable is significant (p-value < 0.05). When clustering standard errors at the 
session level, the difference is significant only for the last 15 periods of the experiment (p-value < 0.05). 
39
 The differences are statistically significant based on the estimation of random effect models (p-value < 
0.05). When clustering standard errors at the session level, the difference is significant only for the last 15 
periods of the experiment (p-value < 0.05). 
  
105 
Another theoretical prediction concerns the effect of effort carryover on the total 
effort expended. Theory predicts that the total effort expenditures should increase in the 
carryover rate. Table 3.4.1 indicates that this theoretical prediction is supported when 
comparing the PCNI treatment with the FCNI treatment. In the PCNI treatment the total 
effort is 153.1 and it increases to 171.6 in the FCNI treatment. Consistent with 
Hypothesis 2, the difference is significant based on the estimation of a random effect 
model (p-value < 0.01). The difference between PCI and FCI is also positive but it is not 
significant (p-value = 0.32). 
Result 5: The dissipation rate and the total effort increase in the carryover rate. 
Overall, general comparative statics predictions with regard to the effect of effort 
carryover on the first stage effort, the second stage effort, and the total effort are 
supported by our experiment (Results 4 and 5). While qualitative predictions are 
supported by the data, the quantitative predictions of the theory are clearly rejected. This 
is mainly because there is significant over-dissipation (Result 1) as well as substantial 
variation in efforts (Result 3). 
 
C. The Effect of Information Disclosure 
One of the purposes of this study is to investigate how the information about the 
effort carried over by the opponent affects the behavior in the two-stage contest. Our null 
hypothesis is that there should be no difference in the effort expenditures between “I” and 
“NI” conditions. Contrary to Hypothesis 3, Table 3.4.1 reveals a strong difference in the 
aggregate behavior under the two information conditions. In particular, subjects expend 
less effort in the first stage and more effort in the second stage when they receive the 
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information about the effort carried over by the opponents. The differences between 
effort expenditures in PCI and FCI treatments and PCNI and FCNI treatments are 
significant (p-value < 0.05).
40
 
Result 6: The first stage efforts are higher under the “NI” condition and the 
second stage efforts are higher under the “I” condition. 
It is interesting to note that the actual efforts are closer to the equilibrium efforts 
under the “NI” condition than under the “I” condition. The point is especially clear when 
comparing FCI and FCNI treatments. The absolute difference between the equilibrium 
effort and the actual effort in the first stage is 9 in the FCI treatment and only 3.4 in the 
FCNI treatment (Table 3.4.1). The difference between the equilibrium effort and the 
actual effort in the second stage is 34.3 in the FCI treatment and only 18.9 in the FCNI 
treatment. Consequently, the experimental results indicate that under the “NI” condition 
individual behavior is more consistent with the equilibrium than under “I” condition. This 
is a surprising result, because one would expect that the complete information condition 
more closely imitates the theoretical model described in Section 3.2, and thus it should 
elicit behavior that is more consistent with the equilibrium. However, we find that 
disclosing information leads subjects away from the equilibrium behavior in a two-stage 
contest with effort carryover. 
The findings of the current study suggest that the earlier findings of market and 
bargaining experiments about the negative effect of information disclosure on 
equilibrium behavior may also apply to some contest environments. It has been 
                                                 
40
 This finding is different from the findings of Parco et al. (2005), who do not find any significant effect of 
information disclosure on individual behavior in a two-stage contest with budget constraints. 
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documented in market experiments that information disclosure can harm the competitive 
equilibrium (Smith, 1991, 1994; Noussair and Porter, 1992; Cason and Plott, 2005). 
Smith (1991) found that in continuous double auction under private information 
convergence to the Nash equilibrium is faster than under complete information. Noussair 
and Porter (1992) reported that English and the uniform price sealed bid auctions are 
more efficient when there is a lack of common information. The principle that private 
information can yield more equilibrium-consistent results has also been established in the 
Nash bargaining games (Roth, 1987). 
 
D. The Determinants of Effort 
To provide a multivariate analysis, we estimate several regression models which 
are summarized in Table 3.4.2. To allow for time effects we include an inverse of a 
period trend. All regressions also include dummy-variables to capture individual subject, 
treatment, and session effects. The dependent variable in specifications (1) and (2) is the 
first stage effort. The dependent variable in specifications (3) and (4) is the second stage 
effort. The independent lagged variables are designed to capture the dynamic nature of 
the experiment. The effort1-lag and effort2-lag denote the first and second stage efforts 
expended by the same subject in period t-1. The other-effort1-lag and other-ffort2-lag 
denote the first and second stage effort expended by the opponent in period t-1. 
From specifications (1) and (2) we see that effort1-lag is positive and significant, 
indicating that subjects who expend higher first stage efforts in period t-1 are also more 
likely to expend higher efforts in period t. Another interesting finding from specification 
(1) is that the other-effort1-lag is also positive and significant. This means that subjects 
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expend higher efforts in response to higher efforts in period t-1 by the opponents. This 
finding suggests that the physiological impact of seeing higher effort by the opponents 
may be one of the reasons for significant over-dissipation in the first stage of PCNI and 
FCNI treatments. Note that no such effect is found in PCI and FCI treatments 
(specification 2). 
Table 3.4.2 – Determinants of Effort 
  
Table 3.4.2 also reports two regressions where the dependent variable is the 
second stage effort. To account for selection effect, specifications (3) and (4) follow 
Heckman‟s (1979) two-step estimation procedure. In the first step, we estimate probit 
models similar to specifications (1) and (2), where the dependent variable is whether the 
Treatments PCNI, FCNI PCI, FCI PCNI, FCNI PCI, FCI
Dependent variable, (1) (2) (3) (4)
effort in stage 1 stage 1 stage2 stage 2
effort1-lag 0.60*** 0.56*** 0.26*** 0.25***
    [effort in stage 1 in period t -1] (0.06) (0.06) (0.03) (0.04)
effort2-lag 0.00 0.02 0.62*** 0.43***
    [effort in stage 2 in period t -1] (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
other-effort1-lag 0.09*** 0.03* 0.00 0.00
    [opponent's effort in stage 1 in period t -1] (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
other-effort2-lag -0.01 -0.01 0.05*** 0.04**
    [opponent's effort in stage 2 in period t -1] (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
1/t 13.77** 14.29*** 5.84 -2.76
    [inverse of a period trend] (5.76) (5.30) (4.75) (6.13)
PCI -3.37* 4.10***
    [1 if treatment is PCI] (1.75) (1.06)
PCNI -1.90* 0.56
    [1 if treatment is PCNI] (0.99) (1.18)
effort1 -0.38*** -0.59***
    [effort in stage 1 in period t ] (0.03) (0.04)
other-carryover 0.09***
    [effort carried over by the opponent] (0.02)
Observations 1392 1392 2255 2287
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 1%
All specifications include indicator variables for each individual and each session
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player won the first stage or not.
41
 Then we use the results from the first step to estimate 
coefficients in specifications (3) and (4). From both specifications we can see that the 
other-effort1-lag, which affects the first stage effort, has no significant effect, while the 
other-effort2-lag has positive and significant effect on the second stage effort. The 
effort2-lag is positive and significant, indicating that subjects who expend higher second 
stage efforts in period t-1 are also more likely to expend higher second stage efforts in 
period t. 
Specifications (3) and (4), also include the effort1 variable which denotes own 
effort in period t. From the theoretical analysis in Section 3.2 (equation 4), one can 
conclude that, given the positive carryover rate , an increase in the first stage effort 
decreases the second stage effort. This finding is supported by the regression analysis in 
Table 3.4.2. In both specifications (3) and (4) the effort1 coefficient is negative and 
significant. Note that specification (4) also uses an additional variable, other-carryover. 
This variable captures the amount of effort carried over by the opponent from the first 
stage to the second stage. The other-carryover variable cannot be used in the estimation 
of specification (3) because in PCNI and FCNI treatments subjects did not receive any 
information about the efforts carried over by their opponents. From the estimation of 
specification (4) we can see that subjects expend higher second stage efforts in response 
to higher opponent‟s effort carryover. This finding supports Result 6 and it suggests that 
information disclosure shifts the individual effort from the first stage to the second stage. 
 
                                                 
41
 We also tried using the elicited risk attitudes to control for selection effect. The estimates were virtually 
the same. 
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3.5 Conclusion 
This experiment studies two-stage contests with carryover. Experimental results 
support all major theoretical predictions: the first stage effort and the total effort increase, 
while the second stage effort decreases in the carryover rate. Disclosing information 
about the opponent‟s carryover effort increases the second stage effort and decreases the 
first stage effort. These findings have important implications for designing an optimal 
political contest. By manipulating the information and the extent of carryover rate, the 
designer can minimize socially wasteful expenditures in the first stage and encourage the 
winning candidates to incur all major expenditures in the second stage. The 1972 Federal 
Election Campaign Act requires all candidates to disclose their campaign expenditures. 
Our findings suggest that such a policy shifts the campaign expenditures from the first 
stage to the second stage, minimizing socially wasteful resources. 
The results of the experiment also indicate that, in all two-stage contests, 
expenditures are much higher than predicted. This finding is different from the findings 
of Parco et al. (2005) and Amaldoss and Rapoport (2009), who find significant over-
expenditures only in the first stage of a two-stage contest with budget constraints, and not 
in the second stage. The disparity between our findings and the two studies mentioned 
above implies that removing the budget constraints results in wasteful over-expenditures. 
One policy implication of this finding is that the designer of a political contest should 
impose budget constraints on candidates‟ expenditures in order to reduce wasteful over-
expenditures. Such argument speaks in favor of the 1974 FECA Amendments, which are 
designed to lower the cost of campaigning by setting limits on expenditures in 
Presidential elections. 
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3.7 Appendix 
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS 
This is an experiment in the economics of strategic decision making. Various 
research agencies have provided funds for this research. The instructions are simple.  If 
you follow them closely and make appropriate decisions, you can earn an appreciable 
amount of money. 
The experiment will proceed in three parts. Each part contains decision problems 
that require you to make a series of economic choices which determine your total 
earnings. The currency used in Part 1 of the experiment is U.S. Dollars. The currency 
used in Part 2 and 3 of the experiment is francs. Francs will be converted to U.S. Dollars 
at a rate of _60_ francs to _1_ dollar. At the end of today‟s experiment, you will be paid 
in private and in cash. 12 participants are in today‟s experiment. 
It is very important that you remain silent and do not look at other people‟s work. 
If you have any questions, or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an 
experimenter will come to you. If you talk, laugh, exclaim out loud, etc., you will be 
asked to leave and you will not be paid. We expect and appreciate your cooperation.  
At this time we proceed to Part 1 of the experiment. 
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR PART 1 
YOUR DECISION 
In this part of the experiment you will be asked to make a series of choices in 
decision problems. How much you receive will depend partly on chance and partly on the 
choices you make. The decision problems are not designed to test you. What we want to 
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know is what choices you would make in them. The only right answer is what you really 
would choose. 
For each line in the table in the next page, please state whether you prefer option 
A or option B. Notice that there are a total of 15 lines in the table but just one line will be 
randomly selected for payment. You ignore which line will be paid when you make your 
choices. Hence you should pay attention to the choice you make in every line. After you 
have completed all your choices a token will be randomly drawn out of a bingo cage 
containing tokens numbered from 1 to 15. The token number determines which line is 
going to be paid. 
Your earnings for the selected line depend on which option you chose: If you 
chose option A in that line, you will receive $1. If you chose option B in that line, you 
will receive either $3 or $0. To determine your earnings in the case you chose option B 
there will be second random draw. A token will be randomly drawn out of the bingo cage 
now containing twenty tokens numbered from 1 to 20. The token number is then 
compared with the numbers in the line selected (see the table). If the token number shows 
up in the left column you earn $3. If the token number shows up in the right column you 
earn $0. 
 Are there any questions? 
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Participant ID _________ 
 
Decis
ion 
no. 
Optio
n A 
Option 
B 
Please  
choose  
A or B 
1 $1 $3   never 
$0   if 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13, 
       14,15, 16,17,18,19,20 
 
2 $1 $3   if 1 comes out 
$0   if 2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13, 
       14,15, 16,17,18,19,20 
 
3 $1 $3   if 1 or 2 comes out 
$0   if 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15, 
       16,17,18,19,20 
 
4 $1 $3   if 1,2 or 3 
$0   if  4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15, 
       16,17,18,19,20 
 
5 $1 $3   if 1,2,3,4 
$0   if  5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,  
       16,17,18,19,20 
 
6 $1 $3   if 1,2,3,4,5 
$0   if 6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,  
       16,17,18,19,20 
 
7 $1 $3   if 1,2,3,4,5,6 
$0   if 7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,  
       16,17,18,19,20 
 
8 $1 $3   if 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 
$0   if 8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,  
       16,17,18,19,20 
 
9 $1 $3   if 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8 
$0   if 9,10,11,12,13,14,15,  
       16,17,18,19,20 
 
10 $1 $3   if 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9 
$0   if 10,11,12,13,14,15,  
       16,17,18,19,20 
 
11 $1 $3   if 1,2, 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 $0   if 11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20  
12 $1 $3   if 1,2, 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11 $0   if 12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20  
13 $1 $3   if 1,2, 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12 $0   if 13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20  
14 $1 
$3   if 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10  
       11,12,13 
$0   if 14,15,16,17,18,19,20  
15 $1 
$3   if 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10  
       11,12,13,14 
$0   if 15,16,17,18,19,20  
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR PART 2 
YOUR DECISION 
The second part of the experiment consists of 30 decision-making periods and 
each period consists of two stages. At the beginning of each period, you will be randomly 
and anonymously placed into a group of four participants. The composition of your group 
will be changed randomly every period. Each period you will be randomly and 
anonymously assigned as participant 1, 2, 3, or 4. In Stage 1 participant 1 will be paired 
against participant 2 and participant 3 will be paired against participant 4. All four 
participants will be given an initial endowment of 120 francs. You will use this 
endowment to bid for a chance of participating in Stage 2. You may bid any number of 
francs between 0 and 120 (including 0.5 decimal points). An example of your decision 
screen is shown below.  
  
119 
 
After four participants make their bids in Stage 1, the computer will determine 
two finalists – one from each pair. The rule used by the computer for choosing a finalist 
in each of the two pairs will be explained later. The two finalists will proceed to Stage 2. 
The two other participants who did not win in Stage 1 will no longer participate in this 
period. If you proceed to Stage 2 half of your bid made in Stage 1 will be carried over to 
Stage 2. The other finalist will also carry over to Stage 2 half of the bid he or she made in 
Stage 1. In Stage 2 you and the other finalist will have an opportunity to make an 
additional bid which will be added to half of the bid you made in Stage 1. You may bid 
any number of francs between 0 and the amount of francs remaining from the initial 
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endowment (including 0.5 decimal points). The winner of Stage 2 will receive the reward 
of 120 francs. An example of the decision screen in Stage 2 is shown below. 
 
The diagram below depicts the basic structure of each period. 
 reward of 120 francs 
participant 1 
may bid any 
number between 
 0 and 120 
endowment of 
120 francs Stage 1 
finalist 1  
may add to the bid any 
number between 0 and the 
amount of francs remaining  
participant 2 
may bid any 
number between 
 0 and 120 
participant 3 
may bid any 
number between 
 0 and 120 
participant 4 
may bid any 
number between 
 0 and 120 
finalist 2  
may add to the bid any 
number between 0 and the 
amount of francs remaining  
 
Two participants 
who win in Stage 
1 carry over to 
Stage 2 half of the 
bids they make in 
Stage 1 
Stage 1 
Stage 2 
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YOUR EARNINGS 
If you receive the reward in Stage 2 your period earnings are equal to your 
endowment plus the reward minus your bids in Stage 1 and Stage 2. If you do not receive 
the reward in Stage 2 your period earnings are equal to your endowment minus your bids 
in Stage 1 and Stage 2. Note that if you do not win in Stage 1, your additional bid in 
Stage 2 is automatically assigned to zero. 
If you receive the reward:  
Earnings = Endowment + Reward – Your Bid in Stage 1 – Your Bid in Stage 2 = 
     = 120 + 120 – Your Bid in Stage 1 – Your Bid in Stage 2 
If you do not receive the reward:   
Earnings = Endowment – Your Bid in Stage 1 – Your Bid in Stage 2 = 
     = 120 – Your Bid in Stage 1 – Your Bid in Stage 2 
The more you bid in each stage, the more likely you are to win that stage. The 
more the other participants bid, the less likely you are to win. Specifically, in Stage 1, for 
each franc you bid you will receive one lottery ticket. At the end of Stage 1 the computer 
draws randomly one ticket among all the tickets purchased by you and the other 
participant. The owner of the drawn ticket wins Stage 1 and proceeds to Stage 2. Thus, 
your chance of winning in Stage 1 is given by the number of francs you bid divided by 
the total number of francs you and the other participant bids. 
Chance of winning 
in Stage 1 
= 
Your Bid in Stage 1 
Your Bid in Stage 1 + The Other 
Participant‟s Bid in Stage 1 
If both participants bid zero in Stage 1, the computer randomly chooses one 
participant who wins Stage 1 and proceeds to Stage 2. If you proceed to Stage 2, half of 
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your bid in Stage 1 is carried over to Stage 2. Your total bid in Stage 2 is equal to half of 
your bid in Stage 1 plus your additional bid in Stage 2. The total amount of lottery tickets 
in Stage 2 which computer will assign to you is equal to your total bid in Stage 2. At the 
end of Stage 2 the computer draws randomly one ticket among all the lottery tickets in 
Stage 2 owned by you and the other finalist. The owner of the drawn ticket wins Stage 2 
and receives the reward of 120 francs. Thus, your chance of winning Stage 2 is given by 
your total bid in Stage 2 divided by your total bid in Stage 2 and the other finalist‟s total 
bid in Stage 2. 
Chance of winning 
in Stage 1 
= 
Your Total Bid in Stage 2 
Your Total Bid in Stage 2 + The Other 
Finalist‟s Total Bid in Stage 2 
 
Example of the Random Draw 
This is a hypothetical example of how the computer makes a random draw. Let‟s 
say, in Stage 1, participant 1 bids 50 francs, participant 2 bids 30 francs, participant 3 
bids 0 francs, and participant 4 bids 20 francs. Therefore, the computer assigns 50 lottery 
tickets to participant 1, 30 lottery tickets to participant 2, 0 lottery tickets to participant 3, 
and 20 lottery tickets to participant 4. In Stage 1, participant 1 is paired against 
participant 2. Therefore, for this first pair the computer randomly draws one lottery ticket 
out of 80 (50 lottery tickets for participant 1 and 30 lottery tickets for participant 2). As 
you can see, participant 1 has higher chance of winning in Stage 1: 0.63 = 50/80. 
Participant 2 has 0.27 = 30/80 chance of winning in Stage 1. Similarly, participant 3 is 
paired against participant 4 in Stage 1. For this second pair, the computer randomly draws 
one lottery ticket out of 20 (0 lottery tickets for participant 3 and 20 lottery tickets for 
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participant 4). As you can see, in this pair participant 3 has no chance of winning in Stage 
1: 0 = 0/20.  
Let‟s say that computer made a random draw in Stage 1 and the winner of the first 
pair is participant 2 while the winner of the second pair is participant 4. Therefore, 
participant 2 and participant 4 proceed to Stage 2. Let‟s say, in Stage 2, participant 2 bids 
additional 25 francs and participant 4 bids additional 15 francs. Therefore, the computer 
assigns 25 lottery tickets to participant 2 and 15 lottery tickets to participant 4. In 
addition, computer assigns 15 (30/2) lottery tickets to participant 2 and 10 (20/2) lottery 
tickets to participant 4 which are carried over from Stage 1. Then the computer randomly 
draws one lottery ticket out of 65 (25 + 15 + 15 + 10). As you can see, participant 2 has 
higher chance of winning in Stage 2: 0.62 = (25 + 15)/65. Participant 4 has 0.38 = (15 + 
10)/65 chance of winning in Stage 2.  
After four participants make their bids in Stage 1, the computer will make a 
random draw which will decide who wins in Stage 1 and thus proceeds to Stage 2. Then 
after two remaining participants make their additional bids in Stage 2, the computer will 
make a random draw which will decide who wins in Stage 2 and thus receives the 
reward. Then the computer will calculate your period earnings based on your bid in Stage 
1 and Stage 2 and whether you received the reward or not. These earnings will be 
converted to cash and paid at the end of the experiment if the current period is one of the 
five periods that is randomly chosen for payment. 
At the end of each period the following information will be displayed on the 
outcome screen: your bid in Stage 1, the other participant‟s bid in Stage 1, whether you 
won in Stage 1 or not, half of your bid carried over from Stage 1 plus your additional bid 
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in Stage 2, half of the other finalist‟s bid carried over from Stage 1 plus the other 
finalist‟s additional bid in Stage 2, whether you received the reward or not, and the 
earnings for the period. An example of the outcome screen is shown below. Once the 
outcome screen is displayed you should record your results for the period on your 
Personal Record Sheet under the appropriate heading. 
 
Outcome Screen 
 
IMPORTANT NOTES 
 You will not be told which of the participants in this room are assigned to which 
group. At the beginning of each period you will be randomly re-grouped with three other 
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participants to from a four-person group. Each period you will receive an endowment of 
120 francs. You will use this endowment to bid for a reward which you will receive only 
if you win in Stage 1 and Stage 2. You can never guarantee yourself the reward. 
However, by increasing your bid, you can increase your chance of winning in Stage 1 and 
Stage 2 and thus increase your chance of receiving the reward. Remember, if you win in 
Stage 1 half of your bid made in Stage 1 will be carried over to Stage 2. Regardless of 
who receives the reward in Stage 2, all participants will have to pay their bids made in 
Stage 1 and Stage 2. 
At the end of the experiment we will randomly choose 5 of the 30 periods for 
actual payment in Part 2 using a bingo cage. You will sum the total earnings for these 5 
periods and convert them to a U.S. dollar payment. 
Are there any questions? 
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR PART 3 
The third part of the experiment consists of 30 decision-making periods and each 
period consists of two stages. The rules for part 3 are similar to the rules for part 2. At the 
beginning of each period, you will be randomly and anonymously placed into a group of 
four participants. The composition of your group will be changed randomly every period. 
Each period you will be randomly and anonymously assigned as participant 1, 2, 3, or 4. 
In Stage 1 participant 1 will be paired against participant 2 and participant 3 will be 
paired against participant 4. All four participants will be given an initial endowment of 
120 francs. You will use this endowment to bid for a chance of participating in Stage 2. 
After four participants make their bids in Stage 1, the computer will determine two 
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finalists who will proceed to Stage 2 – one from each pair. The two other participants 
who did not win in Stage 1 will no longer participate in this period. The only difference 
from part 2 is that in part 3, if you proceed to Stage 2 your entire bid made in Stage 1 will 
be carried over to Stage 2 (instead of half of the bid made in Stage 1). The other finalist 
will also carry over to Stage 2 the entire bid he or she made in Stage 1. In Stage 2 you 
and the other finalist will have an opportunity to make an additional bid. You may bid 
any number of francs between 0 and the amount of francs remaining from the initial 
endowment (including 0.5 decimal points). So, the additional bid you make in Stage 2 
will be added to the bid you made in Stage 1. The winner of Stage 2 will receive the 
reward of 120 francs. 
The diagram below depicts the basic structure of each period. 
 
 
 
 
 
reward of 120 francs 
participant 1 
may bid any 
number between 
 0 and 120 
endowment of 
120 francs Stage 1 
finalist 1  
may add to the bid any 
number between 0 and the 
amount of francs remaining  
participant 2 
may bid any 
number between 
 0 and 120 
participant 3 
may bid any 
number between 
 0 and 120 
participant 4 
may bid any 
number between 
 0 and 120 
finalist 2  
may add to the bid any 
number between 0 and the 
amount of francs remaining  
 
Two participants 
who win in Stage 
1 carry over to 
Stage 2 the bids 
they make in 
Stage 1 
Stage 1 
Stage 2 
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YOUR EARNINGS 
Your earnings for the period are calculated in the same way as in part 2. 
If you receive the reward:  
Earnings = Endowment + Reward – Your Bid in Stage 1 – Your Bid in Stage 2 = 
     = 120 + 120 – Your Bid in Stage 1 – Your Bid in Stage 2 
If you do not receive the reward:  
Earnings = Endowment – Your Bid in Stage 1 – Your Bid in Stage 2 = 
     = 120 – Your Bid in Stage 1 – Your Bid in Stage 2 
The more you bid in each stage, the more likely you are to win that stage. The 
more the other participants bid, the less likely you are to win. Specifically, in Stage 1, for 
each franc you bid you will receive one lottery ticket. At the end of Stage 1 the computer 
draws randomly one ticket among all the tickets purchased by you and the other 
participant. The owner of the drawn ticket wins Stage 1 and proceeds to Stage 2. Thus, 
your chance of winning in Stage 1 is given by the number of francs you bid divided by 
the total number of francs you and the other participant bids. 
Chance of winning 
in Stage 1 
= 
Your Bid in Stage 1 
Your Bid in Stage 1 + The Other 
Participant‟s Bid in Stage 1 
If both participants bid zero in Stage 1, the computer randomly chooses one 
participant who wins Stage 1 and proceeds to Stage 2. If you proceed to Stage 2, your 
entire bid in Stage 1 is carried over to Stage 2. Your total bid in Stage 2 is equal to your 
bid in Stage 1 plus your additional bid in Stage 2. The total amount of lottery tickets in 
Stage 2 which computer will assign to you is equal to your total bid in Stage 2. At the end 
of Stage 2 the computer draws randomly one ticket among all the lottery tickets in Stage 
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2 owned by you and the other finalist. The owner of the drawn ticket wins Stage 2 and 
receives the reward of 120 francs. Thus, your chance of winning Stage 2 is given by your 
total bid in Stage 2 divided by your total bid in Stage 2 and the other finalist‟s total bid in 
Stage 2. 
Chance of winning 
in Stage 1 
= 
Your Total Bid in Stage 2 
Your Total Bid in Stage 2 + The Other 
Finalist‟s Total Bid in Stage 2 
After four participants make their bids in Stage 1, the computer will make a 
random draw which will decide who wins in Stage 1 and thus proceeds to Stage 2. Then 
after two remaining participants make their additional bids in Stage 2, the computer will 
make a random draw which will decide who wins in Stage 2. Then the computer will 
calculate your period earnings based on your bid in Stage 1 and Stage 2 and whether you 
received the reward or not. These earnings will be converted to cash and paid at the end 
of the experiment if the current period is one of the five periods that is randomly chosen 
for payment. 
At the end of each period the following information will be displayed on the 
outcome screen: your bid in Stage 1, the other participant‟s bid in Stage 1, whether you 
won in Stage 1 or not, your bid carried over from Stage 1 plus your additional bid in 
Stage 2, the other finalist‟s bid in Stage 1 plus the other finalist‟s additional bid in Stage 
2, whether you received the reward or not, and the earnings for the period. Once the 
outcome screen is displayed you should record your results for the period on your 
Personal Record Sheet under the appropriate heading. 
 Remember, if you win in Stage 1 your entire bid made in Stage 1 will be carried 
over to Stage 2. At the end of the experiment we will randomly choose 5 of the 30 
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periods for actual payment in Part 2 using a bingo cage. You will sum the total earnings 
for these 5 periods and convert them to a U.S. dollar payment. 
 
  
130 
ESSAY 4 
PERFECT-SUBSTITUTES, BEST-SHOT, AND WEAKEST-LINK CONTESTS 
BETWEEN GROUPS 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Many economic allocations are decided by contests in which individuals or 
groups expend costly resources while competing to win a specific prize. Examples 
include corporate competitions between consortia, R&D and patent competitions between 
firms, or election campaigns by political parties. Most of these contests are characterized 
by the fact that major decision are made by groups such as boards of directors, teams of 
researchers, or committees, and not by individuals. 
As group contests unfold, conflicts arise within each group and between groups. 
Members of the same group have incentives to cooperate with each other by contributing 
individual efforts in order to win a contest. Since effort is costly, each member also has 
an incentive to abstain from contributing any effort and instead free-ride on the efforts of 
other members. The amount of free-riding that occurs within a group depends on the 
composition of the group and the rules that regulate the competition. Members of the 
same group who have less interest in winning the contest are more likely to free-ride on 
the efforts of members who have greater interest in winning. However, free-riding 
behavior  is  unlikely  when  the performance of the entire group depends crucially on the 
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performance of each member of a group. We can gain valuable insights into what factors 
determine the outcome of the competition by studying different group compositions and 
different contest rules. 
Take, for example, a contest between two firms for a patent: a “Good Manager” 
firm with a highly motivated manager but poorly motivated workers and a “Bad 
Manager” firm with a poorly motivated manager but highly motivated workers. Which 
firm will win the patent contest, the firm with the better motivated manager or the firm 
with the better motivated workers? What is the optimal compensation scheme that 
motivates the highest performance of each firm? How do the rules of the competition 
affect the effort expenditures and the amount of free-riding within each firm?  
To answer these questions we design a novel experiment in which two groups 
compete in a contest. Each group has two types of players – one strong player and two 
weak players. The strong player values the prize more highly than the weak player and 
the valuations are common knowledge. The assumptions of the model allow us to 
interpret the heterogeneity in valuations as heterogeneity in abilities or heterogeneity in 
costs. All players within each group simultaneously and independently expend their 
efforts. The group performance is defined as some function of all individual efforts. In 
the public goods literature, the three most frequently used functional rules are perfect-
substitutes, best-shot, and weakest-link (Hirshleifer, 1983; Cornes, 1993). The novelty of 
our study is that we apply these rules to the contest setting. In the “perfect-substitutes” 
contest, the performance of a group depends on the sum of individual efforts. In the 
“best-shot” contest, the performance of a group depends on the best performer. In the 
“weakest-link” contest, the performance of a group depends on the worst performer. Each 
  
132 
group‟s probability of winning the prize depends on its performance relative to the total 
performance by both groups. Therefore, the better performing group is more likely to 
win. However, the group that does not perform well still has some chance to receive the 
prize. 
Contrary to theoretical predictions, we find significant over-contribution of efforts 
by both strong and weak players in contests where individual efforts are perfect 
substitutes. This over-contribution is neither explained by quantal response equilibrium 
nor by inequality aversion, but it can be partially explained by social identity theory. 
Consistent with theoretical predictions, in best-shot contests most of the effort is 
expended by strong players while weak players free-ride. One explanation for this finding 
is that the asymmetry between players serves as a coordination device by introducing a 
focal point where only strong players expend positive efforts (Schelling, 1960). This 
finding also suggests that such asymmetry can be used to solve the coordination failure 
problem in volunteer's dilemma games (Diekmann, 1985, 1993). In weakest-link contests 
all players expend similar positive efforts conforming to the group Pareto dominant 
equilibrium. A surprisingly strong coordination in weakest-link contests implies that the 
between-group competition serves as a strong incentive which facilitates coordination. It 
also suggests that introduction of between-group competition can be used to solve the 
coordination failure problem in games with Pareto-ranked equilibria such as the stag hunt 
(Van Huyck et al., 1990) and minimum effort public goods games (Weber, 2006). 
When groups are asymmetric, as in the patent contest between the “Good 
Manager” firm and the “Bad Manager” firm, the outcome of the competition depends on 
the contest rules. The “Good Manager” firm with a better motivated manager is more 
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likely to win the contest if the performance of both firms depends solely on the best 
performer within each firm. On the contrary, the “Bad Manager” firm is more likely to 
win the weakest-link and the perfect-substitutes contests. These results shed some light 
on how to develop an optimal managerial compensation scheme in cases where a chief 
executive officer (CEO) has to decide how to divide a bonus pool between a manager and 
workers. By wisely accounting for the type of underlying contest, the CEO can increase 
the team‟s chance of success. For example, if the team is participating in the best-shot 
type of contest then the CEO should allocate the largest bonus to the manager. However, 
given the fact that the majority of real life contests require considerable coordination (as 
in the weakest-link) and high level of joint effort (as in the perfect-substitutes), it is not 
optimal to allocate a very large bonus to the manager. 
The rules that regulate the competition also determine the amount of total effort 
expenditures, amount of free-riding, and the relative performance of strong players. 
Perfect-substitutes contests generate the highest total effort expenditures among all 
contests, followed by best-shot and then weakest-link contests. The most free-riding 
behavior occurs in best-shot contests while there is almost no free-riding in weakest-link 
contests. We also find that strong players expend the highest relative effort in best-shot 
contests, followed by perfect-substitutes and then weakest-link contests. These findings 
have important implications for designing an optimal contest between groups. For 
example, a contest designer can choose the weakest-link rule to reduce free-riding by all 
players. However, by doing so the designer should anticipate the weakest-link contest to 
generate the lowest total effort expended, as well as weak performance of strong players. 
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The general conclusion from our findings is that the advantage of one contest rule over 
another comes at a cost. 
 
4.2 Literature Review 
The most commonly used contest in the literature is the one proposed by Tullock 
(1980). In this contest, individual players expend costly efforts to influence the 
probability of winning a prize. The player‟s probability of winning is proportional to the 
player‟s relative expenditure. Thus, the player expending the highest effort has a higher 
probability of winning the prize. 
The Tullock model considers competing individuals and thus reflects the conflict 
between individual players only. The first attempts to address inter-group conflict as well 
as intra-group conflict were made by Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983) and Katz et al. 
(1990).
42
 The pioneering study by Katz et al. (1990), which is built on the original 
Tullock contest, demonstrates that the effort expended by a group depends on individual 
valuations of the prize and not on the size of the group. One interpretation of this finding 
is that, as the size of a group increases, the amount of free-riding within the larger group 
increases to such an extent that the larger group has no advantage over the smaller group 
(Olson, 1965; Konrad, 2009). Baik (1993, 2008) refined the analysis of Katz et al. (1990) 
by considering intra-group heterogeneity. He showed that if the group members differ in 
their valuations of the prize, only the member with the highest valuation expends positive 
                                                 
42
 Other theoretical studies of contests between groups include Nitzan (1991), Baik (1993; 2008), Katz and 
Tokatlidu (1996), Munster (2007), Cheikbossian (2008), and Lee (2009). 
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effort.
43
 Other members of the same group choose to free-ride on the effort of the 
member with the highest valuation. Lee (2009) showed that when a group‟s probability of 
winning the contest depends only on the player who expends the lowest effort then 
multiple equilibria exist in which there is no free-riding. 
The efforts expended in such contests are difficult to measure in the field since 
one can observe only the performance which is a function of effort, ability, and random 
noise (Ericsson and Charness, 1994). With this in mind, several researchers have turned 
to experimental tests of various contests. The first attempts to examine individual 
behavior in contests using laboratory methods were made by Millner and Pratt (1989, 
1991). These studies, and many replications, employ individuals instead of groups.
44
 The 
exception to this is found in experimental studies of political voting models where, 
instead of individuals, groups are competing for the prize (Rapoport and Bornstein, 1987, 
1989; Schram and Sonnemans, 1996; Cason and Mui, 2005). A major restriction of 
political models is that the subject‟s choice space limited to a binary decision: whether to 
cast a vote or not. The only experimental studies on group contest where subjects can 
make their decisions on continuous space are Gunnthorsdottir and Rapoport (2006), 
                                                 
43
 The result that the equilibrium effort levels depend exclusively on the highest valuation for the prize in 
each group and not on the group size is well known in the literature. This result is also robust to different 
specifications of contest success function (Nti, 1998; Baik et al., 2001). Several studies suggested using 
convex cost of effort or modified utility function in order to overcome free-riding and make group size 
meaningful. For example, Riaz et al. (1995) show that by modifying utility function the total effort 
expended by both groups increases if either group increases in size. In such case free riding exists within a 
group, but it is incomplete. Esteban and Ray (2001) show that in case of convex costs the group size is an 
important factor which influences the outcome of the contest. 
44
 Laboratory studies of contests between individuals conclude: there is significant over-dissipation of rent 
(Millner and Pratt, 1989, 1991); all-pay auctions generate higher efforts than lottery contests (Davis and 
Reilly, 1998; Potters et al., 1998); risk-aversion and quantal response equilibrium can account for non-
equilibrium behavior (Miller and Pratt, 1991; Goeree et al., 2002; Sheremeta, 2009a); the non-monetary 
utility of winning is an important factor to explain over-dissipation in contests (Parco et al., 2005; 
Sheremeta, 2009b). 
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Kugler et al. (2009), and Abbink et al. (2009).
45
 The former two studies investigate the 
effect of egalitarian and proportional profit sharing rules on the individual behavior in the 
contest between groups. Both studies find that the proportional profit sharing rule elicits 
higher individual efforts than the egalitarian rule. Abbink et al. (2009) experimentally 
study the contest introduced by Katz et al. (1990) and find that groups behave more 
aggressively than individuals. Our experimental design shares some features with the 
three studies above. However, it differs substantially by the fact that we have 
heterogeneous players, instead of homogeneous players. Moreover, we also study the 
impact of three different contest rules, as in Harrison and Hirshleifer (1989), on the effort 
expenditures and the amount of free-riding. 
 
4.3 The Experimental Environment 
A. The Model 
To simplify our analysis we assume that there are two groups expending costly 
efforts in order to win a contest. Group  (“Good Manager” firm) consists of  risk-
neutral players, and each player expends individual effort . Group  (“Bad Manager” 
firm) is defined in a similar way. All players simultaneously and independently expend 
irreversible efforts. The group performance  is a function of all individual efforts. The 
three functional forms considered in this study are perfect-substitutes, best-shot, and 
weakest-link (Hirshleifer, 1983). 
                                                 
45
 Another two studies that employ team contests in the context of labor tournaments are Nalbantian and 
Schotter (1997) and Sutter and Strassmair (2009). 
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In the perfect-substitutes contest the group performance is a sum of all individual 
efforts, . This type of contest resembles many real life competitions where 
the performance of the group depends on the joint effort of all members within that 
group. Consider, for example, a contest between two towns for a county‟s road 
construction budget. The government of the county selects the winning town based on the 
lobbying efforts by the people within each town. In such a contest, the performance of a 
town depends on the sum of all individual lobbying efforts. 
In the best-shot contest the group performance depends only on the best performer 
within a group, . An example of such a contest is a competition 
between groups where each member of each group presents a design of a new product 
and the group whose member presents the best design receives a reward. In this contest 
the performance of a group depends only on the best performer within that group. 
In the weakest-link contest the performance of the entire group depends on the 
worst performer within a group, . Kremer (1993) discusses a 
devastating event caused by the failure of the weakest component. In 1986, the space 
shuttle Challenger broke apart 73 seconds into its flight after a failure of a small 
component called the O-ring seal. After investigation, the failure of the O-ring was 
attributed to a design flaw. Consequently, Kremer built a theoretical model of economic 
development called the “O-ring theory”, where the performance of an organization 
depends mainly on the worst performing individual (or unit) – the “weakest link”. An 
example of a weakest-link contest is a competition between groups where each member 
of the group is responsible for a specific task. If any of the members fails to perform the 
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task then the group loses the competition. Other weakest-link, best-shot, and perfect-
substitutes examples can be found in Hirshleifer (1983), Bliss and Nalebuff (1984), and 
Harrison and Hirshleifer (1989). 
The performance of each group determines the probability of winning the contest. 
After all players of group  and group  choose their efforts,  and  are compared. 
The better performing group has a higher chance of winning the prize. The probability of 
group winning the prize is defined by a lottery contest success function: 
.      (1) 
That is, each group‟s probability of winning depends on its performance relative 
to the total performance by both groups. Our reason for choosing this specific contest 
success function is that it is simple enough for subjects to understand, but this simplicity 
does not affect the comparative statics predictions of the theory (Baik, 1993, 2008; Baik 
et al., 2001; Nti, 1998; Lee, 2009). The lottery contest success function is also commonly 
used in most of the Tullock contest literature, including virtually all of the experimental 
contest literature. 
In the case where group  wins the prize, player  receives the valuation of . 
All prize valuations are common knowledge and may differ from player to player. 
Without loss of generality, assume that  and 
. We will call players  and  “strong players” and other players “weak 
players”. Given (1), the expected payoff for player  in group can be written as: 
.     (2) 
The first term of the expected payoff, , is simply the probability of 
group  winning the prize times player ‟s valuation of the prize. By expending a higher 
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effort, , player  can increase the probability  of winning the contest. 
Therefore, player  has an incentive to cooperate with other members of his group; but 
since cooperation is costly, ( ), there is also an incentive to free-ride. It is important 
to emphasize that, because of the lottery contest success function and the linear costs, 
heterogeneity in valuations can also be interpreted as heterogeneity in abilities or 
heterogeneity in costs. For example, without changing the nature of the current contest 
one could divide (2) by  and thus transform this contest into a contest where players 
have heterogeneous costs. 
Theoretical implications of the model described in this section depend on the 
contest rule. In the perfect-substitutes contest, the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, where 
each player's effort level is the best response to the effort levels of the other players, is 
unique and is characterized by player ‟s and ‟s optimal efforts of 
 and  (Baik, 1993, 2008). All other 
players free-ride in the equilibrium and expend no effort. The intuition behind the 
equilibrium is that the strong player obtains the highest marginal payoff, whereas all 
players have the same constant marginal cost. Given this, at the equilibrium effort of the 
strong player, the marginal payoff for the weak players is always lower than the marginal 
cost. Therefore, the weak players have no incentive to expand any positive effort. 
One would expect that the best-shot contest generates the same unique 
equilibrium as the perfect-substitutes contest. However, multiple equilibria can arise in 
which any two players, each from a different group, compete against each other as in a 
simple two-player contest, while other players fully free-ride. This multiplicity of 
equilibria arises when the valuations of strong players,  and , are not sufficiently 
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higher than the valuations of weak players. In this case, strong players can free-ride on 
the efforts of weak players. In the next section we will discuss all possible equilibria in 
the best-shot contest used in our experiment. 
The equilibrium of the weakest-link contest has recently been characterized by 
Lee (2009). In such a contest there exist multiple pure-strategy Nash equilibria in which 
there is no free-riding. In each equilibria the players in each group match all their efforts 
at the same level while best responding to the effort of the other group. Each individual 
player does not have any incentive to change his effort level, given the efforts of the other 
players. However, players within the same group have incentives to cooperate with each 
other and hence increase their effort levels. Lee (2009) proved that there is only one 
group Pareto dominant equilibrium in which no individual player or group has any 
incentive to deviate. In the Pareto equilibrium, all players expend efforts, which are 
derived from a simple two-player contest between the weakest player in group  and the 
weakest player in group , i.e.  and 
 for all . 
 
B. Experimental Design and Predictions 
Our experiment studies contests between symmetric and asymmetric groups. 
Table 4.3.1 summarizes the valuations of the players, the equilibrium efforts and the 
expected payoffs in contests between symmetric groups. Both groups G and B have three 
players – one strong player with higher valuation of 60 and two weak players with lower 
valuations of 30. The total group effort in Table 4.3.1 is defined as the sum of all 
individual efforts. The effective group effort in the perfect-substitutes contest is defined 
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as the sum of all individual efforts, in the best-shot contest it is the maximum individual 
effort within a group, and in the weakest-link contest it is the minimum individual effort 
within a group. 
Table 4.3.1 – Symmetric Contests
 
In the perfect-substitutes contest, the equilibrium is unique and is characterized by 
player 1G‟s and 1B‟s optimal effort of 15. The weak players in the equilibrium should 
free-ride and expend no effort. As a result, the total group effort and the effective group 
effort are 15. In the best-shot contest there are multiple equilibria, which are established 
each time when one player from group G competes against one player from group B as in 
a simple two-player contest, while other players fully free-ride. However, the Pareto 
equilibrium coincides with the equilibrium of the perfect-substitutes contest (Table 
4.3.1).
46
 In the weakest-link contest there are multiple equilibria in which there is no free-
riding. The unique Pareto dominant equilibrium is characterized by an effort of 7.5 for all 
players. In the Pareto dominant equilibrium the total group effort, defined as a sum of all 
                                                 
46
 Other equilibria in the best-shot are characterized by player 2G‟s (or 3G‟s) and 2B‟s (or 3B‟s) efforts of 
7.5 while others expend 0. In these equilibria, both groups have equal probability of winning the contest. 
The expected payoff of player 1 is 30, player 2(3) is 7.5, and player 3(2) is 15. One can see that these 
equilibria, as well as the equilibria where one strong player competes against one weak player, will cause 
highly asymmetric payoffs. Based on the findings of the other-regarding preferences literature (Fehr and 
Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000), we expect that the equilibrium described in Table 4.3.1 is 
most likely to be chosen by players since all players within a group earn the same expected payoffs of 15. 
1 2, 3 1 2, 3 1 2, 3 Total Effective
 Perfect-substitutes G , B 60 30 15 0 15 15 15 15 0.5
 Best-shot G , B 60 30 15 0 15 15 15 15 0.5
 Weakest-link G , B 60 30 7.5 7.5 22.5 7.5 22.5 7.5 0.5
In the perfect-substitutes treatment the equilibrium is unique
In the best-shot and weakest-link treatments there are multiple equilibria (the table shows group Pareto equilibria)
Probability 
of     
Winning
Equilibrium    
Group Effort
Equilibrium       
Payoff of Player Treatment Group
Valuation of 
Player                                                                                      
Equilibrium 
Effort of Player
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efforts within a group, is 22.5; and the effective group effort, defined as a minimum effort 
within a group, is 7.5. 
Table 4.3.2 – Asymmetric Contests
 
Although contests between symmetric groups are not uncommon, most contests in 
reality take place between asymmetric groups. In the introduction we discussed a contest 
for a patent between the “Good Manager” firm and the “Bad Manager” firm, in which the 
asymmetry of two competing firms comes primarily from the differences between 
managers and workers. To capture this we examine a contest between two asymmetric 
groups as shown in Table 4.3.2. Similar to the symmetric case, we study the effect of 
three contest rules: perfect-substitutes, best-shot, and weakest-link. In each contest the 
composition of group B is the same as in symmetric contests. In group G, however, the 
prize valuation of player 1G is increased to 90, while the prize valuation of players 2G 
and 3G is decreased to 15. The overall valuation of both groups is held constant. 
In equilibrium, group G has a higher chance of winning the perfect-substitutes 
and best-shot asymmetric contests. This result comes from the competition between the 
strong players. Since player 1G (“Good Manager”) has higher valuation than player 1B 
(“Bad Manager”), player 1G expends higher effort in the equilibrium (21.6 versus 14.4). 
1 2, 3 1 2, 3 1 2, 3 Total Effective
G 90 15 21.6 0 32.4 9 21.6 21.6 0.60
B 60 30 14.4 0 9.6 12 14.4 14.4 0.40
G 90 15 21.6 0 32.4 9 21.6 21.6 0.60
B 60 30 14.4 0 9.6 12 14.4 14.4 0.40
G 90 15 3.3 3.3 26.4 1.7 10.0 3.3 0.33
B 60 30 6.7 6.7 33.3 13.3 20.0 6.7 0.67
In the perfect-substitutes treatment the equilibrium is unique
In the best-shot and weakest-link treatments there are multiple equilibria (the table shows group Pareto equilibria)
Probability 
of     
Winning
Equilibrium    
Group Effort
 Best-shot
 Weakest-link
Group
 Perfect-substitutes
Equilibrium    
Payoff of Player
Equilibrium 
Effort of Player Treatment
Valuation of 
Player                                                                                     
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As a result, group G wins the contest 60% of the time. In contrast, the outcome of the 
weakest-link asymmetric contest depends solely on the weakest player in each group. In 
group G the weak player‟s valuation is 15, while in group B the weak player‟s valuation 
is 30. Therefore, equilibrium efforts by all players in group G and group B are 3.3 and 
6.7. These efforts imply that group G wins the contest only 33% of the time, while group 
B wins the contest 67% of the time. That is, asymmetry helps the “Good Manager” firm 
except in the weakest-link contest. 
 
C. The Experimental Procedures 
The experiment was conducted at the Vernon Smith Experimental Economics 
Laboratory. A total of 108 subjects participated in six sessions (18 subjects per session). 
All subjects were Purdue University undergraduate students who participated in only one 
session of this study. Some students had participated in other economics experiments that 
were unrelated to this research. 
The computerized experimental sessions were run using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 
2007). Each session proceeded in three parts. Subjects were given the instructions, 
available in the Appendix, at the beginning of each part and the experimenter read the 
instructions aloud. In the first part, similar to Holt and Laury (2002), subjects‟ risk 
attitudes were elicited using multiple price list of 15 simple lotteries.
47
 At the end of the 
experiment, 1 out of the 15 lottery decisions made by subjects was randomly selected for 
payment. The second and the third parts corresponded to one symmetric and one 
                                                 
47
 Subjects were asked to state whether they preferred safe option A or risky option B. Option A yielded $1 
payoff with certainty, while option B yielded a payoff of either $3 or $0. The probability of receiving $3 or 
$0 varied across all 15 lotteries. The first lottery offered a 5% chance of winning $3 and a 95% chance of 
winning $0, while the last lottery offered a 70% chance of winning $3 and a 30% chance of winning $0. 
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asymmetric treatment using the same contest rule. In three sessions we ran symmetric 
treatments first and in three other sessions we ran asymmetric treatments first. Each 
subject played 30 periods in symmetric treatment and 30 periods in asymmetric 
treatment. 
In each period subjects were randomly and anonymously placed into group G or B 
designated as either player 1, 2, or 3 within that group. Thus, all subjects had an equal 
chance to play as strong and weak players during different periods of the experiment. At 
the beginning of each period, each player received 60 experimental francs as an 
endowment (equivalent to $1.20).
48
 All subjects were told that by contributing 1 franc to 
their individual account they would earn 1 franc, while by contributing 1 franc to their 
group account they could increase the chance of their group receiving the reward. 
Subjects could contribute any integer number of francs between 0 and 60. After all 
subjects submitted their effort contributions to the group account, a random draw 
determined the winning group. A simple lottery was used to explain how the computer 
chose the winning group. At the end of each period subjects were informed of group G‟s 
and B‟s efforts. Subjects were paid for 5 out of 30 periods in parts two and three at the 
end of the experiment. The earnings were converted into US dollars at the rate of 50 
francs to $1. On average, subjects earned $21 each and the experimental sessions lasted 
for about 70 minutes. 
 
 
                                                 
48
 Although we restrict the endowment to 60, it does not affect the equilibrium. The highest equilibrium 
effort of the strong player (whose valuation is 90) is only 21.6, which is much lower than the non-binding 
endowment of 60. 
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4.4 Experimental Results 
A. Symmetric Contests 
Table 4.4.1 summarizes the average effort and payoff in symmetric contests. In 
the perfect-substitutes contest the equilibrium of the game is characterized by the positive 
effort only for player 1. Contrary to theoretical predictions, weak players expend 
substantial efforts. Around 70% of all efforts expended by players 2 and 3 are positive. 
We also observe that subjects in the role of player 1 expend on average an effort of 18.9, 
which is significantly higher than the equilibrium effort of 15 (p-value < 0.01).
49
 Even 
when we exclude the first 15 periods of the experiment, the actual efforts by weak and 
strong players are still significantly higher than the equilibrium (p-value < 0.05). As a 
result of significant over-contribution, the total group effort is almost three times higher 
than the equilibrium and all players earn significantly lower payoffs. The significant 
over-contribution of efforts is consistent with Abbink et al. (2008), who find that groups 
in a similar perfect-substitutes contest expend four times more than the equilibrium.
50
 
Result 1: Contrary to theoretical predictions, significant over-contribution of 
efforts by both strong and weak players is observed in the perfect-substitutes contest. 
                                                 
49
 To support this conclusion we estimated a simple panel regression, where the dependent variable is effort 
and independent variables are period trend and a constant. The model included a random effects error 
structure, with the individual subject as the random effect, to account for the multiple bids made by 
individual subjects. Based on a standard Wald test, conducted on estimates of a model, we found that for 
both types of players the constant coefficients are significantly higher than the predicted theoretical values 
(p-value < 0.01). 
50
 Significant over-contribution of efforts has been also observed in other contest studies that employ 
individual rather than group contestants (Millner and Pratt 1989, 1991; Davis and Reilly, 1998; Sheremeta, 
2009a,b). 
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Table 4.4.1 – Average Effort and Payoff in Symmetric Contests
 
There are several possible explanations for significant over-contribution of 
efforts. First, participants who are assigned as weak players may think that they are 
expected to “play the game” and thus should expend some positive efforts.51 In other 
words, it might be unnatural for participants to expend no effort. Second, both strong and 
weak players are likely to make “errors.” Sheremeta (2009a) showed how the quantal 
response equilibrium (QRE) developed by McKelvey and Palfrey (1995), which accounts 
for errors made by individual subjects, can explain some over-contribution of efforts in 
lottery contests.  The crucial parameter of QRE is the error parameter, λ, which 
determines the sensitivity of the choice probabilities with respect to payoffs. Following 
standard estimation procedures (Goeree et al., 2002) we estimated QRE for all symmetric 
contests.
52
 
                                                 
51
 The concern of boundary equilibrium is well recognized in studies of linear public goods games (Keser, 
1996; Sefton and Steinberg, 1996). 
52
 The numerical computation of the equilibrium was feasible only after restricting the strategy space to {0, 
5, 10, 15,…, 60}. We used the logit probabilistic choice rule, where the probability of choosing a certain 
action is proportional to an exponential function of the associated expected payoff. A more detail 
description of the estimation procedures is available from the author upon a request. 
1 2, 3 Total Effective 1 2, 3
 Perfect-substitutes G , B 15 0 18.9 (0.7) 10.8 (0.4) 40.5 40.5 74.0% 28.0%
 Best-shot G , B 15 0 15.2 (0.8) 4.7 (0.4) 24.6 19.9 98.4% 68.9%
 Weakest-link G , B 7.5 7.5 7.7 (0.4) 7.0 (0.2) 21.6 4.8 99.3% 107.0%
Standard error of the mean in parentheses
 Treatment Group
Equilibrium 
Effort of Player
Average                      
Effort of Player
Payoff as % of 
Equilibrium Payoff
Group Effort
1 2, 3
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Figure 4.4.1 – Average Effort at the QRE in Symmetric Contests 
The left panel of Figure 4.4.1 shows the average effort (on the vertical axis) at the 
QRE as a function of λ in the perfect-substitutes contest. When λ is zero, the behavior is 
consistent with the Nash equilibrium: player 1 expends 15 and players 2 and 3 expend no 
effort. As the level of errors increases, the weak players over-contribute relative to the 
Nash equilibrium. The strong players initially under-contribute and then, after a certain 
level of errors, over-contribute relative to the Nash equilibrium. As both types of players 
move closer to a random play, i.e., putting equal weights on each strategy, the average 
effort approaches 30 (one half of the endowment). Assuming a common level of error for 
both types of players in the perfect-substitutes contest, the maximum likelihood estimate 
of λ is 2.42. At this level of error weak players expend the average effort of 11.35 and the 
strong players expend the average effort of 14.4. Compared with the actual decisions 
made (Table 4.4.1), the QRE model overestimates the efforts of the weak players and 
underestimates the efforts of the strong players, and thus it cannot account for significant 
over-contribution by both types of players simultaneously. 
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Figure 4.4.2 – Effort of Player 1 vs Maximum Individual Effort in the Group (Best-Shot) 
In the symmetric best-shot contest many subjects select a strategy where only 
strong players expend positive efforts. Figure 4.4.2 displays the effort made by player 1 
and the corresponding maximum individual effort in the group. The size of the bubble 
indicates the frequency of observation (the total number of observations is 360). For 
example, the biggest bubble on the graph indicates that 49 times player 1‟s effort of 20 
turned out to be the highest effort within a group. Over 75% of all observations lie on the 
45 degree line, indicating that player 1 most frequently has the highest effort within a 
group. Moreover, in the best-shot contest only 28% of efforts made by players 2 and 3 are 
above 0 (compared to 70% in the perfect-substitutes contest). 
Result 2: In the best-shot contest most of the efforts are made by strong players, 
while weak players tend to free-ride. 
As mentioned in Section 4.3, multiple equilibria exist where one weak player 
from group G competes against one weak player from group B in what effectively 
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becomes a two-player contest. Thus, it can be optimal for strong players to expend no 
effort when some weak players expend positive efforts. This may explain why 26% of 
efforts made by strong players are 0 in the best-shot contest, compared to only 12% in the 
perfect-substitutes contest. The difference is significant based on the estimation of a 
random effect probit model, where the dependent variable is whether the weak strong 
contributes or not, and the independent variable is a dummy for the best-shot contest (p-
value < 0.01). 
Overall, the behavior we observe in the best-shot contest is consistent with 
theoretical predictions. This finding is different from previous findings of Harrison and 
Hishleifer (1989) who document that, in the best-shot public goods game, players expend 
four times higher efforts than predicted. The difference between our findings and findings 
of Harrison and Hishleifer (1989) is likely due to the fact that, instead of symmetric 
players, we have asymmetric players. In the equilibrium of the best-shot contest only one 
player should expend positive effort while other players should expend no effort. The 
introduction of asymmetry between players results in a focal point where only the strong 
player expends positive effort (Schelling, 1960; Ochs, 1995; Kroll et al., 2007; Crawford 
et al., 2008). This finding suggests that the asymmetry between players serves as a 
coordination device and thus it may solve the coordination failure problem in volunteer's 
dilemma games (Diekmann, 1985, 1993).  
Next we look at the behavior of players in the symmetric weakest-link contest. 
The striking difference between the weakest-link contest and the two other contests is 
that, in the weakest-link contest, all players expend very similar efforts. Table 4.4.1 
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reports that player 1 on average expends effort of 7.7 and players 2 and 3 expend efforts 
of 7. In the Pareto dominant equilibrium all players should expend 7.5 as their effort.
53
 
Result 3: In the weakest-link contest both strong and weak players expend similar 
positive efforts, at levels consistent with the Pareto dominant equilibrium. 
  
Figure 4.4.3 – Distribution of Effort in the Weakest-Link Contest 
It is important to emphasize, however, that nearly 50% of all individual efforts do 
not precisely coincide with the minimum individual effort within the group (the effective 
group effort in Table 4.4.1) suggesting some coordination failure. Figure 4.4.3 displays 
the distribution of efforts in the weakest-link contest. Most frequently, strong and weak 
players coordinate their efforts around 5. Consequently, the average effective group effort 
of 4.8 is lower than the optimal Pareto dominant effort of 7.5. Figure 4.4.4 displays the 
dynamics of the average effort and the standard deviation in the weakest-link contest. As 
players become more experienced, the within-group standard deviation decreases. This is 
                                                 
53
 Based on a standard Wald test, conducted on estimates of a random effect model, we cannot reject the 
hypothesis that the weak players expend the Pareto equilibrium effort (p-value = 0.12 when we use the first 
15 periods and p-value = 0.26 when we use the last 15 periods). The strong players expend significantly 
higher efforts than the equilibrium in the first 15 periods of the experiment (p-value < 0.05), however, there 
is no significant difference in the last 15 periods (p-value = 0.73). 
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a good indication of convergence towards the equilibrium prediction of symmetric 
efforts. At equilibrium, of course, the standard deviation should be zero. 
 
Figure 4.4.4 – Average Effort in the Weakest-Link Contest 
Overall, the behavior we observe in the weakest-link contest is consistent with the 
Pareto dominant equilibrium. This finding contrasts with the early literature on 
coordination games with Pareto-ranked equilibria (Van Huyck et al., 1990, 1991; Cooper 
et al., 1990, 1992). The seminal studies by Van Huyck et al. (1990) and Cooper et al. 
(1990) document that coordination failure is a common phenomenon in the laboratory. A 
number of studies have tried to resolve the coordination failure through pre-play 
communication (Van Huyck et al., 1992), repetition and fixed-matching protocols (Clark 
and Sefton, 2001), and gradual increase in the group size (Weber, 2006). Our experiment 
points out that introduction of between-group competition may be a simple solution to the 
coordination failure problem.
54
 
                                                 
54
 Similar result is established by Bornstein et al. (2002), who find that competition between groups 
improves collective efficiency relative to the base line treatment of Van Huyck et al. (1990). The main 
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The fairly strong correspondence to the equilibrium predictions in the best-shot 
and weakest-link contests (Results 2 and 3) suggests that over-contribution of efforts by 
strong and weak players in the perfect-substitutes contest (Result 1) is due not only to 
errors or misunderstanding of the contest but also to the result of “intentional” over-
bidding behavior.
55
 A rapidly developing literature in economics on social group identity 
may have an explanation for such behavior (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000, 2005; Chen and 
Li, 2008). By expending positive efforts in the perfect-substitutes contest players always 
contribute to the group performance, which is not necessarily true for the best-shot or 
weakest-link contest. Therefore, subjects participating in the perfect-substitutes contest 
may identify themselves as a group and be influenced by this group identification (Kugler 
et al., 2005). Obviously, the group identification shifts players‟ attention from self-
interested profit-maximizing behavior to altruistic group-maximizing behavior and thus 
may cause over-contribution of efforts.
56
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
difference of our study is that all players in the losing group had to forfeit their efforts, whereas in 
Bornstein et al. they simply received zero payoffs. 
55
 The QRE makes relatively similar predictions about the over-contribution of efforts in the perfect-
substitutes and best-shot contests (left and middle panels in Figure 4.1). However, the estimated level of 
error (λ=1.22) in the best-shot contest is significantly different from the estimated level of error (λ=2.42) in 
the perfect-substitutes contest based on the standard likelihood ratio test (p-value < 0.01).  
56
 Players 1, 2, and 3 receive the total prize of 120 = 60+30+30. Thus, if all players in group G (group B) 
maximize their total group payoff, instead of maximizing individual payoffs, then the equilibrium group 
effort should be 30, instead of 15 (Table 4.4.1). This equilibrium effort is derived from a simple contest 
between two players for a prize of value 120 (Tullock, 1980). If the above argument is correct and social 
group identity promotes individual members to act as one, then the average group effort observed in the 
experiment is only 30% higher than the equilibrium group effort (40.5 versus 30). The magnitude of such 
over-contribution is consistent with the findings of other experimental studies on contests between 
individual players (Anderson and Stafford, 2003; Sheremeta, 2009a,b). 
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B. Asymmetric Contests 
The asymmetric contests had two asymmetric groups competing against each 
other under three different contest rules. Table 4.4.2 summarizes the average individual 
and group efforts in all asymmetric contests. As in the symmetric case, weak players 2 
and 3 in the asymmetric perfect-substitutes contest expend positive efforts, although the 
equilibrium predicts positive effort only for strong player 1. This is consistent with the 
previous Result 1. In line with Result 2, most of the efforts in the asymmetric best-shot 
contest are made by strong players while weak players free-ride. Finally, in line with 
Result 3, strong and weak players in the asymmetric weakest-link contest learn to 
coordinate their efforts at the same level. 
Table 4.4.2 – Average Effort and Probability of Winning in Asymmetric Contests 
 
The unique feature of contests between asymmetric groups is that, depending on 
the contest rule, either group G or group B has a higher probability of winning. For 
example, theory predicts that in the perfect-substitutes contest, group G has a higher 
chance of winning. The data clearly rejects this prediction. We estimated a probit model 
where the dependent variable is winning and the independent variables are individual 
subject dummies, session dummies, and a dummy for group G. The group G dummy-
variable is negative and significant (p-value < 0.01).  
1 2, 3 Total Effective Equilibrium Actual
G 21.6 0 25.0 (1.3) 7.2 (0.6) 39.5 39.5 0.60 0.41
B 14.4 0 19.1 (1.1) 12.0 (0.6) 43.1 43.1 0.40 0.59
G 21.6 0 32.9 (1.2) 4.1 (0.6) 41.0 34.3 0.60 0.56
B 14.4 0 19.4 (1.5) 5.9 (0.6) 31.2 24.5 0.40 0.44
G 3.3 3.3 7.5 (0.4) 5.6 (0.2) 18.8 4.0 0.33 0.42
B 6.7 6.7 7.2 (0.4) 6.8 (0.2) 20.8 4.9 0.67 0.58
Standard error of the mean in parentheses
 Treatment Group
Equilibrium 
Effort of Player
 Weakest-link
Probability of 
Winning
1 2, 3
 Perfect-substitutes
 Best-shot
Average Effort                  
of Player
Group Effort
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Result 4: Contrary to theoretical predictions, group G wins significantly less in the 
perfect-substitutes contest than group B. 
Although this result is not consistent with the equilibrium, it is in line with the 
unpredicted over-contribution of efforts by weak players (Result 1). Theory predicts that 
player 1B, whose valuation is 60, should be discouraged by player 1G, whose valuation is 
90. Given that the effective competition in equilibrium is only between strong players, 
group G should have a higher probability of winning the contest. But Table 4.4.2 shows 
that, in the perfect-substitutes contest, player 1B is not discouraged by player 1G.
57
 
Moreover, player 1B receives significantly more support from weak players 2B and 3B 
than player 1G receives from players 2G and 3G.
58
 As a result, instead of winning the 
contest 40% of the time, group B wins the contest 59% of the time. 
In the best-shot and weakest-link contests the story is quite different. Consistent 
with theoretical predictions, group G wins more often in the best-shot contest than group 
B. The estimation of a random effect probit model, where the dependent variable is 
winning and the independent variable is a dummy for group G, indicates significant 
difference (p-value < 0.01). Theory also predicts that group G has a lower probability of 
winning the weakest-link contest. This prediction is supported by the data (p-value < 
0.01). 
                                                 
57
 Note that although the equilibrium effort of player 1B in the asymmetric perfect-substitutes contest 
(Table 4.4.2) is lower than in the symmetric perfect-substitutes contest (Table 4.4.2), the actual average 
efforts are almost identical, indicating no discouragement effect. This finding is consistent with 
experimental study of Anderson and Stafford (2003) who do not find evidence for a discouragement effect 
in a simple contest between heterogeneous individuals. 
58
 Two pilot experiments employed a treatment in which there were 2 symmetric groups with 4 players in 
each group. The valuation for the dominant player 1 was 20 and the valuations for players 2, 3, and 4 were 
16, 12, and 8. In this contest, the low valuation players not only expended positive efforts but these efforts 
were proportional to players‟ valuations. This can explain why in the asymmetric perfect-substitutes 
contests players 2B and 3B expend higher efforts than players 2G and 3G. 
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Result 5: Consistent with theoretical predictions, group G wins more often than 
group B in the best-shot contest and less often in the weakest-link contest. 
Why does group G win the best-shot contest but lose the weakest-link contest? 
The outcome of the best-shot contest depends only on strong players. As previously 
established (Result 2), neither 1G nor 1B players receive any significant support from 
weak players in best-shot contests. Consequently, competition occurs between strong 
players only, with player 1G having a higher valuation and thus a substantial advantage 
over player 1B. On the other hand, the outcome of the weakest-link contest depends only 
on the weakest player in each group. Since the weakest player in group G has a lower 
valuation than in group B (15 versus 30), group G has a lower probability of winning the 
contest.
59
 
The findings described in this section answer one of the questions that we posed 
in the introduction, namely, which firm will win the patent contest: the “Good Manager” 
firm with the better motivated manager or the “Bad Manager” firm with the better 
motivated workers? It turns out that the outcome of the competition depends upon the 
underlying rules. The firm with the better motivated manager is more likely to win the 
best-shot contest (Result 5), while the firm with the better motivated workers is more 
likely to win the weakest-link or perfect-substitutes contests (Results 4 and 5). 
Another interpretation of our results relates to managerial compensation schemes. 
Let‟s say a CEO has a bonus pool which can be used to motivate a team of one manager 
and several workers. By wisely accounting for the type of underlying contest, the CEO 
                                                 
59
 Table 4.4.2 shows that in the weakest-link contest the strong player in group G expends significantly 
higher effort than weak players. One interpretation of this observation is that the strong player tries to 
coordinate with weak players at a substantially higher level than the equilibrium, because the prize 
valuation of the strong player is six times higher than the prize valuation of weak players. 
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can increase the team‟s chance of success. For example, if the team is participating in the 
best-shot type of contest then CEO should allocate the largest bonus to the manager. 
However, if winning the contest requires considerable coordination (as in the weakest-
link contest) or high level of joint effort (as in the perfect-substitutes contest) then it 
might not be optimal to allocate a very large bonus to the manager. 
 
C. A Comparison of Contest Rules 
This section shows how a contest designer (or an administrator) can meet a given 
objective by manipulating contest rules. In our case a designer has a choice between three 
contest rules: perfect-substitutes, best-shot, and weakest-link.
60
 The objective varies 
between contests (Tullock, 1988). In sports or social benefit programs the designer‟s 
objective is to maximize the total effort expended. In rent-seeking contests, the designer‟s 
objective may be to minimize the total effort expended, and thus to increase individual 
payoffs. For a patent race or innovation tournament the objective of the designer is to 
maximize the effort expended by the strongest contestant. Of course, the analysis in this 
section is subject to the specific parametric restrictions used in our experiment such as the 
group size and individual valuations. It is also assumed that the contest designer has a full 
control over the rule of the contest, which in many real life contests may not be the case. 
                                                 
60
 In developing countries like Nigeria, India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, governments continuously target 
to eliminate polio – an acute viral infectious disease. To encourage this process, the government can use a 
contest: the region which performs the best in eradicating polio will receive a fund which can be distributed 
among the districts of the region. The winning region can be determined in three ways: (1) the region with 
the lowest number of total new polio patients in a year, (2) the region which has the lowest number of polio 
patients in a best district, (3) the region which has the lowest number of polio patients in a worst district. 
The first option corresponds to the perfect-substitutes, the second option is the best-shot, and the third 
option is the weakest-link. 
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Nevertheless, we believe that the following analysis provides interesting insights that are 
worth reporting. 
 
Figure 4.4.5 – Total Group Effort 
Consider first what type of contest maximizes a group‟s total effort. Figure 4.4.5 
shows the overall dynamics of a group‟s total effort in all contests. As players become 
more experienced, the average effort decreases in all contests. A simple regression of 
effort on the number of periods played shows a significant negative relationship. The 
declining trend resembles the findings from the public goods literature (Ledyard, 1995). 
It is also consistent with the experimental studies of contests between individual players 
(Millner and Pratt, 1989, 1991; Davis and Reilly, 1998; Sheremeta, 2009a,b). More 
importantly, perfect-substitutes contests generate the highest total effort among all 
contests, followed by best-shot contests. The lowest effort expended is in weakest-link 
contests. The differences are significant based on the estimation of random effect models, 
where the dependent variable is a group effort and the independent variables are a period 
trend and a treatment dummy-variable (p-value < 0.05). 
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Result 6: Among all contests, perfect-substitutes contests generate the highest 
total effort expended, followed by best-shot and then weakest-link contests. 
Another performance measure is the amount of free-riding in different contests. 
Usually, a free-riding behavior is defined as an effort of 0. This definition is stronger than 
the one used by Isaac and Walker (1988), who defined players contributing less than one 
third of the endowment as “strong free-riders”. Figure 4.4.6 shows the overall dynamics 
of free-riding (effort of 0) in each treatment of our experiment (at equilibrium, 67% of all 
players should free-ride in perfect-substitutes and best-shot contests and 0% in weakest-
link contests). The graph highlights extreme variations in free-riding between contests 
with almost 60% free-riders in the best-shot contests, 30% – in the perfect-substitutes 
contests, and less than 1% – in the weakest-link contests. 
Result 7: Most free-riding behavior occurs in the best-shot contests, followed by 
perfect-substitutes, and there is almost no free-riding in the weakest-link contests. 
 
Figure 4.4.6 – Fraction of Free-Riders (Players Who Expend Effort of 0) 
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The free-riding behavior observed in our experiment is consistent with the early 
conjectures of Harrison and Hirshleifer (1989). They predicted that free-riding behavior 
disappears under the weakest-link rule and is amplified under the best-shot rule. 
Disregarding a noticeable difference between public good games and contests, we find 
that the same ranking of free-riding behavior as in public good games also applies to 
contests. This information is important for a contest designer whose objective may be 
either to reduce or to amplify the free-riding behavior in the contest between groups. 
 
Figure 4.4.7 – Effort of Strong Player as a Fraction of Group Total Effort  
In a patent race or innovation tournament, a contest designer may have an 
objective of getting strong players, who usually come up with much better ideas, to 
expend the highest efforts within their groups. This can be done by manipulating the 
contest rules. Figure 4.4.7 shows that about 70% of total efforts in best-shot contests 
come from strong players, which decreases to 50% when moving to perfect-substitutes 
and to 40% in weakest-link contests. The differences are significant at the 0.01 level, 
based on the estimation of random effect models. 
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Result 8: Strong players expend the highest relative efforts in best-shot contests, 
followed by perfect-substitutes and then weakest-link contests. 
Results 6, 7, and 8 point us to the general conclusion that the advantage of one 
contest rule over another comes at a cost. For example, to reduce free-riding, a contest 
designer could choose the weakest-link contest (Result 7). However, by doing so the 
designer should anticipate the weakest-link contest to generate the lowest total effort 
expended (Result 6), as well as weak performance of strong players (Result 8). 
 
D. The Determinants of Effort 
This section provides a multivariate analysis in order to indentify the determinants 
of effort. To capture heterogeneity across subjects, we use random effect models with 
individual subject effects. The regressions are of the following form: 
- -
 (3) 
where  is player ‟s effort in a period ,  denotes whether player  
won in the previous period, -  and -  denote own group 
effort and other group effort in a period . To allow for time effects, all regressions 
include an inverse of a period trend . All regressions also include dummy-variables 
to capture contest asymmetry and session effects. The results of the estimation are 
presented in Table 4.4.3. Specifications (1) and (2) use the data from perfect-substitutes 
contests, specifications (3) and (4) use the data from best-shot contests, and specifications 
(5) and (6) use the data from weakest-link contests. 
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The significant risk coefficient in specifications (1) and (2) implies that the more 
subjects choose risky lotteries, indicating a higher willingness to take risk, the higher 
their effort is in perfect-substitutes contests.
61
 This finding is consistent with the findings 
of other experimental studies on contests (Miller and Pratt, 1991; Sheremeta, 2009a). 
Note that the risk coefficient is not significant in specifications (3) through (6). This 
suggests that risk attitudes may affect individual behavior differently in best-shot and 
weakest-link contests than in perfect-substitutes contests. 
Table 4.4.3 – Determinants of Effort (Random-Effect Models) 62 
 
In all specifications of Table 4.4.3 the group-lag coefficient is positive and 
significant. This means that subjects are adjusting their efforts in period  to reflect their 
                                                 
61
 As we described in Section 3.3, in our experiment we elicited a measure of risk attitudes from a series of 
lotteries. In these lotteries subjects were given a choice between a safe option A and a risky option B. 
62
 We also tried estimating alternative regression models. By interacting explanatory variables with 
asymmetry dummy-variable, we found that in the asymmetric perfect-substitutes and best-shot contests the 
othergroup-lag coefficient is significantly higher than in the symmetric contests. On the other hand, in the 
asymmetric weakest-link contest the othergroup-lag coefficient is significantly lower than in the symmetric 
weakest-link contest. One possible explanation for this is that the othergroup-lag coefficient is correlated 
with the total equilibrium effort (in the design of our experiment, asymmetry increases the total equilibrium 
effort in perfect-substitutes and best-shot contests while it decreases the total equilibrium effort in weakest-
link contests). 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable, effort 
Player 1 Player 2-3 Player 1 Player 2-3 Player 1 Player 2-3
risk 1.04* 0.66* 0.16 -0.47 -0.12 -0.06
    [number of risky options B] (0.53) (0.31) (0.48) (0.36) (0.12) (0.10)
win-lag -0.33 -0.06 -1.98 0.12 0.49 0.4
    [1 if group won in period t -1] (0.98) (0.50) (1.10) (0.44) (0.43) (0.21)
group-lag 0.19** 0.10** 0.10** 0.04** 0.33* 0.37**
    [group effort in period  t -1] (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.13) (0.06)
othergroup-lag 0.03 0.03* 0.07* 0.03 0.26* 0.15*
    [other group effort in period  t -1] (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.12) (0.06)
period-trend 10.17* 11.33** 18.49** 11.77** 8.50** 7.15**
    [inverse of a period trend 1/t ] (4.82) (2.45) (5.19) (2.04) (2.09) (1.06)
asymmetry 2.64** -1.33** 9.52** -0.37 -0.09 -0.56**
    [1 if contest is asymmetric] (0.93) (0.47) (1.16) (0.45) (0.42) (0.21)
Observations 696 1392 696 1392 696 1392
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%
In each regression we include dummies to control for session effects
All models include a random effects error structure, with the individual subject effects
Perfect-Substitutes Best-Shot Weakest-Link
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group effort in period .
63
 Note that the group-lag coefficient in specifications (5) and 
(6) is the highest due to high coordination incentives in weakest-link contests. The 
significant othergroup-lag coefficient indicates that the efforts expended by subjects in 
one group also have an effect on the efforts of the rival group. The significant positive 
inverse of the period-trend in all regressions indicates that both strong and weak players 
decrease their efforts with the repetition of the game. 
Overall, the coefficient asymmetry capturing group asymmetry has signs that are 
consistent with theoretical predictions. Theory predicts that by moving from symmetric to 
asymmetric perfect-substitutes and best-shot contests the strong player‟s effort should 
increase. This theoretical prediction is supported by positive and significant asymmetry 
coefficients in specifications (1) and (3). On the other hand, the behavior of weak players 
should not be affected by the asymmetry. This theoretical prediction is supported for the 
best-shot (specification 4) but not for the perfect-substitutes (specification 2). Theory also 
predicts that as we move from symmetric to asymmetric weakest-link contests, both 
strong and weak players should decrease their efforts. We find support for this prediction 
from estimation of specifications (5) and (6). 
 
4.5 Discussion and Conclusions 
This experiment shows that individual behavior in contests between symmetric 
and asymmetric groups depends upon a player‟s type and the rules that regulate the 
competition. In contests, where individual efforts are perfect substitutes, both strong and 
                                                 
63
 Croson et al. (2005) find that subjects in the linear public goods game attempt to match the average 
contributions of others, while in the weakest-link public goods game they attempt to match the minimum 
contribution of others. 
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weak players significantly over-contribute their efforts. As a result, perfect-substitutes 
contests generate the highest level of group effort among all contests. In best-shot 
contests, where the performance of a group depends on the best performer within the 
group, most of the effort is expended by strong players while weak players free-ride. In 
weakest-link contests, where the group performance depends on the worst performer 
within the group, there is almost no free-riding and all players expend similar positive 
efforts. 
What are the implications of our findings? First, our findings point out that 
introduction of between-group competition and asymmetry between players (as in the 
weakest-link and best-shot contests) may solve the coordination failure problem in games 
with Pareto-ranked equilibria (such as the minimum effort and best-shot public goods 
games). Second, our findings have direct implications for designing an optimal contest 
between groups. For example, if the designer of a contest wants to encourage the highest 
performance from the strongest players, he should employ a best-shot contest. In such a 
contest, as our results point out, most of the efforts within a group will be made by strong 
players. If the objective is to reduce free-riding, the contest designer should choose to use 
the weakest-link contest. It is important to emphasize, however, that choosing one contest 
over another comes at a cost. By choosing the best-shot contest, the designer should 
anticipate strong free-riding behavior from weak players. By choosing the weakest-link 
contest, the designer should anticipate little group effort as well as poor performance by 
strong players. 
The results of our experiments can also help to explain some of the findings in the 
psychological literature on “burnout” – a phenomenon characterized by feelings of 
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exhaustion from work.
64
 In particular, studies show that in Asian countries, such as 
Japan, the incidences of burnout are much higher than in the US (Golembiewski et al., 
1996). One possible explanation is that the competition between US firms, which are 
more hierarchical with managers playing the major roles, resembles a best-shot contest, 
whereas the competition between Japanese firms, which are more horizontal with 
individual workers playing important roles (Aoki, 1990), resembles a perfect-substitutes 
contest. In our experiment, we find that perfect-substitutes contests generate much higher 
competition and thus could induce higher burnout rate than best-shot contests. To reduce 
incidences of burnout, most psychological studies suggest implementing individual-
centered solutions, reasoning that “it is easier and cheaper to change people than 
organizations” (Maslach and Goldberg, 1998; Maslach we al., 2001). Our findings 
suggest this is not necessarily true. By organizing companies‟ work teams in specific 
ways, with specific rules, one can effectively control the competitive environment within 
a workplace and thus control the burnout rate within each team.  
This study opens a new avenue for future research. First, it is important to further 
investigate how individual behavior changes when there are more than two groups in a 
contest or more than three players within each group. Second, it would be interesting to 
see how robust our findings are under alternative contest success functions and convex 
costs (Baik et al., 2001; Esteban and Ray, 2001). Another extension is to allow sequential 
contribution of efforts by weak players and then by strong players within each group. 
                                                 
64
 Two experimental studies by Amegashie et al. (2007) and Muller and Schotter (2009) implicitly address 
the issue of burnout in competitive economic environments. 
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Such modification should not change the Nash equilibrium of the contest.
65
 However, 
behaviorally, sequential and simultaneous contests are very different. It is likely that the 
sequential design will lead subjects to behave more in the line with theoretical predictions 
(Harrison and Hishleifer, 1989). Future research should also consider other realistic 
extensions to the group-contest setting, including budget constraints, incomplete 
information, communication, and endogenous group formation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
65
 It will, however, provide a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in the best-shot and weakest-link 
contests. 
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4.7 Appendix 
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS 
This is an experiment in the economics of strategic decision making. Various 
research agencies have provided funds for this research. The instructions are simple.  If 
you follow them closely and make appropriate decisions, you can earn an appreciable 
amount of money. 
The experiment will proceed in three parts. Each part contains decision problems 
that require you to make a series of economic choices which determine your total 
earnings. The currency used in Part 1 of the experiment is U.S. Dollars. The currency 
used in Parts 2 and 3 of the experiment is francs. Francs will be converted to U.S. Dollars 
at a rate of _50_ francs to _1_ dollar. At the end of today‟s experiment, you will be paid 
in private and in cash. 18 participants are in today‟s experiment. 
It is very important that you remain silent and do not look at other people‟s work. 
If you have any questions, or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an 
experimenter will come to you. If you talk, laugh, exclaim out loud, etc., you will be 
asked to leave and you will not be paid. We expect and appreciate your cooperation.  
At this time we proceed to Part 1 of the experiment. 
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR PART 1 
YOUR DECISION 
In this part of the experiment you will be asked to make a series of choices in 
decision problems. How much you receive will depend partly on chance and partly on the 
choices you make. The decision problems are not designed to test you. What we want to 
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know is what choices you would make in them. The only right answer is what you really 
would choose. 
For each line in the table in the next page, please state whether you prefer option 
A or option B. Notice that there are a total of 15 lines in the table but just one line will be 
randomly selected for payment. You ignore which line will be paid when you make your 
choices. Hence you should pay attention to the choice you make in every line. After you 
have completed all your choices a token will be randomly drawn out of a bingo cage 
containing tokens numbered from 1 to 15. The token number determines which line is 
going to be paid. 
Your earnings for the selected line depend on which option you chose: If you 
chose option A in that line, you will receive $1. If you chose option B in that line, you 
will receive either $3 or $0. To determine your earnings in the case you chose option B 
there will be second random draw. A token will be randomly drawn out of the bingo cage 
now containing twenty tokens numbered from 1 to 20. The token number is then 
compared with the numbers in the line selected (see the table). If the token number shows 
up in the left column you earn $3. If the token number shows up in the right column you 
earn $0. 
 Are there any questions? 
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Participant ID _________ 
 
Decis
ion 
no. 
Optio
n A 
Option 
B 
Please  
choose  
A or B 
1 $1 $3   never 
$0   if 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13, 
       14,15, 16,17,18,19,20 
 
2 $1 $3   if 1 comes out 
$0   if 2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13, 
       14,15, 16,17,18,19,20 
 
3 $1 $3   if 1 or 2 comes out 
$0   if 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15, 
       16,17,18,19,20 
 
4 $1 $3   if 1,2 or 3 
$0   if  4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15, 
       16,17,18,19,20 
 
5 $1 $3   if 1,2,3,4 
$0   if  5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,  
       16,17,18,19,20 
 
6 $1 $3   if 1,2,3,4,5 
$0   if 6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,  
       16,17,18,19,20 
 
7 $1 $3   if 1,2,3,4,5,6 
$0   if 7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,  
       16,17,18,19,20 
 
8 $1 $3   if 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 
$0   if 8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,  
       16,17,18,19,20 
 
9 $1 $3   if 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8 
$0   if 9,10,11,12,13,14,15,  
       16,17,18,19,20 
 
10 $1 $3   if 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9 
$0   if 10,11,12,13,14,15,  
       16,17,18,19,20 
 
11 $1 $3   if 1,2, 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 $0   if 11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20  
12 $1 $3   if 1,2, 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11 $0   if 12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20  
13 $1 $3   if 1,2, 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12 $0   if 13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20  
14 $1 
$3   if 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10  
       11,12,13 
$0   if 14,15,16,17,18,19,20  
15 $1 
$3   if 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10  
       11,12,13,14 
$0   if 15,16,17,18,19,20  
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR PART 2 
YOUR DECISION 
The second part of the experiment consists of 30 decision-making periods. At the 
beginning of each period, you will be randomly and anonymously placed into a group of 
3 people (group A or B). Either group A or group B will receive the reward of 120 francs 
at the end of each period. In addition to your group assignment you will also be randomly 
assigned a specific type in the group (type 1, 2, or 3). Your type will determine how the 
reward is shared within the group. Each period your group as well as your type will be 
changed. 
Each period you will be given an initial endowment of 60 francs and asked to 
decide how much to allocate to the group account or the individual account. You may 
allocate any integer number of francs between 0 and 60. An example of your decision 
screen is shown below.   
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At the beginning of each period you will see which group and what type you are 
assigned to (as shown at the top of the screen). You will also see the composition of both 
group A and group B, thus you will know the types of participants in both groups (as 
shown on the right and left columns of the screen). 
 
YOUR EARNINGS 
After all participants have made their decisions, your earnings for the period are 
calculated. These earnings will be converted to cash and paid at the end of the experiment 
if the current period is one of the five periods that is randomly chosen for payment. 
Type 1 earnings from the 
group account (if Group A 
receives the reward) 
Your Group and 
Type 
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1) Your period earnings are the sum of the earnings from your individual account 
and the earnings from your group account. 
2) For each franc in your individual account, you will earn 1 franc in return. So, if 
you keep all 60 francs that you are endowed with to your individual account you 
will earn 60 francs. But you can also earn some francs from your group account. 
3) By contributing to the group account you are increasing the chance of receiving 
the reward for your group. If the total number of francs in your group account 
exceeds the total number of francs in the other group account, your group has 
higher chance of receiving the reward. If your group receives the reward then in 
addition to the earnings from your individual account you receive the reward from 
your group account which is determined by your type. A group can never 
guarantee itself the reward. However, by increasing your contribution, you can 
increase your group‟s chance of receiving the reward. 
4) The computer will assign the reward either to your group or to the other group, 
via a random draw. So, in each period, only one of the two groups can obtain the 
reward. 
 
Example 1. Random Draw 
This is a hypothetical example used to illustrate how the computer is making a 
random draw. Think of the random draw in the following way. For each franc in group 
A‟s account the computer puts 1 red token into a bingo cage and for each franc in group 
B‟s account the computer puts 1 blue token. Then the computer randomly draws one 
token out of the bingo cage. If the drawn token is red group A receives the reward, if the 
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token is blue group B receives the reward. Assume that members of both group A and B 
have allocated their francs in the following way (as shown on the Table 1 below). 
Table 1 – Allocation of francs by all types in group A and B 
Group 
A 
If Group 
A 
receives 
reward 
Allocation  
to the 
individual 
account 
Allocation  
to the 
group  
account 
 
Group 
B 
If Group 
B 
receives 
reward 
Allocation  
to the 
individual 
account 
Allocation  
to the 
group  
account 
Type 1 
Type 2 
Type 3 
60 
30 
30 
40 
45 
50 
20 
15 
10 
 Type 1 
Type 2 
Type 3 
60 
30 
30 
50 
60 
55 
10 
0 
5 
Total 120 135 45  Total 120 165 15 
Group A members have allocated total of 45 francs to the group account while 
group B members only 15 francs. Thus, the computer will place 45 red tokens and 15 
blue tokens into the bingo cage (60 tokens total). Then the compute will randomly draw 
one token out of the bingo cage. You can see that since group A has contributed more it 
has higher chance of receiving the reward (45 out of 60 times group A will receive the 
reward). Group B has lower chance of receiving the reward (15 out of 60 times group B 
will receive the reward). 
5) After all contributions are made, the computer makes a random draw. Each 
member of the group that receives the reward will receive the reward according to 
his or her type. Not all types receive the same reward. For example, if you are 
type 1 in group A and your group received the reward, you earn 60 francs from 
group account. As mentioned earlier, at each period your group as well as your 
type will be changed. Sometimes you will be a member of group A, sometimes a 
member of group B. Sometimes you will be type 1, sometimes type 2 or 3. 
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Example 2. Total Earnings 
This example illustrates the calculation of earnings. In Example 1, group A had 
45 francs while group B had 15 francs in the group account. Let‟s say the computer made 
a random draw and group A received the reward. Thus, all the members of group A 
receive the reward according to their types from the group account plus they also receive 
earnings from the individual account. All members of group B receive earnings only from 
the individual account, since group B did not receive the reward. The calculation of the 
total earnings is shown in Table 2 below. 
Table 2 – Calculation of earning for all types in group A and B 
Group 
A 
Earnings 
from 
group 
account 
Earnings 
from 
individual 
account 
Total 
earnings 
 
Group 
B 
Earnings 
from 
group 
account 
Earnings 
from 
individual 
account 
Total 
earnings 
Type 1 
Type 2 
Type 3 
60 
30 
30 
40 
45 
50 
60+40 = 100 
30+45   = 75 
30+50   = 80 
 Type 1 
Type 2 
Type 3 
0 
0 
0 
50 
60 
55 
50 
60 
55 
Total 120 135 255  Total 0 165 165 
At the end of each period, the total number of francs in the two groups‟ accounts, 
group which received the reward, earnings from individual and group accounts, and total 
earnings for the period are reported on the outcome screen as shown below. Please record 
your results for the period on your record sheet under the appropriate heading. 
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IMPORTANT NOTES 
 You will not be told which of the participants in this room are assigned to which 
group and to which type. At the beginning of each period your group as well as your type 
will be randomly changed. A group can never guarantee itself the reward. However, by 
increasing your contribution, you can increase your group‟s chance of receiving the 
reward. 
At the end of the experiment we will randomly choose 5 of the 30 periods for 
actual payment in Part 2 using a bingo cage. You will sum the total earnings for these 5 
periods and convert them to a U.S. dollar payment. 
Are there any questions? 
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR PART 3 
The third part of the experiment consists of 30 decision-making periods. The rules 
for part 3 are exactly the same as the rules for part 2. The only difference is that in part 3 
the rewards for different types in group A and B are different than in part 2: 
 Group A Reward  Group B Reward 
Type 1 
Type 2 
Type 3 
90 
15 
15 
 Type 1 
Type 2 
Type 3 
60 
30 
30 
Total 120  Total 120 
 
IMPORTANT NOTES 
 You will not be told which of the participants in this room are assigned to which 
group and to which type. At the beginning of each period your group as well as your type 
will be randomly changed. A group can never guarantee itself the reward. However, by 
increasing your contribution, you can increase your group‟s chance of receiving the 
reward. 
At the end of the experiment we will randomly choose 5 of the 30 periods for 
actual payment in Part 3 using a bingo cage. You will sum the total earnings for these 5 
periods and convert them to a U.S. dollar payment. 
Are there any questions? 
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